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I. AN ACCOMPANYING LETTER
We are of one mind in recommending for consideration the thoughtful
report developed by the Presidential Succession Clinic of the Fordham
University School of Law. We were pleased to participate in the Fordham
Law Review program that preceded the establishment of the Clinic and led
to the publication of an issue of the journal, entitled The Adequacy of the
Presidential Succession System in the 21st Century: Filling the Gaps and
Clarifying the Ambiguities in Constitutional and Extraconstitutional
Arrangements, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 775–1160 (2010). The program was a
unique, but highly practical, academic undertaking. We each also
participated in a class with the Clinic, sharing our experiences with the
students and responding to their questions.
We are each aware from our own public service of the importance of
anticipating and developing approaches to the handling of contingencies
that, if they occurred, could endanger our nation. We have been reminded
time and again that what may appear at one time to be remote does in fact
occur. Luckily, we have met past challenges and have taken steps to
improve our system, but we have not addressed every gap.
The accompanying Report, entitled Ensuring the Stability of Presidential
Succession in the Modern Era: Report of the Fordham University School of
Law’s Clinic on Presidential Succession, is important for many reasons. It
provides a thorough history of our nation’s three succession statutes,
examines the Twenty-Fifth Amendment that has served the nation well, and
discusses political party rules and procedures for responding to succession
contingencies in the pre-inaugural period. The three professors and nine
students of Fordham Law School who have studied the system of
presidential succession and developed this Report offer recommendations
worthy of careful attention regardless of one’s point of view on the subject
generally or on any particular recommendation. Fordham Law School has
made valuable contributions in the field of presidential succession, and this
Report is the latest and possibly most immediately constructive.
We thank Fordham Law School, its deans, professors, and students, for
inviting us to participate in this rich and vital endeavor. We have no doubt
that this Report will be of enormous benefit to decision makers and citizens
more broadly, and we urge decision makers in the federal government, as
well as our national party leadership, to give it their most serious
consideration.
Birch Bayh

Benton Becker

Fred F. Fielding
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III. FOREWORD
In April 2010, the Fordham University School of Law hosted a two-day
symposium entitled The Adequacy of the Presidential Succession System in
the 21st Century. The symposium featured many of the leading scholars on
the law and practicalities of transition in the case of the President’s
temporary inability to serve or, of far greater potential concern, a national
tragedy resulting in the death or inability of the President, Vice President,
or both.
As a result of the symposium, William Michael Treanor, then Dean of
Fordham Law School, suggested that a clinic be created to study and
propose solutions for the many and challenging issues that remain
unaddressed by the Constitution, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, and current
federal and state statutes.
A clinical seminar was thus established for the Fall 2010 and Spring
2011 terms, led by former Dean John D. Feerick, who has had a lifelong
interest in these issues, has published books and articles on them, and
worked closely with Senator Birch Bayh and others in Congress on the
drafting, passage, and ratification of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Dean
Feerick was joined by Adjunct Professor Dora Galacatos of Fordham Law
School and Senior Counsel for the Law School’s Feerick Center for Social
Justice, and Adjunct Assistant Professor Nicole A. Gordon of the Robert F.
Wagner Graduate School of Public Service at New York University, a
former chair of the New York State Bar Association Committee on the
Federal Constitution. Nine students of different backgrounds were selected
to participate in the Clinic. The course required a significant commitment
by the students in order to master the literature and intricacies of the
subjects raised by the topic.
Beyond their study, the students determined the subjects that the Report
would address. The seminar examined the question of what actual “gaps”
exist in the current succession process (i.e., those for which there is no clear
direction in law), as opposed to possible gaps for which a solution does
exist but is not ideal. The students ordered priorities among the true gaps
and decided which were the most urgent and practical to address.
A further purpose of the seminar was to make a non-partisan,
constitutionally sound, and practical contribution that could be recognized
as worthy and within the immediate reach of the political process. There
was an interest not only in producing a Report, but also in acting on it:
presenting it to decision makers in Congress, the executive branch, and the
political parties, and arguing the merits of the group’s recommendations.
The Clinic decided not to propose a constitutional amendment because of
the extreme difficulty of instituting change in this manner. Instead, the
students focused on suggestions for statutory change, exercise of executive
(and personal) powers, amendment of political party and congressional
rules, and practical plans that can be implemented in the absence of any
change in the law, but that are consistent with the Constitution and existing
succession law.
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The Clinic’s recommendations are summarized in the Executive
Summary and Part VIII of this Report. These recommendations represent
the consensus of the group and should not be attributed to any one person.
We are grateful for the assistance of numerous participants in our work
who are named in the acknowledgements and without whose contributions
we would not have understood the subject as well, as readily, or as deeply.
John D. Feerick

Dora Galacatos

Nicole A. Gordon
October 2012
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IV. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The attempted assassination in January 2011 of U.S. Representative
Gabrielle Giffords in Tucson, Arizona, highlights the fact that the safety of
our political leaders is under constant threat. The President of the United
States, more than any other individual, unites and strengthens the nation and
serves as a source of stability in crisis situations. The gaps and
contingencies that exist in the current system of presidential succession
leave our country vulnerable to a vacuum in national leadership. It is easy
to conclude that the unaddressed contingencies in the current system of
presidential succession are too remote to be of significant concern, but the
unexpected and unforeseen do occur. A catastrophic event could leave both
the President and the Vice President dead or incapacitated.
The symposium on presidential succession, sponsored by the Fordham
Law Review and held at Fordham Law School in April 2010, highlighted
weaknesses and gaps in our system of presidential succession.1 Many of
the nation’s foremost public servants in past succession crises joined with
other experts in academia, law, national security, public policy, and politics
to discuss these issues. They encouraged continued work in this field
leading to the establishment of the Clinic. In July 2010, the Presidential
Succession Clinic at the Fordham University School of Law, composed of
three professors and nine students, undertook the task of analyzing the gaps
in the presidential succession system and advancing recommendations to
address them.
The work of a law school clinic may be seen by some as a largely
academic endeavor; however, as Former Dean William Michael Treanor
noted at the symposium, “[g]iven the terrible frequency with which
Presidents fail to complete their terms of office and the frequency with
which they are disabled, any ambiguities concerning presidential succession
and any flaws in the rules governing succession have the capacity to lead to
national disaster.”2 We agree. The unforeseen and remote can occur, and
advance contingency planning can prevent confusion, or even chaos, at a
time of national distress.
The Clinic began by studying the system of presidential succession as set
forth in the text of the Constitution—Article II, Section 1, Clause 6, and the
Twelfth, Twentieth, and Twenty-Fifth Amendments—the Presidential
Succession Act of 1947, as amended (1947 Act), other federal and state
statutes, political party rules, and documents such as “letter agreements”
that provided for a transition process in certain circumstances. The Clinic
examined a broad range of proposals regarding presidential succession and
interviewed, among others, many of the experts who participated in the
Fordham symposium.
In making recommendations for reform, we were guided by five values:
1. William J. Treanor, Introduction: The Adequacy of the Presidential Succession
System in the 21st Century: Filling the Gaps and Clarifying the Ambiguities in
Constitutional and Extraconstitutional Arrangement, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 775 (2010).
2. Id. at 775–76.
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Adherence to the Constitution;



Certainty and predictability in the transition of leadership;



Legitimacy of a presidential successor in the eyes of the public;



Party continuity; and



Depth in the qualifications of possible successors.
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The Clinic studied three distinct areas: presidential and vice presidential
inabilities not provided for by the Twenty-Fifth Amendment; the line of
succession; and the pre-inaugural period.
First, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment does not address certain instances of
inability of a President or Vice President. These include:


Inability of the President when there is a vacancy in the office of
Vice President;



Dual inability of the President and Vice President;



Inability of the Vice President; and



Inability of a statutory successor while acting as President.

Second, succession to the presidency is possible through a line that
includes members of both the legislative and executive branches. The gaps
and contingencies in this area include:


The questionable constitutionality of having legislative leaders in
the line of succession;



Concerns about the qualifications and presidential pedigree of
executive officers in the line of succession;



The effects of the “bumping” provision in the current succession
law, which can result in multiple individuals exercising the
powers of the President in a short period of time; and



Lack of clarity on whether acting cabinet secretaries are in the
line of succession.

Finally, each segment within the pre-inaugural period, running up to the
start of the quadrennial presidential term on January 20, presents distinct
gaps and contingencies. We address these with particular attention to
democratic legitimacy and current political realities. They include:


Party procedures that do not adequately address the death or
resignation of a presidential or vice presidential candidate prior
to Inauguration Day;



Lack of clarity regarding the duties of presidential electors and
Congress with respect to the casting and counting of electoral
votes in the event of the death or resignation of a presidential or
vice presidential nominee, or both; and



Lack of an institutionalized process for nominating cabinet
members during the transition between presidential
administrations.

***
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The Clinic is aware of the political challenges to reform in this area.
Although we have certain preferred recommendations, we recognize the
obstacles to change and have made a range of proposals so that decision
makers may consider different options.
We also note that our
recommendations for executive action will almost all require cooperation
with the legislative branch. Some of the recommendations surely reflect
actions already taken by recent administrations, but which are not
necessarily known to the public.
A. Presidential and Vice Presidential Inability
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Constitution establishes procedures
for both filling a vacancy in the office of the Vice President and for
addressing a case of presidential inability. The Amendment’s availability in
1973 and 1974, when both the elected President and Vice President
resigned from their offices, provided essential stability and continuity at a
time of great national turmoil.
Although the Twenty-Fifth Amendment has dealt successfully with
challenges encountered since its adoption in 1967, neither the Amendment
nor the 1947 Act addresses several key threats to presidential continuity
posed by presidential or vice presidential inability.
First, the Amendment is predicated on the availability of an able Vice
President. In the event that the office of Vice President is vacant or the
Vice President, due to his own inability, is unable to act with the Cabinet
under Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, the Amendment does not
provide an alternative means for making a declaration that the President is
unable. History has shown that a vacancy or inability in the office of the
Vice President is a contingency that cannot be ignored.
Second, the Amendment does not establish a procedure for declaring the
inability of the Vice President. In the event that a President dies, resigns, or
is removed from office, a situation may arise in which an unable Vice
President would assume the presidency.
In addition, a President
anticipating a temporary inability, or one who is unable but recognizes his
own inability, will likely be reluctant to transfer his powers even briefly to
an unable Vice President. Furthermore, an unable Vice President may not
be in a position to exercise his responsibility pursuant to Section 4 to
declare a President unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.
Third, neither the Amendment nor the 1947 Act establishes procedures
for declaring the inability of an Acting President when there is no Vice
President or the Vice President is unable.
1. Presidential and Acting Presidential Inability Recommendations
a. Statutory Action
1. Acknowledge that the President or Acting President, upon
declaration of his own inability, can transfer his powers voluntarily to the

2012]

PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION IN THE MODERN ERA

15

next in the line of succession in instances of vice presidential inability or
vacancy.
2. Authorize the person next in the line of succession after the Vice
President, together with a majority of the Cabinet, to declare the inability of
the President or Acting President in instances of vice presidential inability
or vacancy.
b. Executive Contingency Planning
3. The President or Acting President should prepare a prospective
executive declaration of inability at the beginning of his service, in which
he would define the situations that, in his view, would render him unable to
discharge the powers and duties of the presidency in the future and would
provide that the declaration of his inability goes into effect based upon a
review process set out by the President or Acting President.
2. Vice Presidential Inability Recommendation
a. Executive Contingency Planning
4. The Vice President should prepare a prospective executive
declaration of inability at the beginning of his service, in which he would
define the situations that, in his view, would render him unable to discharge
the powers and duties of the vice presidency in the future and would
provide that the declaration of his inability goes into effect based upon a
review process set out by the Vice President.
B. Line of Succession
Article II of the Constitution names the Vice President as the first person
on whom the powers and duties of the presidency will devolve and
authorizes Congress to establish a line of succession after the Vice
President. The 1947 Act expands the line to include the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the President pro tempore of the Senate, and then
the cabinet secretaries in the order in which their departments were created.
Debate about the constitutionality of including legislative leaders in the
line of succession has remained a steady undercurrent in the legislative
history of the Presidential Succession Acts of 1792, 1886, and 1947. There
are two major criticisms of including legislative leaders in the line of
succession. First, some argue that the Speaker of the House and President
pro tempore of the Senate are not “Officers” within the meaning of Article
II. Second, some maintain that the inclusion of legislative officers in the
line of succession compromises the principle of separation of powers
between the executive and legislative branches.
In the case of presidential inability, the Speaker and the President pro
tempore can become Acting President in the absence of a Vice President.
Including legislators in the line of succession for this purpose is especially
problematic because they are required by statute to resign from their roles
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and seats in Congress in order to act as President and cannot simply return
to their previous positions when the inability of the President is removed.
Thus, temporarily acting as President until an inability is removed could
effectively end the political career of a legislative leader. This creates a
disincentive for a legislative leader to act as President at a time when stable
leadership is most urgent.
Moreover, the Speaker and the President pro tempore can “bump”
members of the Cabinet who are acting as President, which can result in
multiple successors serving as Acting President during a short period.
1. Line of Succession Recommendations
a. Statutory Action
5. Establish an executive line of succession that runs exclusively
through the Cabinet after the President and Vice President. In the case of
removal, death, or resignation of the President, the cabinet member
assuming the powers and duties of the presidency should be required to
resign from the Cabinet. In a case of inability, the cabinet member
assuming the powers and duties of the presidency should not be required to
resign.
6. In the event an executive line of succession is not adopted, establish
a binary line of succession that first runs through Congress, and then the
Cabinet, in instances of death, resignation, and removal. Successors would
be required to resign in these circumstances. The line of succession would
run solely through the Cabinet in instances of presidential and vice
presidential inability or failure to qualify. Under this proposal, when a
cabinet member assumes the powers and duties of the presidency, that
cabinet member would not be required to resign.
7. Confirm whether acting secretaries are included in the line of
succession, and, if so, either remove them from the line, or alternatively,
amend the 1947 Act so that acting secretaries can assume the powers and
duties of the presidency, in the order of the departments’ creation, but only
after succession has passed through all of the cabinet secretaries.
C. Pre-inaugural Period
The current system of pre-inaugural presidential succession is governed
by a legal framework based on constitutional provisions, federal and state
statutes, and political party rules. Contingencies that may occur during the
period prior to a general election are governed almost exclusively by party
rules. The political parties are authorized by their rules to fill any vacancies
in the nominations for the offices of President and Vice President.
The parties are similarly authorized to fill vacancies that may occur on
their respective national tickets after the general election, prior to the
casting of the Electoral College votes in mid-December.
The Twelfth Amendment governs contingencies that may occur between
the casting of the electoral votes in mid-December and the counting of those
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votes by Congress on January 6. The Amendment is silent, however, as to
whether Congress can invalidate electoral votes cast for a presidential or
vice presidential nominee who dies after the meeting of the Electoral
College but before Congress counts the electoral votes.
The Clinic has concluded that Congress is required to count these votes
and that it must declare the winners even if they have both died since the
meeting of the Electoral College.
The Twentieth Amendment addresses the death of either a President-elect
or Vice President elect during the fourteen days between the congressional
count of the electoral votes on January 6 and Inauguration Day on January
20. In the case of the death or resignation of the President-elect, the Vice
President elect becomes President on January 20. In the case of the death or
resignation of the Vice President elect, the new President is required to
nominate a Vice President to be approved by a majority of both houses of
Congress.
In the event of the double death of the successful presidential and vice
presidential candidates, the Speaker would become Acting President
pursuant to the 1947 Act. Such a scenario may, however, result in a change
in the party of the presidency contrary to the will of the electorate.
1. Pre-inaugural Period Recommendations
a. Political Party Rules
8. In the event of the death or resignation of a presidential candidate
before the political party conventions, require the parties to hold an open
meeting to decide which replacement candidate(s) will receive the
delegates’ votes.
9. In the event of the death or resignation of a presidential nominee
between the political party conventions and the general election, require the
parties to either hold an open meeting to select a replacement candidate or
recall the convention delegates.
10. During the period between the general election and the meeting of
the Electoral College, provide that the vice presidential candidate replaces a
deceased or resigned presidential candidate of the same ticket and that the
candidate’s party issue recommendations to the presidential electors as to a
new candidate for the office of Vice President.
b. Congressional Rules
11. In the event of the death or resignation of a presidential or vice
presidential candidate between the meeting of the Electoral College and the
counting and declaration of the electoral votes by Congress, require
Congress to count votes cast for a candidate if he was alive at the time of
the electoral vote.
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c. Executive Contingency Planning
12. During the period between the counting and declaration of electoral
votes by Congress and Inauguration Day, the outgoing President should
consider promptly nominating any Cabinet nominees the President-elect
submits to him, and Congress should confirm as many nominees as possible
prior to Inauguration Day, consistent with the proper discharge of
Congress’s advice and consent responsibility. One or more newly
confirmed cabinet secretaries should remain at a secure location outside of
Washington, D.C., on Inauguration Day. This recommendation is
particularly important in the case of an exclusively executive line of
succession, as the Clinic recommends.
D. Conclusion
The work of the Constitution’s Framers in creating a system for
presidential succession has provided stability and continuity for the nation
during many uncertain moments in its history. The Twenty-Fifth
Amendment, adopted after the assassination of President John F. Kennedy,
further buttressed the system of presidential succession by providing
mechanisms for the seamless succession of the Vice President to the
presidency in the case of a vacancy in that office, the filling of a vacancy in
the vice presidency, and addressing instances of presidential inability.
Our recommendations are designed to be consistent with the separation
of powers and the framework of checks and balances, to protect the
electorate’s choice of President and Vice President and their party for a
four-year term, and to ensure the stability and continuity of government in
the modern era. We believe the adoption of the Clinic’s recommendations
will support these goals.
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V. INABILITY AND PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION ISSUES
A. Introduction
The Framers of the Constitution constructed a succession provision that
enabled the Vice President to assume the powers and duties of the President
in the event of the death, resignation, removal, or inability of the President.3
The succession provision, however, did not cover all possible
contingencies. The adoption of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment in 1967 filled
several important gaps, but it did not provide for every instance of
presidential inability, nor did it address the case of vice presidential
inability.4 These open areas continue to present policy challenges,
constitutional issues, and questions regarding the interpretation of current
statutes.
B. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment
1. History of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
The assassination of President John F. Kennedy in 1963 renewed
Congress’s interest in providing safeguards in the event of presidential
inability.5 Senator Birch Bayh, as chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on
Constitutional Amendments, largely led these efforts.6 After conducting
extensive hearings and debates and considering the opinions of the
American Bar Association and others on the topic, Congress completed
work on what would become the Twenty-Fifth Amendment in July of
1965.7 The Amendment was ratified on February 10, 1967.8
Section 1 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment codifies the precedent set by
President John Tyler in 1841, when he assumed the office of the President
rather than the position of Acting President, upon President William Henry
Harrison’s death.9 Under Section 1, when the President dies, resigns, or is
removed from office, the Vice President becomes President, rather than

3. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (granting Congress the power to provide for
succession only in the event of dual inability and/or vacancy).
4. See id. amend. XXV.
5. See JOHN D. FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT: ITS COMPLETE HISTORY AND
APPLICATIONS 59 (2d ed. 1992).
6. See id.
7. See id. at 104–08.
8. Id.
9. See id. at 193; see also John D. Feerick, The Problem of Presidential Inability—Will
Congress Ever Solve It?, 32 FORDHAM L. REV. 73, 91–92 (1963) (citing CONG. GLOBE, 27TH
CONG., 1ST SESS., 3–4 (1841); 10 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS: COMPRISING PORTIONS
OF HIS DIARY FROM 1795 TO 1848, at 463–64 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1876)); Joel K.
Goldstein, Taking from the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Lessons in Ensuring Presidential
Continuity, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 959, 966 (2010).
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Acting President, and is no longer Vice President.10 This section is
intended to ensure that there is never a vacancy in the office of President.11
Section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment deals with a vice presidential
vacancy. When there is a vice presidential vacancy resulting either from
the death, resignation, or removal of the Vice President or from the Vice
President’s succession to the presidency upon the death, resignation, or
removal of the President, the new President must nominate a Vice
President, who is subject to confirmation by a majority of both houses of
Congress.12 The term “vacancy” does not cover an inability of the
President or Vice President.13
Sections 3 and 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment address presidential
inability. Section 3 provides a mechanism by which the President can
declare his own inability in a writing to the President pro tempore and the
Speaker, which results in the Vice President serving as Acting President
until the President declares that his inability has been removed.14 Section 4
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment sets forth the process by which the Vice
President and a majority of the Cabinet—or another body as Congress may
provide15—can act together to declare the President unable to perform the
duties of his office when he cannot, or will not, do so himself.16 The Vice
President and a majority of the Cabinet must transmit to the President pro
tempore and the Speaker their written declaration that the President is
unable to perform the duties of his office.17 In both instances, once
presidential inability is declared, the Vice President becomes Acting
President while also continuing as Vice President.18
Under Section 4, the President can dispute the determination of his
inability by declaring in writing to the President pro tempore and the
Speaker that no inability exists.19 The President then resumes his powers
and duties at the end of a four-day period unless the Vice President and
Cabinet majority object within four days of the President’s written
declaration.20 If within that four-day period the Vice President and the
Cabinet majority transmit to the President pro tempore and the Speaker a
written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the duties of his
office, the issue is then given to Congress which can, by a vote of two10. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 1.
11. See FEERICK, supra note 5, at 193.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 2.
13. See FEERICK, supra note 5, at 193–94.
14. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 3.
15. Congress has never exercised its power to substitute a body for the Cabinet to work
with the Vice President under Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.
16. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id.; see also FEERICK, supra note 5, at 204 (“Once the President announces his
recovery by transmitting an appropriate written declaration to the Speaker and the President
pro tempore, he then must wait four days before resuming his powers and duties . . . . Either
the Vice President alone or the Cabinet and Vice President can agree to the President’s
taking over immediately or at any time short of four days.”).
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thirds in each house, declare the President unable.21 If Congress does not
act within twenty-one days, or if either House supports the President, the
President resumes his powers.22 In the interim, the Vice President remains
the Acting President.23
2. Applications of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
President Gerald R. Ford was the first, and so far only, person to become
President under Section 1 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. In 1974, Vice
President Ford became President when President Richard M. Nixon
resigned from office.24
President Ford was also the first person to become Vice President under
Section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment in 1973.25 After President
Nixon’s first Vice President, Spiro Agnew, resigned, Nixon nominated
then-Representative Ford to be the new Vice President,26 and both houses
of Congress confirmed him.27 Less than a year later, Vice President Ford
became President upon President Nixon’s resignation from the presidency,
and President Ford nominated Nelson Rockefeller to be his Vice President.
Rockefeller then became Vice President under Section 2 of the TwentyFifth Amendment after both houses of Congress confirmed him in 1974.28
Although not formally recognized at the time, President Ronald Reagan
was the first to employ the procedures of Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment when he underwent anesthesia in 1985. While he followed the
requirements of Section 3 by submitting a letter to the President pro
tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House, he stated that he was
not invoking the Twenty-Fifth Amendment because he did not want to set a
precedent.29 In his letter, President Reagan explained that he did “not
believe that the drafters of this Amendment intended its application to

21. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See FEERICK, supra note 5, at 160; see also Goldstein, supra note 9, at 969.
25. See Goldstein, supra note 9, at 970.
26. Remarks Announcing Intention to Nominate Gerald R. Ford to be Vice President,
PUB. PAPERS 867–69 (Oct. 12, 1973).
27. 119 CONG. REC. 39,807, 39,899 (1973) (House of Representatives vote); 119 CONG.
REC. 38,212, 38,225 (1973) (Senate vote).
28. 120 CONG. REC. 41,419, 41,516–17 (1974) (House of Representatives vote); 120
CONG. REC. 38,918, 38,936 (1974) (Senate vote); see also FEERICK, supra note 5, at 184;
Goldstein, supra note 9, at 972 (discussing the political confirmation process at length).
29. Letter from President Ronald Reagan to the President Pro Tempore of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House on the Discharge of the President’s Powers and Duties During
His Surgery, 2 PUB. PAPERS 919 (July 13, 1985) [hereinafter Reagan Letter], available at
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1985/71385b.htm; see also HERBERT L.
ABRAMS, THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN SHOT: CONFUSION, DISABILITY, AND THE 25TH
AMENDMENT IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF RONALD REAGAN
199–200 (1992); Fred F. Fielding, Keynote Address at the Fordham Law Review
Symposium: An Eyewitness Account of Executive “Inability” (Apr. 16, 2010), in 79
FORDHAM L. REV. 823, 830 (2010) (noting that President Reagan signed a letter which
authorized the procedures of Section 3 without formally invoking it).
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situations such as the instant one.”30 President Reagan said he was
following a “long-standing arrangement” with his Vice President, rather
than the constitutional provision created for inability.31
In 2002, President George W. Bush was the first President to formally
invoke Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment in anticipation of
undergoing sedation.32 In 2007, President Bush again invoked Section 3 to
transfer presidential powers and duties to Vice President Richard Cheney
when he underwent a second procedure during his term in office.33 In both
instances, President Bush followed the process set forth in Section 3 by
transmitting a written declaration of his own inability to perform the duties
of his office to the President pro tempore and the Speaker.34 President
Bush reclaimed the powers and duties of the presidency by issuing a letter
to the President pro tempore and the Speaker on the same day in both
instances.35
Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment has never been employed,36
but it arguably could have been in the wake of the attempted assassination
of President Reagan on March 30, 1981.37 Although White House Counsel
Fred Fielding had prepared draft documents prior to the assassination
attempt providing for the invocation of either Section 3 or Section 4 of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment under such circumstances, no formal transfer of
power occurred.38 The misstatement of Secretary of State Alexander Haig,
the top Cabinet official in the line of succession, that until Vice President
30. See Reagan Letter, supra note 29; see also Fielding, supra note 29, at 830
(discussing President Reagan’s concerns in writing the letter this way).
31. See Reagan Letter, supra note 29; see also Fielding, supra note 29, at 830. After he
left office, President Reagan acknowledged invoking the Twenty-Fifth Amendment at this
time. See RONALD REAGAN, AN AMERICAN LIFE 500 (1990).
32. See Fielding, supra note 29, at 833; Adam R.F. Gustafson, Note, Presidential
Inability and Subjective Meaning, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 459, 488 (2009).
33. See Fielding, supra note 29, at 833; see also Gustafson, supra note 32, at 489.
34. Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Temporary Transfer of the Powers and
Duties of the President of the United States, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1003–04 (July 21, 2007)
[hereinafter 2007 Bush Letter on Temporary Transfer of Powers], available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=75568; Letter from President George W. Bush to
Congressional Leaders on Temporary Transfer of the Powers and Duties of President of the
United States, 1 PUB. PAPERS 1083 (June 29, 2002) [hereinafter 2002 Bush Letter on
Temporary Transfer of Powers], available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
?pid=63676.
35. Letter from President George W. Bush to Congressional Leaders on Resuming the
Powers and Duties of the President of the United States, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1004 (July 21, 2007)
[hereinafter
2007
Bush
Letter
on
Resuming
Powers],
available
at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=75573; Letter from President George W. Bush to
Congressional Leaders on Resuming the Powers and Duties of President of the United
States, 1 PUB. PAPERS 1084 (June 29, 2002) [hereinafter 2002 Bush Letter on Resuming
Powers], available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=73051.
36. John D. Feerick, Presidential Succession and Inability: Before and After the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 907, 933 (2010) (“Section 4 of the
Amendment, perhaps the strongest test the inability provisions might face, has yet to be
tested.”).
37. See Fielding, supra note 29, at 823–24 (noting that some historians argue that the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment should have been invoked at this time).
38. See id. at 827, 829.
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Bush’s return to the White House he was in charge because
“[c]onstitutionally . . . you have the President, the Vice President, and the
Secretary of State, in that order,” reflected confusion about the order of
succession.39 Chief of Staff James Baker and Edwin Meese III rejected a
discussion of a transfer of presidential power “until they learned more from
the doctors.”40 Vice President Bush made clear that he would not act as
President in the absence of a formal transfer of power.41
C. Contingencies Not Addressed by the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment provides for many—but not all—
contingencies in the event of presidential inability. Currently, there exists
no legal mechanism to declare a President unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office in the event of either a vice presidential vacancy or
inability, declare a Vice President unable to discharge the powers and duties
of his office, or declare an Acting President unable to discharge the powers
and duties of the presidency.
That the Twenty-Fifth Amendment does not address these contingencies,
referred to generally as the “inability gaps,” was not an oversight by its
drafters.42 At the time of the drafting, Representative Richard Poff asked
John D. Feerick, then a member of the American Bar Association (ABA)
Conference on Presidential Inability and Succession, to suggest language
for the Twenty-Fifth Amendment that would cover the case of simultaneous
inability of the President and Vice President.43 Dean Feerick identified the
inability gaps referred to above and drafted language that would permit
succession in the event of dual inability as well as in the event of a vice
presidential inability.44
Dean Feerick proposed, in the case of a vice presidential vacancy or
inability, that “the person next in line of succession shall act in lieu of the
Vice-President” to determine presidential inability.45 He also suggested
that “[t]he inability of the Vice-President shall be determined in the same
manner as that of the President except that the Vice-President shall have no
right to participate in such determination.”46 This language, and the drafted
contingencies, were not included in the final amendment.
Furthermore, these inability gaps were addressed in a like manner by
both an amendment proposed by a bipartisan majority of the Senate
Judiciary Committee in 1958 and an amendment proposed by Senator Birch

39. Id. at 828.
40. DEL QUENTIN WILBER, RAWHIDE DOWN: THE NEAR ASSASSINATION OF RONALD
REAGAN 181 (2011).
41. See id. at 178, 193; see also ABRAMS, supra note 29, at 185–89.
42. Feerick, supra note 36, at 909.
43. See Letter from John D. Feerick to Rep. Richard Poff (Feb. 7, 1965) [hereinafter
Letter from Feerick to Rep. Poff] (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id.; see also Feerick, supra note 36, at 909 n.1.
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Bayh in 1963.47 Herbert Brownell, Attorney General under President
Dwight D. Eisenhower, explained that the proposed 1958 amendment
provided that “‘if at any time there is no Vice President,’ the functions
envisaged for the Vice President by the proposed new constitutional
amendment ‘shall devolve upon the officer eligible to act as President next
in the line of succession to the office of President, as provided by law.’”48
Thus, the next in the line of succession was to have the authority to act in
concert with the Cabinet in determining presidential inability.49 The ABA’s
final proposal similarly contained a provision by which the next in the line
of succession, if there were no able Vice President, could act with a
majority of the Cabinet to determine presidential inability.50
47. See S.J. Res. 161, 85th Cong. (1958); see also S.J. Res. 139, 88th Cong. (1963). The
language of Senate Resolution 139 was very similar to Dean Feerick’s in his letter to
Representative Poff. Compare id., with Letter from Feerick to Rep. Poff, supra note 43.
48. Herbert Brownell, Jr., Presidential Disability: The Need for a Constitutional
Amendment, 68 YALE L.J. 189, 210 (1958); see also S.J. Res. 19, 87th Cong. (1961); H.R.J.
Res. 529, 87th Cong. (1961); S.J. Res. 161.
49. See S.J. Res. 161; see also AM. ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH,
PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND VICE PRESIDENTIAL VACANCIES 9 (1964).
50. See FEERICK, supra note 5, at 59–61. Two months after President Kennedy’s
assassination, the American Bar Association convened a committee of twelve attorneys and
released its consensus report in January 1964. See id. The report contained guiding
principles that largely tracked Senator Birch Bayh’s proposal, Senate Joint Resolution 139,
and the eventual Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Id. at 60–61. The consensus expressed in the
report, following the two-day conference on January 20 and January 21, 1964 was as
follows:
1. Agreements between the President and Vice President or person next in line of
succession provide a partial solution, but not an acceptable permanent solution of
the problem.
2. An amendment to the Constitution of the United States should be adopted to
resolve the problems which would arise in the event of the inability of the
President to discharge the powers and duties of his office.
3. The amendment should provide that in the event of the inability of the President
the powers and duties, but not the office, shall devolve upon the Vice President or
person next in line of succession for the duration of the inability of the President or
until expiration of his term of office.
4. The amendment should provide that the inability of the President may be
established by declaration in writing of the President. In the event that the
President does not make known his inability, it may be established by action of the
Vice President or person next in line of succession with concurrence of a majority
of the Cabinet or by action of such other body as the Congress may by law
provide.
5. The amendment should provide that the ability of the President to resume the
powers and duties of his office shall be established by his declaration in writing.
In the event that the Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet or such other
body as Congress may by law provide shall not concur in the declaration of the
President, the continuing inability of the President may then be determined by the
vote of two-thirds of the elected members of each House of the Congress.
Id. at 60. The Conference came to a consensus on presidential succession as well,
finding that:
1. The Constitution should be amended to provide that in the event of the death,
resignation or removal of the President, the Vice President or the person next in
line of succession shall succeed to the office for the unexpired term.
2. It is highly desirable that the office of Vice President be filled at all times. An
amendment to the Constitution should be adopted providing that when a vacancy
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When Congress did not include language in the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment to address these inability gaps, Senator Samuel Ervin
commented that attempting to fill every gap could jeopardize ratification of
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.51 As Dean Feerick points out, “[i]t was
believed at the time that an amendment providing for every possible
scenario would be too complex and therefore unlikely to survive the
difficult congressional and state ratification processes . . . .”52
Nevertheless, the inability gaps that persist are serious and must be
addressed because mass catastrophe, illness, or some other happenstance
can occur at any time.
1. Inability of the President in Certain Circumstances
Sections 3 and 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, which permit the
declaration of a presidential inability, are premised on the availability of an
able Vice President.53 Neither Section discusses what should occur if the
office of the Vice President is vacant or its occupant is himself unable.54
Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment is unavailable to a President who
wishes to transfer power temporarily if there is a vice presidential vacancy,
because there is no Vice President to act as President.55 Furthermore,
although Section 3 may be available to the President during a vice
presidential inability, a President would be hard pressed to transfer
authority to an unable Vice President. Similarly, Section 4 depends on the
presence of an able Vice President to work with the Cabinet in declaring the
President unable. Section 4 does not provide a substitute for the Vice
President to make such a declaration if the vice presidency is vacant, or if
the Vice President is himself unable and thus incapable of declaring a case
of presidential inability.56
2. Inability of the Vice President in Certain Circumstances
Currently, no mechanism exists by which a Vice President can be
declared unable to perform the powers and duties of his office.57 This gap
results in a number of unaddressed issues if the Vice President is, in fact,
unable. First, if the President dies, resigns, or is removed from office, the
Vice President automatically becomes President under Section 1 of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, even in a case of a Vice President’s undeclared

occurs in the office of Vice President, the President shall nominate a person who,
upon approval by a majority of the elected members of Congress meeting in joint
session, shall then become Vice President for the unexpired term.
Id. at 60–61 & n.3.
51. 110 CONG. REC. 22,950, 22,991–92 (1964).
52. Feerick, supra note 36, at 936.
53. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, §§ 3, 4.
54. See id.
55. See id. § 3.
56. See id. § 4.
57. See Feerick, supra note 36, at 934–36.
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inability.58 Second, if a President sought to transfer his powers temporarily
to the Vice President under Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, he
would be transferring powers to a Vice President unable to exercise them.
Furthermore, Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment cannot be invoked
when the Vice President is unable, because the Vice President is a
necessary actor in the determination of presidential inability under Section
4.59
3. Inability of the Acting President in Certain Circumstances
Current succession law provides no mechanism for dealing with an
inability of an Acting President, whether a Vice President or a statutory
successor.60
D. Recommendations
Following President Kennedy’s assassination, Congress acted wisely in
proposing the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to eliminate major gaps in the
system of presidential succession. We urge the President and Congress to
address the remaining inability gaps.
The Clinic believes that much can be done to anticipate and address these
gaps with changes in the law and contingency planning. In 1988,
participants of the Miller Center Commission on Presidential Disability and
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, including Senator Birch Bayh, Herbert
Brownell, and Fred Fielding, advanced many helpful recommendations for
contingency planning. Such planning has routinely taken place since at
least 1980.61 The exercise is of course confidential, and while we identify
58. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 1 (stating that the Vice President becomes
President upon the death, resignation, or removal from the office of President).
59. See id. § 4 (establishing that the Vice President is a necessary actor in the
determination of presidential inability).
60. The situation in which an Acting President is exercising the powers and duties of the
presidency during a presidential inability and a vice presidential vacancy raises issues
beyond the scope of this Report. These include the question whether an Acting President
can exercise presidential power under Section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment and
nominate a new Vice President while the President is alive but unable. For further
discussion of this issue, see generally William F. Baker & Beth A. FitzPatrick, Presidential
Succession Scenarios in Popular Culture and History and the Need for Reform, 79
FORDHAM L. REV. 835 (2010) and Examination of the First Implementation of Section Two
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Hearing on S.J. Res. 26 Before the Subcomm. on
Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. (1975).
61. Fielding, supra note 29, at 825. Fred Fielding stated:
[O]ne of the first things that I did when I became Counsel to President Reagan was
to put my staff to work on preparing a book. It was going to be a comprehensive
book. It was really kind of an emergency manual, which detailed every possible
scenario that we could think of for presidential inability or even vice presidential
inability.
Id. at 828. Fielding said this manual was passed on to the administration of George W. Bush
and that copies were still stored in safe locations. Id. at 828–29. More generally, see Dean
Feerick’s background information regarding the Miller Center Commission in his book on
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, FEERICK, supra note 5, at xx–xxi (“In 1985, a Commission on
Presidential Disability was appointed by the White Burkett Miller Center of Public Affairs at
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gaps and suggest responses to them, we well understand that others in
positions of responsibility have already engaged in contingency planning
and may find our recommendations duplicative of work already undertaken.
Nonetheless we support continued planning, as is surely underway,
recalling the wisdom of the writers of the Federalist Papers that “[a] wise
nation . . . does not rashly preclude itself from any resource which may
become essential to its safety.”62
1. Statute
The Clinic supports a statutory approach that mirrors the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment to address the inability gaps. There is sufficient basis in the
Constitution and law for doing so. We recommend that Congress enact
legislation facilitating the President’s ability to voluntarily transfer his
powers to the next in the line of succession during a vice presidential
vacancy or inability. We also recommend conferring authority on the next
in line in conjunction with the Cabinet to declare a presidential inability in
the absence of an able Vice President.
A mechanism for the voluntary transfer of power by the President or
Acting President to the next in line in the absence of an able Vice President
would track the provisions in Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment,
requiring a record of the transfer by written declaration to the President pro
tempore and the Speaker of the House or, if they are not available, by a
filing in the Office of the Department of State.63 For the more difficult case
of an obviously unable President or Acting President who refuses or is
unable to declare his own inability, a joint declaration of presidential
inability by the next in line acting together with the Cabinet would assure
responsible handling of the matter and would promote confidence among
the public at large.64
Reliance on the cabinet members, who are close to the President and can
evaluate the President’s or Acting President’s situation, together with the
next immediate successor of either party, would minimize the risk of abuse
of power and facilitate an appropriate transfer. A statutory approach could
also, like the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, contain provisions for dealing with

the University of Virginia to review the country’s experience with the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment and to examine important issues regarding presidential health. Included on the
Commission were two principal authors of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, former Attorney
General Herbert Brownell and former Senator Birch Bayh.”). Following the Clinic’s work
on this Report, former Vice President Cheney published his memoir in which he reflected on
presidential succession issues and, in particular, the implications of vice presidential
inability. See DICK CHENEY, IN MY TIME: A PERSONAL AND POLITICAL MEMOIR 319–21
(2011).
62. THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison).
63. The Office of the Department of State is an appropriate repository as an alternative
to filing with legislative leaders, because those leaders might be the next in the line of
succession, as would be the case under current law. This recommendation presents a
potential problem, however, if the next in the line of succession is the Secretary of State.
64. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, §§ 3, 4.

28

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

a disagreement between the unable President or Acting President and the
person who is next in line acting together with the Cabinet.
Turning to a justification of this approach, we review the reach of
Congress’s power and the role of the next in line.
a. Congressional Authority
Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 of the Constitution gives Congress the
authority to decide who is to act as President in the event that both the
President and the Vice President are unable to perform the duties of their
offices, as well as in the event that the President is unable when the vice
presidency is vacant.
Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 of the Constitution states:
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death,
Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said
Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress
may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or
Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer
shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until
the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.65

The 1792, 1886, and 1947 Acts, by which Congress created lines of
succession beyond the Vice President, rest on this authority.66 The statutes
reflect the idea that a clear line of succession allows the government to
continue to function in the case of simultaneous vacancies and/or inabilities
by ensuring that there is always a qualified successor to carry out the
powers and duties of the presidency.
However, when there is no able Vice President and the President is
incapable of declaring his own inability, the 1947 Act has no mechanism
for declaring presidential inability.67 Thus, although Congress has the
constitutional authority to create the line of succession, the 1947 Act does
not exercise that authority to its full extent.
In addition to the language of Article II, Congress appears to have
authority to address this gap pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause in
Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 of the Constitution. The Necessary and
Proper Clause provides that Congress shall have the power “[t]o make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof.”68

65. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
66. Presidential Succession Act of 1947, 3 U.S.C. § 19(d)(1) (2006); Presidential
Succession Act of 1886, ch. 4, 24 Stat. 1 (repealed 1947); Presidential Succession Act of
1792, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 239 (repealed 1886).
67. See 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2006).
68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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The Supreme Court interpreted Congress’s power under the Necessary
and Proper Clause broadly in its 1819 decision in McCulloch v. Maryland.69
Holding that Congress had the authority to charter a bank, even though the
Constitution did not explicitly give Congress such power, Chief Justice
John Marshall wrote:
[W]e think the sound construction of the constitution must allow to the
national legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which the
powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that
body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most
beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the
scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the
letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.70

While the Court has given the Clause an expansive reach, it has also stated
that the Clause “is not the delegation of a new and independent power, but
simply provision for making effective the powers theretofore mentioned.”71
Experts on presidential succession have suggested that a statute providing
a mechanism by which the President or Acting President could be declared
unable to perform the duties of his office would be sound under the
Necessary and Proper Clause, because it would be consistent with the
express power of Congress under the Constitution to establish the line of
succession.72 One commentator writes that such a statute “would not
appear to grant a new and independent power to Congress, [but] only a
measure to ensure the legitimate end of providing for a successor beyond
the Vice President in circumstances where additional process is deemed
necessary as an effective use of the power.”73 Providing for the
determination of presidential inability is “necessary to ensure that the
executive power does not fall into abeyance . . . [and so this Congressional]
power is clearly within the scope of the [Necessary and Proper Clause].”74
Even those who oppose a broad reading of the Necessary and Proper
Clause in terms of presidential succession agree that the clause allows for
intervention where both the President and Vice President are incapacitated.
Presidential succession scholar Ruth Silva, writing prior to the adoption of
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, noted that the Constitution gives Congress
the express power to provide for presidential succession only “when there is
neither a functioning President nor a functioning Vice President.”75 She
argued that “because enumeration in the Constitution of certain powers
denies all others unless incident to an expressed power or necessary to its
69. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
70. Id. at 421.
71. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 88 (1907).
72. See Feerick, Presidential Succession and Inability, supra note 36, at 942–43. See
generally Interview by Deborah Eltgroth & Daniel Hafetz with Birch Bayh, former U.S.
Senator, in Easton, Md. (Oct. 2, 2009), in 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 781 (2010).
73. Feerick, supra note 36, at 942.
74. RUTH C. SILVA, PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 106–07 (1951); see also 14 CONG. REC.
915–16 (1883); 13 CONG. REC. 131 (1881).
75. Ruth C. Silva, Presidential Inability, 35 U. DET. L.J. 139, 171 (1957).
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execution,” Congress does not have the authority to legislate regarding any
scenario but that of a dual inability and/or vacancy.76 Herbert Brownell
agreed that “congressional action under the ‘necessary and proper’ clause
would seem restricted to the uncommon situation in which both the
President and Vice President are incapacitated.”77
b. The Role of the Next in the Line of Succession in Determining Incapacity
Prior to the adoption of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, many who wrote
on the topic of presidential succession relied on the concept of a contingent
grant of power to justify an authority in the next in the line of succession to
determine presidential inability.78 Professor Silva explained that, according
to this theory, “it is a well-established rule of law that the one to whom the
power is granted is to decide when the emergency has arisen.”79 Silva
wrote:
[T]he Vice President, or the “officer” designated by law to act as
President, is constituted the judge of a President’s inability . . . . The
Constitution provides that the power of acting as President belongs to the
Vice President or to the “Officer” while a President is disabled. Since the
Constitution mentions only the successor, he is the judge of the facts.80

Herbert Brownell agreed that “whenever any official by law . . . is
designated to perform certain duties on the happening of certain
contingencies, unless otherwise specified, that person who bears the
responsibility for performing the duties must also determine when the
contingency for the exercise of his powers arises.”81 Attorney General
Robert F. Kennedy issued an opinion in 1961 adopting this theory, stating
that the “Vice President or [an]other ‘officer’ designated by law to act as
President has the authority under the Constitution to decide when inability
exists.”82
Thus, the contingent grant of power theory supports the idea that the next
in the line of succession should have a role in the determination of
presidential inability. However, to permit the next in the line of succession
alone to determine presidential inability would grant him more power than
what is granted to the Vice President under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment,
which does not permit the Vice President to act alone but requires him to
act with a majority of the Cabinet or other congressionally designated
body.83 As a result, reliance on the theory of a contingent grant of power

76. Id.
77. Brownell, supra note 48, at 206.
78. See Presidential Inability, 42 Op. Att’y Gen. 69, 88–90 (1961); see also SILVA, supra
note 74, at 101.
79. SILVA, supra note 74, at 101; see also Silva, supra note 75, at 156.
80. See SILVA, supra note 74, at 101.
81. Brownell, supra note 48, at 204.
82. Presidential Inability, supra note 78, at 88, 90 (identifying this as the scholarly
majority view and concurring with it) (emphasis added).
83. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
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might yield a result that is not consistent with the framework set forth in the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment.
c. Summary
Some may argue that only a constitutional amendment can expand upon
the existing mechanism for declaring a presidential inability. The Clinic,
however, is persuaded that Congress has the power to enact a statute
providing a mechanism for the determination of presidential inability during
a vice presidential inability or vacancy. Based on the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment and a theory of contingent grants of power, which is accepted
by scholars familiar with presidential succession, the Clinic believes
Congress has the authority to legislate in this area. The Clinic recommends
that such a statute be enacted on the basis that it is necessary and proper to
implement Congress’s express power under Article II, Section 1, Clause 6
to provide for the line of succession and to ensure the continuation of
effective government. We recommend the adoption of a statute that
acknowledges that the next in the line of succession has the power to
determine, with the Cabinet or another body that Congress may choose, the
existence of an inability of the President or Acting President in the absence
of an able Vice President. We recommend that this statute also confirm that
a President or Acting President may voluntarily transfer his powers and
duties to the next in the line of succession during a vice presidential
inability or vacancy.
2. Executive Action
The Clinic believes congressional enactment of a statute addressing
presidential inability gaps, in the absence of a constitutional amendment,
presents a sound and feasible approach. However, the Clinic recognizes
that enactment of a statute can be a lengthy process and that national
emergencies may occur at any time. In the absence of statutory reform, the
Clinic is aware that executive branch officials have instituted
comprehensive practices, procedures, and rules to ensure preparedness in
the event of gaps in leadership. The Clinic endorses such contingency
planning and suggests that prospective executive declarations of inability84
provide an effective way to address both presidential and vice presidential
inability while congressional action is under consideration.
Article II, Section 1 permits Congress to provide for a line of succession
only in the event of a dual inability and/or vacancy in the presidency and
vice presidency.85 An executive declaration of prospective inability would
permit the President, Vice President, or Acting President to describe, in a
formal writing, the situations in which he would consider himself unable to

84. Executive declarations of inability are similar to letter agreements. See Appendix B
for a compilation of letter agreements and declarations from various administrations.
85. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
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discharge the powers and duties of his office.86 Executive declarations of
prospective inability allow the President, Vice President, or Acting
President to provide for future instances of inability, and thereby permit
timely implementation of the current succession law.
An executive declaration of inability permits the line of succession to be
triggered during a vice presidential vacancy or inability by giving the
President or Acting President a way in which to declare himself unable to
perform the powers and duties of his office prospectively, in the event that
he becomes unable to declare his own inability in the future. An executive
declaration of prospective inability by the Vice President similarly allows
the succession law to go into effect as intended.
a. Historical Support for Prospective Executive Declarations of Inability
Declarations for future contingencies are consistent with Section 3 of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, which allows the President to temporarily
transfer his powers when he “recognizes his inability—or the imminence of
his inability.”87 Although the President can transfer his power during
foreseen periods of inability, he might be able to do so “even prospectively
for unexpected yet contemplated future incidents.”88 Former Attorney
General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach testified that “the President should be
able to arrange for the Vice President to act . . . in the event of a certain
contingency . . . which would be a self-executive [sic] provision.”89
Others agree. Noting that President Bush signed a letter formally
transferring his powers to Vice President Cheney prior to undergoing
anesthesia, Adam Gustafson argues that “there is no overwhelming
constitutional reason why such a letter may not be sent further in
advance.”90 Indeed, some have suggested that the President and Vice
President can “outlin[e] procedures for contingent cessions of executive
power” for “unplanned future inabilities.”91 These procedures might extend
as well to a statutory successor in contemplation of a possible vacancy in
the vice presidency or an inability of the Vice President. Although
“[p]rospective declarations of inability would require a broad reading” of
Section 3, a narrow reading that “discourages the President from taking

86. The Clinic acknowledges that such a writing will require some person or persons to
decide whether the conditions set forth in the executive declaration of prospective inability
are present. The Clinic notes that an executive declaration of prospective inability could
possibly authorize a designated party to resign on behalf of the President or Vice President in
defined circumstances. For an example of such a letter, see the Eisenhower-Nixon Letter
Agreement in Appendix B. A sample Executive Declaration of Inability is also included in
Appendix B.
87. 111 CONG. REC. 7941 (1965) (statement of Rep. Richard Poff).
88. Gustafson, supra note 32, at 476.
89. Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of Vice President: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. of the Judiciary, 89th Cong.
21 (1965) (statement of Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Acting Att’y Gen.).
90. Gustafson, supra note 32, at 476–77.
91. Id. at 477.
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present action for future contingencies . . . may undermine the
Amendment’s purpose of promoting executive branch continuity.”92
This cession of power is not unprecedented in American history. Prior to
the adoption of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, when no mechanism for the
declaration of presidential inability existed, President Eisenhower
recognized the urgency of addressing presidential succession issues.93 In
1958, he presented to Vice President Nixon a “letter agreement” setting
forth certain procedures in the event of his future inability as President.94
President Eisenhower wrote that he and Vice President Nixon “could do
much to eliminate all these uncertainties by agreeing, in advance, as to the
proper steps to be taken at any time when [he] might become unable to
discharge the powers and duties of the President.”95 President Eisenhower
stated that “this agreement would not in any way contravene the clear
intention of the Constitution; on the contrary, it is rather a statement of our
common intention to act completely according to the spirit of . . . the
Constitution.”96
Pursuant to the letter agreement, Vice President Nixon was to act as
President if President Eisenhower determined himself to be unable or if
Vice President Nixon determined President Eisenhower was unable;
Eisenhower would resume his presidential duties upon his own declaration
that the inability had ended.97 Later administrations followed the
Eisenhower-Nixon precedent by entering into letter agreements to provide
for prospective inability, including President Kennedy and Vice President
Lyndon B. Johnson,98 and President Johnson and Speaker of the House
John W. McCormack.99 Although they appeared to share a similar
understanding,100 a fully executed agreement between President Johnson
and Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey has not yet been found. There
appears to be evidence that, even after the adoption of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment, Presidents George H.W. Bush and Clinton executed letter
agreements with their Vice Presidents indicating their intentions for the
transfer of power in case of inability.101 One commentator noted that prior
92. Id. at 479.
93. See Feerick, Presidential Succession and Inability, supra note 36, at 921.
94. See id. For a reproduction of the letter, see Appendix B.
95. Letter from President Dwight D. Eisenhower to Richard Milhous Nixon (Feb. 5,
1958), available at http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/second-term/
documents/566.cfm.
96. Id.
97. See id.
98. See Feerick, supra note 36, at 922.
99. See id. The letter agreement was between President Johnson and Speaker
McCormack due to the vice presidential vacancy that resulted from Johnson’s ascension to
the presidency when President John F. Kennedy was assassinated. For a reproduction of the
letter, see Appendix B.
100. See id.
101. See Gustafson, supra note 32, at 477 (citing David A. Drachman et al.,
Subcommittee Report: Criteria for Disability and Impairment, in PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY:
PAPERS, DISCUSSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT AND
ISSUES OF INABILITY AND DISABILITY AMONG PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 276 (James
F. Toole & Robert J. Joynt eds., 2001)).
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to the adoption of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, letter agreements “did not
have the force of law behind them and depended entirely on the good will
of the incumbent President and Vice President.”102
b. Summary
In case a presidential inability arises during a vice presidential vacancy or
inability, an executive declaration of prospective inability can fill the gap
that is not addressed by the Twenty-Fifth Amendment by allowing the
President to define a future inability. The declaration of a future inability,
although not explicitly provided for in Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment, is consistent with the purpose of Section 3 (and the Article II
succession provision), to promote executive branch continuity, and has
historical precedent.
The Clinic believes that vice presidential inability is also best addressed
through the use of executive declarations of prospective inability. An
executive declaration of prospective inability would permit the Vice
President to describe the situations that he considers would render him
unable. Upon the occurrence of one of these situations, if the Vice
President has made a declaration of prospective inability, the next in the
line of succession would then be in a position to declare the inability of the
President or Acting President, as circumstances require.
Although the Vice President does not have the explicit authority under
the Constitution to declare his own inability, the Clinic believes such
authority is implicit. A mechanism by which vice presidential inability can
be declared is necessary for an effective system of presidential succession.
Historical precedent supports this approach since past and current
administrations have engaged in contingency planning to address issues
arising from vice presidential inability.103
3. Other Options
a. Vice Presidential Inability
The Clinic considered various options to deal with vice presidential
inability and ultimately favors executive declarations of prospective
inability, as described above. Below is a summary of the other options we
considered.
i. Statute
The Clinic considered congressional enactment of a statute providing a
mechanism for a determination of vice presidential inability. The Vice
President plays a vital role in succession through his authority, with the
102. See Feerick, supra note 36, at 922.
103. See Fielding, supra note 29, at 828–29 (noting that he created a book “which
detailed every possible scenario that we could think of for presidential inability or even vice
presidential inability”).
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Cabinet, to determine presidential inability under the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment. Thus, a statute providing for a determination of the Vice
President’s inability could be seen as necessary and proper to enable the
person next in the line of succession to play a vital role in the event of a
Vice President’s inability. Ultimately, the Clinic did not believe such a
statute would pass constitutional muster because the Constitution specifies
that Congress can act in the event of a dual inability; it does not provide that
Congress can act in the case of vice presidential inability alone.104 Silva
and Brownell, as indicated above, believed that congressional authority was
limited to circumstances in which both the President and Vice President
were unable or absent.105
ii. Impeachment
Impeachment would be a dubious and problematic route to address the
problem of vice presidential inability. The wrongdoing contemplated by
the Constitution’s requirement of “high crimes and misdemeanors” has
been a source of debate and somewhat broadly construed by some.106
However, although impeachable conduct need not be criminal, inability still
stands far apart from bribery, treason, and the other types of “political”
crimes that constitute a willful abuse of office and that justify impeachment
and removal.107 Further, partisan considerations have frequently played a
role in impeachment and removal. The impeachment and removal of a
President or Vice President for inability is both unsupported by the
language or any reasonable interpretation of the Constitution and could set a
dangerous precedent for the use or threat of impeachment and removal as a
partisan political weapon.108
VI. LINE OF SUCCESSION ISSUES
A. Introduction
Under Article II, Section I, Clause 6 of the Constitution, the Vice
President is the first successor to the powers and duties of the presidency,
and Congress is authorized to create a line of succession.109 The line of
succession beyond the vice presidency has taken three different forms over
the past 220 years. The Presidential Succession Act of 1792 (1792 Act)
included a line of succession that was strictly legislative in nature, running
104. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
105. See supra notes 75–77 and accompanying text.
106. Mark R. Slusar, The Confusion Defined: Questions and Problems of Process in the
Aftermath of the Clinton Impeachment, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 869, 872–79 (1999)
(describing the narrow and broad reading of "high crimes and misdemeanors" by scholars
and commentators).
107. MILLER CTR. COMM’N NO. 4, REPORT OF THE MILLER CENTER COMMISSION ON
PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 11 (1988).
108. Richard K. Neumann, Jr., The Revival of Impeachment as a Partisan Political
Weapon, 34 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 161, 167 (2007) (suggesting that prior presidential
impeachments were politically motivated).
109. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
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to the President pro tempore of the Senate and then to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives.110 Then, the Presidential Succession Act of 1886
(1886 Act) changed the line of succession to an entirely executive line,
running through the cabinet secretaries.111 The 1947 Act, changed the line
of succession to include both legislators and executive officers, starting
with the Speaker, followed by the President pro tempore, and then cabinet
secretaries in the order of their departments’ creation: the “Secretary of
State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General,
Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary of Commerce,
Secretary of Labor, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development, Secretary of Transportation, Secretary of
Energy, Secretary of Education, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, and
Secretary of Homeland Security.”112
The 1947 Act, like the 1792 Act, has been subject to criticism on
constitutional grounds, as well as on the basis of policy considerations.113
There is a serious question regarding both the constitutionality of including
legislative members in the line of succession and the “bumping” provision
that permits a cabinet member, acting as President, to be replaced by the
Speaker or President pro tempore.
As a matter of policy, the succession of legislative members presents
numerous concerns, including the violation of the doctrine of separation of
powers, the possibility of a sudden and complete shift in party control of the
executive branch, and conflicts of interest issues in instances of
impeachment or removal of the President. On the other hand, inclusion of
executive officers also raises questions about cabinet members’
qualifications to serve as Acting President. The Clinic treats each of these
issues in the sections that follow and advances a recommendation for
returning to the executive line of succession as provided for in the 1886
Act. Failing adoption of this recommendation, the Clinic recommends an
exclusively cabinet line of succession for cases of presidential inability.
This reform will facilitate a voluntary transfer of presidential power when
circumstances require it and will reduce disruption in legislative leadership,
but will otherwise preserve legislative succession.
B. Constitutional Concerns
1. Constitutionality of the Legislative Line of Succession
The constitutionality of the 1947 Act and, more generally, of the
legislative line of succession is questionable. The first constitutional
question is whether the term “Officer,” as understood by the Framers and as
it appears in Article II, Section 1, Clause 6, includes legislators. Article II,
Section 1, Clause 6 provides in relevant part:
110.
111.
112.
113.

Presidential Succession Act of 1792, ch. 8, § 9, 1 Stat. 239, 240 (repealed 1886).
Presidential Succession Act of 1886, ch. 4, 24 Stat. 1, 1 (repealed 1947).
Presidential Succession Act of 1947, 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2006).
See infra Appendix C.
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In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death,
Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said
Office . . . the Congress may by Law . . . declar[e] what Officer shall then
act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the
Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.114

Congressional leaders and scholars have interpreted the term “Officer” to
mean “Officer of the United States,”115 which refers only to executive
branch officers who are nominated by the President and confirmed by the
Senate.116 Thus, some argue that legislators are not qualified under the
Constitution to act as President.117
Some commentators have also contended that, based on the description
of the executive branch and the use of the term “Officer” elsewhere in the
Constitution, the Framers did not anticipate legislators succeeding to the
presidency. For example, in 1864, Senator James Bayard of Delaware
referred to Article II, Section 1, Clause 2, which provides for the election of
presidential electors, as an instance in which the term “Officer” is placed in
opposition to those holding legislative positions.118
This clause
distinguishes between Senators and Representatives and persons “holding
an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States.”119 Based on this
distinction, Senator Bayard concluded that Senators and Representatives are
not “Officers,” nor do they “hold[] office under the United States”; rather,
they hold a position of “trust,” and therefore are not qualified to succeed to
the presidency under the Constitution.120 Furthermore, Senator Bayard
argued that legislators are not “officers of the United States” because
citizens from individual states or districts elect them, rather than citizens
throughout the country.121
Similar arguments arise from the language in Article II, Section 1, Clause
1, which states in relevant part that “[the President] shall hold his Office
during the Term of four Years.”122 Moreover, Article I, Section 2, Clause 1
states, “[t]he House of Representatives shall be composed of Members

114. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
115. Goldstein, supra note 9, at 1020; see also CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N,
PRESERVING OUR INSTITUTIONS: THE SECOND REPORT OF THE CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT
COMMISSION 26 (2009) (noting that “[a] line of thought running from James Madison to
Akhil Amar holds that it is unconstitutional to have congressional leaders in the line of
succession”).
116. CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 115, at 26–27 (noting that one side of
the debate believed “the word ‘Officer’ clearly meant ‘Officer of the United States’ and thus
expressly forbade leaders of Congress”).
117. See CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 1ST SESS. app. 35–37 (1864).
118. 13 CONG. REC. 128 (1881); see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (“Each State shall
appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal
to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in
the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or
Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.”).
119. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
120. 13 CONG. REC. 128 (statement of Sen. James A. Bayard).
121. Id.
122. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
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chosen every second Year by the People of the several States,”123 and
Article I, Section 3, Clause 1 states, “[t]he Senate of the United States shall
be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature
thereof, for six Years.”124 If the Framers intended legislative members to
fill “Officer” positions, then they presumably would have used the same
language in the Constitution for both the executive and legislative branches;
however, the Framers refer to legislators as “chosen” for either two or six
years, and they omitted the language “hold his Office.”125
Additionally, the 1947 Act may violate the Incompatibility Clause of
Article I, Section 6, Clause 2.126 The Constitution makes clear that sitting
members of Congress cannot hold “any civil Office under the Authority of
the United States.”127 Therefore, the clause “civil Office under the
Authority of the United States”128 must refer exclusively to the members of
the executive and judicial branches because the Constitution does not say
any “other” civil office. Language within the same clause provides that “no
Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of
either House during his Continuance in Office,”129 again suggesting that a
legislator is not an “Officer.” The language of Article I, Section 6 thus
appears to exclude legislators from those who are “Officers.”130
The constitutional provisions governing impeachment also raise issues
related to the definition of “Officer.” Article II, Section 4 provides for the
impeachment of the President, Vice President, and “all civil Officers of the
United States.”131 Over time, the interpretation of the words “all civil
Officers” has come to exclude legislators,132 and thus supports the
argument that legislators are not “Officers” and are therefore not eligible to
succeed to the presidency. Other provisions of the Constitution also
support this view. Specifically, Article II, Section 3 gives the President the
authority to “Commission all the Officers of the United States.”133
However, members of Congress do not receive commissions to serve in the

123. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
124. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
125. Compare id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1, and id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, with id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
126. Id. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (“No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which
he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States,
which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during
such time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of
either House during his Continuance in Office.”).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See 13 CONG. REC. 128 (1881) (statement of Sen. James A. Bayard) (arguing that
these “Officers” are not included in the line of succession).
131. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (“The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the
United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of,
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”).
132. See Appendix C for a discussion of this interpretation related to the impeachment
trial of Senator William Blount.
133. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall Commission all the Officers of the
United States.”).
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House of Representatives or the Senate, thus supporting the argument that
legislators are not “Officers of the United States.”134
On the other hand, some scholars note that the Framers used the term
“Officers” in Article II, Section 1 instead of the term “Officers of the
United States.”135 Thus, it is argued that the ratifying states may have
found the distinction important because the Speaker and the President pro
tempore are described as “Officers” of their houses elsewhere in the
Constitution.136
Yet, even if members of Congress are deemed “Officers” and are eligible
to act as President, their inclusion in the line of succession raises issues
about separation of powers. As President James Madison noted in 1792, an
Acting President from the legislative branch would blur the lines of
separation of powers.137 In addition, the Speaker participates in the
impeachment process, and the President pro tempore votes in removal
proceedings, which presents an obvious conflict of interest since the 1947
Act places both in the line of succession. In fact, this conflict of interest
was present in the 1868 effort to remove President Andrew Johnson for
violating the Tenure of Office Act.138 Johnson succeeded to the presidency
after the assassination of President Abraham Lincoln and carried on as
President with no Vice President.139 When then-President pro tempore
Benjamin F. Wade voted in the removal trial of President Johnson, he
effectively voted for his own succession to the presidency by voting
“guilty” to remove President Johnson, because, under the 1792 Act, the
President pro tempore was next in the line of succession after the Vice
President.140 Ultimately, the effort to remove President Johnson failed by
one vote, but the incident cast light on the issue of potential conflicts of
interest in the context of a legislative line of succession.141
Moreover, the historical record reveals the political maneuvering that led
to the insertion of legislators into the 1792 Act. The Federalists and AntiFederalists were engaged in a power struggle.142 The Federalists did not
want the line of succession to run through the Cabinet because Thomas
Jefferson, an Anti-Federalist, was Secretary of State at the time.143
Alexander Hamilton, leader of the Federalist Party, persuaded his fellow
Federalists in the Senate to overlook the constitutional questions about the

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

See, e.g., 13 CONG. REC. 127–28 (statement of Sen. James A. Bayard).
Goldstein, supra note 9, at 1020–21.
Id. at 1021; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 5.
Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, supra note 137.
See JOHN D. FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS: THE STORY OF PRESIDENTIAL
SUCCESSION 113–14 (1965).
139. See Feerick, supra note 36, at 934 (noting that there was a vice presidential vacancy
from 1865 to 1869 when Vice President Jackson became President upon the death of
President Lincoln).
140. See id. at 114.
141. See id.
142. Id. at 60–62.
143. Id. at 60–61.
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1792 Act in order to establish a legislative line of succession that would
exclude Jefferson.144
Although the arguments outlined above cast doubt on the
constitutionality of the legislative line of succession, other arguments
support its constitutionality. The primary support comes from the text of
Article I, Sections 2 and 3,145 which provides for the House of
Representatives and the Senate to choose their “other Officers,” in addition
to the two legislative positions referred to by name in the Constitution,
Speaker and President pro tempore.146 Thus, if the Speaker and President
pro tempore are referred to as “Officers” in Article I, Sections 2 and 3,147
and the word “Officer” in Article II, Section 1148 refers to all “Officers,”
then members of Congress are arguably eligible to be included in the line of
succession.
Furthermore, historical practice supports the constitutionality of the
legislative line of succession. The Second Congress, which passed the 1792
Act placing legislators in the line of succession, included six members149 of
the Constitutional Convention who approved the final language of the
Constitution,150 and thus were uniquely qualified to interpret the Framers’
intent. However, four of the six members151 present in the 2nd Congress
voted against the 1792 Act, including future President James Madison, who
at the time was a Representative from Virginia.152 As noted previously,
President Madison believed that the inclusion of the President pro tempore
and the Speaker in the line of succession was not constitutional because
they were not “Officers” in the constitutional sense and that any other
reading of the Constitution would violate the separation of powers.153
Additionally, President Madison believed that the forced resignation of the
President pro tempore or Speaker under the 1792 Act would remove any
authority those individuals might previously have held in order to act as
President.154

144. Id. at 60–62.
145. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 5.
146. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (“The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and
other Officers . . . .”); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 5 (“The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and
also a President pro tempore . . . .”).
147. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 5.
148. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
149. These members were Abraham Baldwin, Elbridge Gerry, Thomas Fitzsimons,
Nicholas Gilman, James Madison, and Hugh Williamson. See 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 417–18
(1791).
150. FEERICK, supra note 138, at 60.
151. Those voting against the 1792 Act were Abraham Baldwin, Nicholas Gilman, James
Madison, and Hugh Williamson. Id.
152. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 417–18.
153. See Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, supra note 137.
154. See id.
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2. Presidential Qualifications
Constitutional considerations also arise regarding other kinds of
qualifications for those in the line of succession. Article II, Section 1,
Clause 5 provides:
No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States,
at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the
Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who
shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen
Years a Resident within the United States.155

The 1947 Act confirmed that this provision would apply to those in the
line of succession with the language, “this section shall apply only to such
officers as are eligible to the office of President under the Constitution.”156
While these requirements are clear, the question remains whether an
individual who may be constitutionally qualified to act as President is
“qualified” in the eyes of the national electorate.
For example,
notwithstanding that the President pro tempore is third in line of succession
after the President, that position is traditionally filled by the Senator with
“the longest record of continuous service,”157 rather than by a Senator who
is being evaluated as a possible successor to the President. If the Senate’s
only criterion for nominating a President pro tempore is the length of a
Senator’s service, we respectfully suggest that the Senate should change its
practice or the position should be removed from the line of succession.
The qualifications of cabinet members raise other issues. From time to
time, the policies of department secretaries have generated considerable
controversy, which may lead some to question their presidential pedigree.
In addition, the electorate may be unfamiliar with cabinet secretaries (or for
that matter, legislative leaders).158 Therefore, when considering whether
the legislative or executive line of succession is appropriate, the issue of
qualifications must be considered both in the constitutional sense and as
seen through the eyes of the electorate.

155. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
156. Presidential Succession Act of 1947, 3 U.S.C. § 19(e) (2006).
157. President Pro Tempore, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_
term/president_pro_tempore.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2012). In a recent article, Professor
Amar also argues that “most Speakers are un-presidential.” Akhil Reed Amar, Why Speakers
of the House Should Never Be President, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 12, 2012 (“Speakers of both
parties have typically been unfit for the presidency.”), available at http://www.tnr.com/
print/article/politics/99509/presidential-succession-speaker-house.
158. For example, a survey of 1,000 “likely voters” on April 1–2, 2011 discussed whether
the American public is knowledgeable of the current Cabinet. For a more detailed
explanation of the survey, see Locke, Solis Are Least Known of Obama Cabinet Members,
RASMUSSEN REP. (Apr. 9, 2011), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/
politics/obama_administration/april_2011/locke_solis_are_least_known_of_obama_cabinet_
members. Similarly, on March 17–20, 2011, a Pew Research Center survey found that only
43 percent of Americans knew that John Boehner was the Speaker of the House. See Bruce
Drake, What Does John Boehner Do for a Living? Less Than Half in Poll Know, POLL
WATCH DAILY (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.pollwatchdaily.com/2011/04/01/what-does-johnboehner-do-for-a-living-less-than-half-in-poll-know/.
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3. “Bumping” Provision
“Bumping” is a term that has come to describe cases in which
legislators—not the President or Vice President—replace a cabinet member
who is an Acting President. Under the 1947 Act, cabinet members who
have succeeded to the powers and duties of the office of President in the
absence of a Speaker or President pro tempore may be displaced or bumped
from the presidency once a Speaker or President pro tempore is elected or
qualifies for office. This provision does not allow for cabinet members to
bump one another or for a Speaker to bump the President pro tempore or
vice versa, but it does create a scenario for several officeholders to serve as
President in a short time.
The possibility of multiple successors in a short period appears to violate
Article II, Section 1, which authorizes Congress only to enact a law that
would declare what “Officer” would act as President until “a President shall
be elected,” and not a law that would allow others to bump Acting
Presidents from office.159 Furthermore, Article II, Section 1 states that the
Acting President “shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or
a President shall be elected.”160
The rationale behind inclusion of the bumping provision is not well
documented in the legislative history of the 1947 Act. The debates on the
1886 Act, however, do include references to bumping.161 In 1883, Senator
George Edmunds of Vermont first proposed having the Secretary of State
act as President, should no Speaker or President pro tempore be available,
and then relinquish the office once a Speaker or President pro tempore was
available to act as President.162 Senator George Hoar opposed this, stating
that it is not within Congress’s power under the Constitution to provide for
two or three officers in succession to act as President.163 The 1886 Act did
not provide for bumping.

159. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6; see also Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar,
Is the Presidential Succession Law Constitutional?, 48 STAN. L. REV. 113, 135 (1995)
(noting this discrepancy and discussing further the problems created by bumping).
160. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
161. See, e.g., 17 CONG. REC. 676–77 (1886) (statement of Sen. George Everett Adams);
17 CONG. REC. 220 (1885) (debate on Dec. 16, 1885); 14 CONG. REC. 880 (1883) (debate on
Jan. 5, 1883).
162. 14 CONG. REC. 880.
163. Id.
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C. Uncertainty in Times of Presidential Succession164
1. Acting Secretaries in the Line of Succession165
It is unclear whether the acting cabinet secretaries are in the line of
succession under the 1947 Act.166 During congressional debates leading up
to the 1947 Act, the topic of their inclusion did not come up once.167
Senator Kenneth Wherry, who introduced Senate Bill 564, which was later
passed into law as the 1947 Act, said, “[T]he bill accomplishes what I want
to do, and that is to make the Speaker always the man that is to be the
Acting President.”168 Senator Wherry thought that, other than the President
and the Vice President, the Speaker was the closest official to the
electorate.169 He stated:
My theory is that as long as they all are elected officers I would much
rather it would go to the Speaker first; then to the President pro tempore
as the next closest to the Speaker, maybe. But in the event neither one of
them is available, then go down through the line we have now, and they
act as President only until either the President, Vice President, the
Speaker, or the President pro tempore qualifies. In that order they can
supplant the Secretary of State.170

Thus, it is unlikely that Senator Wherry intended to include acting
secretaries. They are more removed from the electorate than the Speaker,
164. It is highly unlikely but not unquestionably clear that the Speaker of the House pro
tempore and the Acting President pro tempore of the Senate are not currently included in the
line of succession. See infra Appendix E. There have been two bills introduced by
Congressman Brad Sherman since September 11, 2001, that specifically state that the
Speaker of the House pro tempore is not considered the Speaker of the House for the
purposes of presidential succession. Both of these bills are silent with regard to the Acting
President pro tempore of the Senate. The Clinic, recognizing that this is a point that has not
previously been discussed in the literature on presidential succession, does not find a
convincing argument for the inclusion of these legislators in the current line of succession.
For a discussion of Congressman Sherman’s bills, see infra Appendix D. The Clinic,
however, recommends that Congress explicitly clarify whether acting secretaries and
substitute congressional leadership are included in the line of succession. We think it
inappropriate to include the latter—interim legislative officials—in the line of succession.
165. An acting secretary is an officer who was not appointed as a cabinet secretary by the
President, but who nonetheless now holds the powers of a cabinet secretary. By contrast, a
cabinet secretary is an individual who was appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate for the position of cabinet secretary. For a discussion of the bills
introduced since September 11, 2001, see infra Appendix D.
166. See CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 115, at 34 (“We have spoken to
acting secretaries who told us they had been placed in the line of succession.”).
167. See Succession to the Presidency: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Rules and
Admin., 80th Cong. (1947) [hereinafter Succession to the Presidency]; To Determine
Presidential Succession: Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 80th
Cong. (1947); Selection of an Acting President in the Case of Failure to Qualify of Both
President-Elect and Vice-President Elect: Hearing Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 80th Cong. (1947); H.R. REP. NO. 80-80 (1947); H.R. DOC. NO. 80–89
(1947); H.R. REP. NO. 80–817 (1947).
168. Succession to the Presidency, supra note 167, at 42 (statement of Sen. Kenneth S.
Wherry).
169. Id. at 43.
170. Id. at 61 (emphasis added).
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President pro tempore, and cabinet secretaries. Further, Senator Wherry
advocated for succession to run, after the Speaker and President pro
tempore, “through the line we have now,” which under the 1886 Act was
only the cabinet secretaries confirmed as such, thus excluding acting
secretaries.171 However, the language of the 1947 Act itself is ambiguous.
The inclusion of acting secretaries in the line of succession is supported
by a comparison of the language in the 1947 Act and the 1886 Act.172 The
1886 Act explicitly included only cabinet secretaries confirmed as such.173
After enumerating the list of cabinet secretaries who were included in the
line of succession, section 2 of the 1886 Act provided “[t]hat the preceding
section shall only be held to describe and apply to such officers as shall
have been appointed by the advice and consent of the Senate to the offices
therein named.”174 In contrast, the language of the 1947 Act is less clear.
Section 19(d)(1) of the 1947 Act provides that “the officer of the United
States who is highest on the following list [referring to a list of cabinet
secretaries], and who is not under disability to discharge the powers and
duties of the office of President shall act as President.”175 Section 19(e)
goes on to state, “Subsection (d) of this section shall apply only to officers
appointed, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.”176 The lack
of language in the 1947 Act explicitly limiting succession to cabinet
secretaries, “confirmed as such,” raises the question of whether the acting
secretaries are in the line of succession. However, the 1886 Act’s omission
of the acting secretaries, Senator Wherry’s likely exclusion of acting
secretaries, and a complete absence of discussion of acting secretaries in the
legislative history of the 1947 Act weigh against any interpretation of the
1947 Act that would include acting secretaries in the line of succession.
If acting secretaries are in the line of succession, then section 19(d)(1) of
the 1947 Act means that an acting secretary in a higher-listed department
may become Acting President ahead of the lower-listed cabinet
secretaries.177 Section 19(d)(1) states only that “the officer of the United
States who is highest on the following list . . . shall act as President.”178
There is no distinction made between an acting secretary or a cabinet
secretary who was appointed and confirmed as such. Thus, under one
interpretation, an acting Secretary of State would have a valid claim to
become Acting President ahead of the Secretary of the Treasury.179
Whatever Congress’ intent in passing the 1947 Act, the Clinic has
grappled with the soundness of including acting secretaries in the line of
171. Presidential Succession Act of 1886, ch. 4, § 2, 24 Stat. 1 (repealed 1947).
172. See CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 115, at 34. The Continuity of
Government Commission has confirmed with some acting secretaries that they were placed
in the line of succession. See id.
173. See infra note 174.
174. Presidential Succession Act of 1886 § 2.
175. Presidential Succession Act of 1947, 3 U.S.C. § 19(d)(1) (2006).
176. Id. § 19(e).
177. Id. § 19(d)(1).
178. Id.
179. Id. § 19.
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succession. Their inclusion greatly expands the line of succession, but it
also raises several concerns about the implementation of the line of
succession and the qualifications of the individuals who could assume the
powers and duties of the presidency.180
D. Additional Concerns
1. Democratic Pedigree
Commentators most often defend placing members of Congress in the
line of succession before cabinet members on the basis of democratic
pedigree, arguing that members of Congress are elected officials, and thus
most representative of the national electorate after the President and Vice
President.181 It is argued that cabinet members, on the other hand, are not
elected but are only appointed by the President.182 Although they are not
chosen by the electorate, cabinet members do represent the electorate’s
mandate as designees of the President, who is the most politically
representative of the national constituency.183 Furthermore, cabinet
members, other than interim appointments, are not only appointed by the
President but also must be confirmed by the Senate, which places them in
the unique position of having been confirmed by “two continental
institutions,”184 in contrast to the Speaker of the House and the President
pro tempore, who are selected only by their local constituency and then by
their respective houses.185
2. Party Continuity
The current line of succession can effectuate a change of party in the
White House if the legislative leader who assumes the powers and duties of
the presidency belongs to the party opposite that of the elected President.
Because a party shift could occur at any time during a presidential term, and
the 1947 Act does not provide for special elections, the party which was not
elected to the presidency could control the office of the President for up to
four years (should a dual inability and/or vacancy occur, for example, on or
after Inauguration Day), contrary to the electorate’s mandate. Such a shift
may be viewed as illegitimate in the eyes of the electorate.

180. For further discussion on the effect acting secretaries might have on implementing
the line of succession, as well as the concerns regarding their presidential qualifications, see
infra Appendix E.
181. See Amar & Amar, supra note 159, at 130 (noting that this argument is often made).
182. President Truman, in his address to Congress, criticized a cabinet line of succession,
where the President has the ability to nominate the person who would be the “immediate
successor in the event of [the President’s] own death or inability to act.” H.R. DOC. NO.79246, at 1 (1945).
183. See id.; see also Steven G. Calabresi, The Political Question of Presidential
Succession, 48 STAN. L. REV. 155, 172–73 (1995).
184. Amar & Amar, supra note 159, at 131.
185. Id. at 130–31.
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3. Historical Precedent
There is historical precedent for a legislative line of succession. Scholars
such as James E. Fleming argue that if the question of the constitutionality
of a legislative line of succession were to come before the Supreme Court,
the burden of proof would be on those arguing against the constitutionality
of the 1792 and 1947 Acts.186
E. Recommendations For Future Action
1. Executive Line of Succession187
The Clinic recommends an executive line of succession that would
include all cabinet secretaries in the order in which their departments were
established. Cabinet secretaries should be required to resign from their
positions if they act as President in cases of death, resignation, or removal,
not because of a separation of powers issue, but so that their offices can be
filled with a new secretary and so that there will be a full Cabinet. As a
matter of constitutional law, an executive line of succession cannot be
challenged because cabinet secretaries, unlike legislative leaders, are clearly
“Officers” under Article II, Section 1, Clause 6. Furthermore, cabinet
secretaries, by virtue of their position in government and day-to-day
involvement in the administration of the executive branch, are more likely
than legislators to run the executive branch consistent with the views held
by the former or unable President.
Finally, an executive line of succession moots the bumping provision. If
legislators are no longer in the line of succession, they cannot bump an
executive officer acting as President.
2. Binary Line of Succession
As an alternative to an executive line of succession, the Clinic proposes
that, in cases of presidential inability and vice presidential inability or
vacancy, the line of succession should temporarily run through the cabinet
secretaries. Under this proposal, cabinet secretaries should not be required
186. James E. Fleming, Presidential Succession: The Art of the Possible, 79 FORDHAM L.
REV. 951, 952–56 (2010).
187. The Clinic also discussed maintaining the current legislative-cabinet line of
succession, but to modify it to maintain party continuity by placing the leaders of the
President’s party in the House of Representatives and the Senate in the line of succession,
rather than the Speaker and President pro tempore regardless of their party affiliation. The
Clinic does not support this recommendation. First, the question remains unanswered as to
whether the Speaker and President pro tempore are “Officers” in the constitutional sense.
The creation of additional offices within the House of Representatives and the Senate would
create positions that are even less clearly “Officers” because these new positions are not
specifically enumerated in the Constitution. Second, because the proposed positions within
Congress are not constitutionally mandated—unlike the Speaker and President pro
tempore—they may be revoked based on a simple vote within each House, which would add
to the uncertainty in the line of succession. For a thoughtful discussion and contrary
recommendations on this subject, see Goldstein, supra note 9, at 1038–39.
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to resign from their positions because no separation of powers issues are
implicated and cabinet secretaries can return to their former offices without
a second presidential nomination and subsequent Senate confirmation. This
approach promotes party continuity during times of temporary presidential
inability. In the event of a dual presidential and vice presidential vacancy
due to death, resignation, or removal from office, under this binary
approach the line of succession would continue as it currently stands under
the 1947 Act, with successors running first to the legislative leaders and
then to cabinet secretaries.188
F. Recommendations For Immediate Action
1. Acting Secretaries
The Clinic recommends that Congress confirm whether acting secretaries
are included in the line of succession and, if so, either remove them from
the line, or alternatively, amend the 1947 Act so that acting secretaries can
assume the powers and duties of the presidency, in the order of their
departments’ creation, but only after succession has passed through all of
the cabinet secretaries. Greater clarity is needed on the subject of their
inclusion. We are aware that the Continuity in Government Commission
and various legislative proposals189 suggest that acting secretaries be
excluded altogether, reflecting to some extent a doubt as to their
qualifications to serve in the highest office. However, we do not rush to
this conclusion even in the face of such impressive authority, believing that
a number of individuals who serve in these positions are highly qualified
and have been confirmed by the Senate. Their inclusion in the line of
succession does have the benefit of deepening the line of succession in the
event of a catastrophe. Finally, if acting secretaries are included in the line
of succession, then the departmental lines of succession need to be more
carefully studied to determine the qualifications of the individuals in those
lines of succession for possible presidential service. Either explicitly
excluding acting secretaries from the line of succession, or allowing acting
secretaries to assume the powers and duties of the presidency only after all
succession has run through all of the cabinet secretaries, would greatly
reduce confusion were statutory succession triggered in the event of a mass
catastrophe and, in particular, were an unknown acting secretary of
questionable presidential pedigree to succeed to the presidency.
VII. PRE-INAUGURAL SUCCESSION CONTINGENCIES
A. Introduction
The peaceful and orderly transfer of executive power, beginning with the
popular election and culminating with the inauguration of the new
188. See infra Appendix D for Congressman Brad Sherman’s similar proposal.
189. For a more complete discussion of the Continuity of Government’s proposal and the
proposed legislation, see infra Appendix D.
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President, is crucial to the continuity of a democratic government that is
responsive and accountable to the electorate. Lack of clarity in the
constitutional provisions, federal statutes, state laws, and party rules
governing candidate succession during the pre-inaugural period threatens
the orderly transfers of presidential power.190 The contingencies raised
below therefore merit attention, are ripe for reform, and are no less
important than post-inaugural contingencies.
B. Legal Framework
Constitutional provisions, federal and state statutes, and political party
rules govern the modern system of pre-inaugural presidential succession.191
This section identifies the sources of law that are applicable at specific
junctures in the pre-inaugural period and the relationships among them.
Contingencies that may occur prior to a general election—during which
prospective candidates campaign for their parties’ nominations in primaries,
caucuses, and party conventions—are governed almost exclusively by party
rules and state law. The Rules of the Republican Party, adopted at the 40th
Republican National Convention held August 27–30, 2012, state:
The Republican National Committee is hereby authorized and empowered
to fill any and all vacancies which may occur by reason of death,
declination, or otherwise of the Republican candidate for President of the
United States or the Republican candidate for Vice President of the
United States, as nominated by the national convention, or the Republican
National Committee may reconvene the national convention for the
purpose of filling any such vacancies.192

Similarly, the Democratic National Committee has the responsibility of
filling vacancies on the party’s national ticket that occur prior to the general
election. The Charter and the Bylaws of the Democratic Party of the United
States, as amended by the Democratic National Committee on August 20,
2010, provide:
The Democratic National Committee shall have general responsibility for
the affairs of the Democratic Party between National Conventions, subject
to the provisions of this Charter and to the resolutions or other actions of
the National Convention. This responsibility shall include . . . (c) filling
vacancies in the nominations for the office of President and Vice
President.193

190. This discussion is limited to death or resignation of a candidate or nominee. The
possible contingencies arising from temporary or permanent inability, though worthy of
prompt attention and scrutiny, are numerous and largely beyond the scope of this inquiry in
the pre-inaugural period.
191. See infra Appendix A for the text of these constitutional provisions, federal statutes,
and political party rules. See infra Appendix F, Chart 5 for the text of the state statutes.
192. REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., THE RULES OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY 8 (2012),
available at http://www.gop.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/2012_RULES_Adopted.pdf).
193. DEMOCRATIC NAT’L COMM., THE CHARTER & THE BYLAWS OF THE DEMOCRATIC
PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES 3 (2010), available at http://www.democrats.org/files/misc/
pdf/Charter_and_Bylaws_8_20_10.php.
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The Democratic National Committee, in the Call for the 2012
Democratic National Convention, stipulates:
In the event of death, resignation or disability of a nominee of the Party
for President or Vice President after the adjournment of the National
Convention, the National Chairperson of the Democratic National
Committee shall confer with the Democratic leadership of the United
States Congress and the Democratic Governors Association and shall
report to the Democratic National Committee, which is authorized to fill
the vacancy or vacancies.194

The Constitution provides in Article II, Section 1, Clause 4 that “[t]he
Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on
which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout
the United States.”195 In 1845, Congress established the date for the
general election in a presidential year to be the first Tuesday after the first
Monday in November. The general election is the process whereby
presidential electors are chosen by popular vote in each state.196 In the
event of a mass catastrophe, such as a terrorist attack that prevents citizens
from going to the polls or the death of a party’s nominee in the period prior
to the general election, Congress is constitutionally authorized to delay the
date of the election.197 Fortunately, Congress has never had to act on this
authority.198
Prior to the general election, each state is responsible for selecting its
presidential electors.199 Generally, candidates for presidential Elector are
nominated by the state political parties, which are responsible for filing the
electors’ names with the Secretary of State of their respective states.200
Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 provides the manner in which these
selections are to be made:

194. DEMOCRATIC NAT’L COMM., CALL FOR THE 2012 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL
CONVENTION 18 (2012), available at http://www.thegreenpapers.com/P12/2010-08-20DRAFT_2012_Call_for_Convention_8_19_10.pdf.
195. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4.
196. See Act of Jan. 23, 1845, ch. 1, 5 Stat. 721 (current version at 3 U.S.C. § 1 (2006))
(“[T]he electors of President and Vice President shall be appointed in each State on the
Tuesday next after the first Monday in November in every fourth year succeeding every
election of a President and Vice President.”).
197. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4.
198. In contrast, local governments have postponed elections in emergency situations.
The terrorist attack in New York City on September 11, 2001, resulted in the postponement
of citywide primary elections scheduled that day and which were already underway at the
time of the attack. A New York Supreme Court order canceling the election was followed
by an executive order by Governor George E. Pataki temporarily suspending the election.
Jerry H. Goldfeder, Could Terrorists Derail a Presidential Election?, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
523, 525–26 (2005).
199. See 3 U.S.C. § 1. Under the Twenty-Third Amendment, the District of Columbia is
also entitled to appoint electors. The Amendment provides: “The District . . . shall appoint
. . . [a] number of electors of President and Vice President equal to the whole number of
Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the District would be entitled if it were a
State, but in no event more than the least populous State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII, § 1.
200. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 103.021 (West 2012).
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Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may
direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and
Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but
no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or
Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.201

After the general election, the electors are required to meet and are
expected to cast their electoral votes for the candidates to whom they are
pledged.202 Under current law, the presidential electors meet in their
respective state capitals and in the District of Columbia forty-one days
following the general election.203 At these fifty-one separate meetings, the
electors cast their electoral votes in the manner required by the Twelfth
Amendment, which states:
The Electors shall meet in their respective states and vote by ballot for
President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an
inhabitant of the same state with themselves; they shall name in their
ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person
voted for as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all
persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as VicePresident, and of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign
and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the
United States, directed to the President of the Senate.204

Federal law does not require electors in each state to vote for any
particular candidate.205 Many states, however, mandate by statute that
electors vote for candidates to whom they have pledged their votes.206
These statutory mandates create a potential crisis if a presidential or vice
presidential candidate dies between Election Day in November and the
meeting of the Electoral College in mid-December. In such a case,
“[t]heoretically, the electors would be free to vote for anyone they pleased.
But the national party rules for the filling of vacancies by the national
committees would still be in effect, and the electors would probably respect
the decision of their national committee on a new nominee.”207 The
political parties, relying on the authority granted to them in their respective
party rules and bylaws, likely would recommend a replacement candidate
for whom the electors should vote.
201. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
202. THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 20273, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE:
HOW IT WORKS IN CONTEMPORARY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 1, 3–4 (2003), available at
fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/28109.pdf.
203. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 644, 62 Stat. 673 (current version at 3 U.S.C. § 7 (2006))
(“The electors of President and Vice President of each State shall meet and give their votes
on the first Monday after the second Wednesday in December next following their
appointment at such place in each State as the legislature of such State shall direct.”).
204. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
205. See Beverly J. Ross & Michael Josephson, The Electoral College and the Popular
Vote, 12 J.L. & POL. 665, 671–73 (1996).
206. See infra Appendix F, Chart 5 (setting out the text of these state statutes).
207. Presidential Succession Between the Popular Election and the Inauguration:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d
Cong. 44 (1994) (statement of Prof. Lawrence D. Longley).
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After the electoral votes are cast by the electors and certified by the
appropriate state official, the votes are sealed and transmitted to the
President of the U.S. Senate, the Vice President.208 The Twelfth
Amendment provides that “[t]he President of the Senate shall, in the
presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the
certificates and the votes shall then be counted.”209 By federal statute, the
joint session of Congress is required to take place at 1:00 p.m. on January 6
in the calendar year following the meetings of the Electoral College.210 The
person receiving the greatest number of votes for President becomes
President, provided he receives a majority of the electoral votes.211
Likewise, the person receiving the greatest number of votes for Vice
President becomes Vice President, provided he receives a majority of the
electoral votes.212
If no candidate for President receives a majority, the House of
Representatives is required, pursuant to the Twelfth Amendment, to go into
session and choose the President “from the persons having the highest
numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President.”213
The state delegations cast their votes for President “by states,” with each
state having one vote; a candidate must receive the votes of an absolute
majority of state delegations—twenty-six—in order to become Presidentelect.214
Similarly, if no candidate for Vice President receives a majority of the
electoral votes, then, pursuant to the Twelfth Amendment, the Senate is
required to go into session and choose the Vice President “from the two
highest numbers on the list.”215 A candidate must receive the vote of the
“majority of the whole number” of Senators—fifty-one—in order to
become Vice President elect.216
Section 4 of the Twentieth Amendment provides that, in the event of the
death of any of the candidates from whom the respective Houses may
choose the President or Vice President, Congress retains the authority to
provide for a possible solution:
The Congress may by law provide for the case of the death of any of the
persons from whom the House of Representatives may choose a President
whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them, and for the
case of the death of any of the persons from whom the Senate may choose

208. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
209. Id.; see also Nathan L. Colvin & Edward B. Foley, Lost Opportunity: Learning the
Wrong Lesson from the Hayes-Tilden Dispute, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1043, 1045 (2010)
(discussing the ambiguity of the constitutional language with regard to who and how the
count is conducted because of the constitutional provision’s passive voice).
210. 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2006).
211. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
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a Vice President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon
them.217

If the House of Representatives fails to choose a President-elect in time
for the inauguration on January 20,218 then Section 3 of the Twentieth
Amendment specifies that the Vice President elect becomes Acting
President until the House chooses a President when the right of choice
devolves upon it.219 If the Senate has also failed to choose a Vice President
elect by Inauguration Day, then, under the 1947 Act, the next in the line of
succession, currently the Speaker of the House, becomes Acting President
until either the House selects a President or the Senate selects a Vice
President.220
If the President-elect dies between the counting of the electoral votes by
Congress on January 6 and Inauguration Day on January 20, then under the
Twentieth Amendment the Vice President elect becomes President.221 In
the event of the death of the Vice President elect during this period, the
President, at the beginning of his term of office, must nominate a new Vice
President for congressional confirmation pursuant to Section 2 of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment.222 In the event that both the President-elect and
Vice President elect die during this same period, the statutory line of
succession goes into effect on Inauguration Day, placing the Speaker, the
President pro tempore, and then cabinet secretaries—in the order of their
departments’ creation—in the line for the presidency.223 The Speaker then
becomes the Acting President for the full presidential term; but, if neither a
Speaker nor a President pro tempore is available, the cabinet member next
in line of succession would become Acting President until a Speaker or
President pro tempore becomes available.224
C. Succession Prior to the General Election
If death or resignation occurs prior to the general election, the political
party of the candidate can fill the vacancy in the ticket.225 As stated above,
217. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 4.
218. Id. amend. XX, § 1.
219. Id. amend. XX, § 3 (“If a President shall not have been chosen before the time fixed
for the beginning of his term, or if the President elect shall have failed to qualify, then the
Vice-President elect shall act as President until a President shall have qualified.”). The
Twelfth Amendment confirms the elevation of the Vice President to Acting President if the
House fails to select a President. Id. amend. XII (“And if the House of Representatives shall
not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them . . . then the
Vice President shall act as President, as in the case of the death or other constitutional
disability of the President.”).
220. Presidential Succession Act of 1947, 3 U.S.C. § 19(a) (2006).
221. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 3 (“If, at the time fixed for the beginning of the term of
the President, the President elect shall have died, the Vice President elect shall become
President.”).
222. Id. amend. XXV, § 2.
223. 3 U.S.C. § 19; Richard Albert, The Constitutional Politics of Presidential
Succession, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 497, 536 (2011) (noting that “departmental seniority
determines the order of precedence among cabinet secretaries”).
224. Id.
225. See supra notes 192–94 and accompanying text.
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Congress can also delay the date of the presidential election.226 In the rare
instances in which a vice presidential candidate has died or resigned, the
national party executive committees, usually in consultation with the
presidential candidate, convened to select a replacement candidate in
accordance with the party rules. For example, President William Howard
Taft’s incumbent Vice President, James S. Sherman, died on October 30,
1912, just days before the national popular election.227 Vice President
Sherman’s name remained on the ballot because his death occurred so close
to the election.228 On November 12, 1912, the Republican National
Committee selected Columbia University President Nicholas Murray Butler
as Sherman’s replacement.229 Electors for Sherman voted for Butler when
the Electoral College met.230
In 1972, Democratic presidential nominee George McGovern selected
Senator Thomas Eagleton as his vice presidential candidate, and the party
subsequently nominated him at the national party convention.231 Senator
Eagleton withdrew his name from the ticket on July 31, 1972, after he
disclosed that he had been hospitalized three times for the treatment of
The Democratic National Committee nominated
depression.232
McGovern’s replacement choice for Vice President—Sargent Shriver—on
August 8, 1972, in a meeting open to the press.233
The rules of both major political parties delegate a great deal of
discretion to their executive committees for selecting replacement
candidates.234 In exercising this discretion, the parties should fulfill the
electorate’s expectations of transparency, process, and certainty by
clarifying the procedure for selecting replacement candidates in the party
rules and bylaws. As necessary, these changes should be adopted before
the national party conventions.

226.
227.
228.
229.

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4.
Sherman is Dead, Hurt by Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1912, at 1.
No Provision for Sherman’s Successor, N.Y. TRIBUNE, Oct. 31, 1912, at 2.
THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34692, PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION:
PERSPECTIVES, CONTEMPORARY ANALYSIS, AND 110TH CONGRESS PROPOSED LEGISLATION 13
(2008) (“The Republican National Committee met after election day and appointed Nicholas
M. Butler to replace Sherman on the ticket . . . .”), available at www.fas.org/sgp/
crs/misc/RL34692.pdf.
230. See FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS, supra note 138, at 161.
231. James N. Naughton, Shriver Is Named for Second Place by the Democrats, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 9, 1972, at 1.
232. Id.; see also James N. Giglio, The Eagleton Affair: Thomas Eagleton, George
McGovern, and the 1972 Vice Presidential Nomination, 39 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 647, 658,
669–71 (2009).
233. Naughton, supra note 231.
234. REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., supra note 192, at 8; DEMOCRATIC NAT’L COMM., supra
note 193, at 3.
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1. Succession Prior to the National Party Convention
If the death or resignation of a presidential candidate occurs prior to the
national party convention,235 the party executive committee determines the
obligation of the pledged delegates, if any, won through primary
elections.236 Parties should consider two possible amendments to their
rules: releasing the pledged delegates from their obligation to vote for
certain candidates, and awarding the pledged delegates won by the absent
candidate to another candidate.
2. Succession After the National Party Convention
The death or resignation of a presidential or vice presidential candidate
after the national political party convention, but prior to the general
election, poses additional concerns.
The national party executive
committee has the authority to name a replacement candidate here as
well.237 The primary voters and the convention delegates have already
fulfilled their duties. While not impossible, recalling the thousands of
convention delegates would present an enormous financial and logistical
burden and may not prove to be more transparent, democratic, or certain
than a meeting of the national party executive committee.
3. Recommendations
The national party committees should examine the need for criteria and
procedures to guide the selection process in the event of the death,
resignation, or inability of a candidate prior to the general election. For
instance, in the case of vacancy caused by death or resignation, the party
executive committee could meet to select a replacement candidate, in
consultation with members of Congress and governors from the same
party,238 and together lay out criteria for replacement candidates. The
criteria should vary to account for the many circumstances leading to the
succession of a presidential candidate and might include national security
experience, previous exposure to the electorate, or continuity of policy
235. If the death or resignation of a candidate occurs before any primary elections are
held, there may still be issues concerning state qualifying periods, names printed on ballots,
early voting, and absentee voting. These merit attention but are outside the scope of this
Clinic.
236. But see H.R. REP. NO. 72-345, at 5 (1932) (“A constitutional amendment is not
necessary to provide for the case of the death of a party nominee before the November
elections. Presidential electors, and not the President, are chosen at the November election.
. . . The electors, under the present Constitution, would be free to choose a President,
notwithstanding the death of a party nominee.”) (citation omitted).
237. See supra notes 227–34 and accompanying text.
238. The national political party conventions are held in the summer, leaving anywhere
from two to three months between the convention and the national popular election on the
first Tuesday after the first Monday in November. Members of Congress and governors are
usually granted unpledged delegate status and may vote as they wish for the party nominees
during the party conventions. Therefore, consultation with these individuals will provide the
parties with guidance similar to that given by the unpledged delegates at the party
conventions.
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positions with the deceased or resigned candidate. The national party
executive committee could also create expedited timelines for recalling
convention delegates.
Where a running mate has died or withdrawn, we would expect the
presidential candidate to have a major role in the process of selecting a
replacement. Conversely, we would expect the vice presidential running
mate to receive every appropriate consideration as the replacement
candidate for a presidential nominee who had died or resigned before the
general election. This consideration would have different weight if the
succession event occurred after the election when the electorate has
expressed itself.
The value of transparency suggests that the meetings of the national party
committees when considering replacement candidates should be open to the
public and the press and should be televised. When a national party
committee takes on the extraordinary role of selecting a replacement
candidate, the privacy ordinarily afforded to internal party decisions should
be sacrificed to ensure that the public’s confidence is served by the party’s
process and the results of its deliberations.239
D. Succession After the General Election but Before the Meetings of
the Electoral College
Replacement of a candidate, who has died or resigned during the fortyone day period between the general election on the first Tuesday after the
first Monday in November, and the casting of votes by the Electoral
College in mid-December, must respect the fact that the electorate has
spoken through a national election. Historically, the national party
committees have instructed each party’s electors how to cast their electoral
votes in the event of the death of a candidate.240 However, whether there is
a legal obligation for a presidential elector to vote according to party
instructions, including a vote for a replacement nominee, is a question that
“cannot be answered with any certainty.”241
Speaking to this contingency, a 1932 House Report interpreting Article
II, Section 3 and the Twelfth Amendment stated that electors are free
agents: “Presidential electors, and not the President, are chosen at the
239. The Charter and the Bylaws of the Democratic Party provide that “[a]ll meetings of
the Democratic National Committee, the Executive Committee, and all other official Party
committees, commissions and bodies shall be open to the public, and votes shall not be taken
by secret ballot.” DEMOCRATIC NAT’L COMM., supra note 193, at 7. The Rules of the
Republican Party provide that “[a]ll meetings of the Republic National Committee and all of
its committees shall be open meetings, except as provided for by Robert’s Rules of Order,”
and that “[n]o votes (except elections to office when properly ordered pursuant to the
provisions of Robert’s Rules of Order) shall be taken by secret ballot in any open meeting of
the Republic National Committee or of any committee thereof.” REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM.,
supra note 192, at 6, 7.
240. See supra notes 231–33 and accompanying text.
241. Memorandum from John D. Feerick to Hon. Richard H. Poff on the “Legal
Obligation” of a Presidential Elector to Vote for his Party Nominee 1 (Feb. 29, 1968) (on file
with the Fordham Law Review).
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November election. The electors, under the present Constitution, would be
free to choose a President, notwithstanding the death of a party
nominee.”242 Under this interpretation, electors cannot be compelled to
vote for their party’s nominees.243 Several historical instances of
“unfaithful” electors have not stopped Congress from counting those
electors’ votes,244 supporting the view that presidential electors are free
agents.245
Yet, history and custom also indicate that Congress can invalidate
electoral votes cast against party instructions in the case of a nominee’s
death. Horace Greeley, the 1872 presidential nominee for the Democratic
and Liberal Republican parties, died on November 29, 1872, a few weeks
after the national popular election held on November 5, 1872. Sixty-three
of the sixty-six presidential electors whom Greeley won voted for other
candidates in accordance with party instructions. Congress declined to
count the three votes from Georgia cast for Greeley against party
instructions on the ground that electoral votes cast for a dead person246 were
invalid.247 Congress, however, grouped those three electoral votes with all
other electoral votes cast for the purpose of determining the number needed
for an electoral majority.248
According to the law of some states, presidential electors are held
accountable if they do not vote as instructed by the party at the meeting of
the Electoral College.249 More than half the states and the District of
Columbia have adopted laws aimed at deterring unfaithful electors.250 In a
majority of these states, an elector pledges to vote for his party’s nominee
for President and Vice President when the Electoral College meets to cast
242. H.R. REP. NO. 72-345, at 5 (1932); see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; id. amend. XII.
243. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
244. Over the history of the United States, eighty-two electoral votes have been changed
on the initiative of the individual elector. See Faithless Electors, FAIRVOTE ARCHIVES,
http://archive.fairvote.org/faithless.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2012).
245. See JOHN C. FORTIER ET AL., AFTER THE PEOPLE VOTE: A GUIDE TO THE ELECTORAL
COLLEGE 8 (John C. Fortier ed., AEI Press 3d ed. 2004); Akhil Reed Amar, Presidents, Vice
Presidents, and Death: Closing the Constitution’s Succession Gap, 48 ARK. L. REV. 215,
230 (1995).
246. As recounted in the congressional debates:
Mr. Hoar objects that the votes reported by the tellers as having been cast by the
electors of the State of Georgia for Horace Greeley, of New York, cannot lawfully
be counted because said Horace Greeley, for whom they appear to have been cast,
was dead at the time said electors assembled to cast their votes, and was not a
“person” within the meaning of the Constitution, this being an historic fact of
which the two Houses may properly take notice.
COUNTING ELECTORAL VOTES: PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF CONGRESS RELATING TO
COUNTING THE ELECTORAL VOTES FOR PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, H.R. MISC. DOC. NO. 44-13, at 372 (1877) [hereinafter COUNTING ELECTORAL
VOTES].
247. See id. at 363–80; see also THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22992,
THE PRESIDENT-ELECT: SUCCESSION AND DISABILITY ISSUES DURING THE TRANSITION
PERIOD 3 (2008), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS22992.pdf.
248. COUNTING ELECTORAL VOTES, supra note 246, at 407.
249. Six states have enacted civil and criminal penalties for faithless electors. See infra
Appendix F, Chart 5 for the text of these states’ statutes.
250. See infra Appendix F, Chart 5 for the text of these state statutes.
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its votes. In the other states, electors are obligated to vote for the winners
of the state’s popular election.251 Although the courts have never addressed
the question whether state laws binding electors are enforceable, the courts
have upheld the constitutionality of these laws. In Ray v. Blair, the
Supreme Court held that it is constitutional for states to allow parties to
require pledges from the electors,252 as the electors are actors on behalf of
their respective states.253 Moreover, the Court held that a state has the right
to reject the appointment of an elector who refuses to take the pledge
required by his party.254
The result of a national popular election presumably cements in the
minds of the voters the expectation that the successor to the incoming
President will be the newly-elected Vice President. Of course, under the
Twentieth Amendment, this would not occur until Inauguration Day.255
Nevertheless, to fulfill voters’ expectations after a presidential election, the
successful vice presidential nominee should be assured of succession if the
successful presidential nominee dies or resigns after Election Day, even if
the electors have the power to cast their votes for someone else in the period
before Inauguration Day, when the Twentieth Amendment would take
effect.256 Since voters would expect the electors to vote for the winners of
each state’s popular vote, the party executive committees should exercise
their discretion to instruct the electors to vote for the successful vice
presidential nominee to replace a deceased presidential nominee and to
recommend, not instruct, a vote by the electors for a new vice presidential
nominee.
1. Recommendations
In the event of the death of a successful presidential nominee after the
general election but before the meeting of the Electoral College, we urge
the parties to adopt rules that automatically elevate the vice presidential
nominee to the position of presidential nominee.257 In addition, the party
251. See infra Appendix A.
252. Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 231 (1952).
253. Id. at 224.
254. Id. at 225.
255. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 3.
256. The nominees for President and Vice President, of course, are not “elected” on
Election Day. Rather, voters elect electors on Election Day, and the electors in turn elect a
President and Vice President when they meet in December to cast their electoral votes. Even
at this point, the nominees for President and Vice President are not yet “elected” because
Congress must validate and count the electoral votes. A presidential nominee becomes the
President-elect and a vice presidential nominee becomes the Vice President elect upon the
count and declaration of electoral votes by Congress. See generally NEALE, supra note 247,
at 3–4. But see H.R. REP. NO. 72-345, at 5 (1932) (“[V]otes which were cast for a person,
who was eligible at the time the votes were cast but who has died before the votes are
counted by Congress . . . . must be counted by Congress.”).
257. The general notion of elevating the candidate for Vice President of the same party to
the presidential spot has some support in Congress, although the means identified for
effectuating this are different from the recommendation in this Report. See Presidential
Succession Act of 2010, H.R. 6557, 111th Cong. § 3 (2010) (suggesting the elevation of the
vice presidential candidate of the same party to the presidential slot and the selection of the
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should issue recommendations to the electors for whom they should vote
for Vice President.258 To the extent that state laws binding presidential
electors conflict with the above recommendation, state legislatures should
amend those statutes and release electors from an obligation to cast an
electoral vote for a dead nominee.259
E. Succession After the Electoral College Vote but Before the Counting and
Declaration of Electoral Votes by Congress
Congress is the ultimate arbiter of electoral votes in the event of the death
or resignation of a successful presidential or vice presidential nominee, or
both, during the period between the meeting of the Electoral College and
January 6, when Congress counts the electoral votes.260 The Twelfth
Amendment states that “[t]he President of the Senate shall . . . open all the
certificates and the votes shall then be counted.”261 It is unclear whether
Congress can invalidate electoral votes cast for a presidential or vice
presidential nominee who dies after the meeting of the Electoral College.262
As in other pre-inaugural periods, the death or resignation of a
presidential or vice presidential nominee poses less urgent problems than in
the case of double death or double resignation.263 There are two outcomes
if Congress counts the votes for a nominee who has won a majority of the
electoral votes but dies or resigns after the votes have been cast. First, in
the event of death or resignation of the presidential nominee, the vice
presidential nominee would become President upon taking the presidential
oath of office on Inauguration Day.264 Second, in the event of the death of
the vice presidential nominee, the President, after assuming office, must
nominate a new Vice President pursuant to Section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment.265
replacement vice presidential candidate via predetermined contingent choices by presidential
electors).
258. Because it would be non-binding, this specific recommendation likely would play an
important role in limiting the political jockeying by electors to put the election before
Congress. If a sufficient number of electors feel forced to vote in a way with which they
disagree, they may switch their electoral votes for President and thereby deny all of the
candidates a majority of the electoral votes, throwing the election to the House of
Representatives. While a non-binding suggestion carries the authoritative weight of the
party, the ultimate election of the replacement Vice President should be left up to the
individual electors. See generally Amar, supra note 245, at 219. Of course, in the event that
the presidential election is thrown into the House or the vice presidential election into the
Senate, Congress would have the authority to disregard party recommendations or
instructions. See U.S. CONST. amend XX, § 4.
259. Apparently, only Wisconsin’s statute regarding presidential electors explicitly
releases electors from their statutory obligation upon the death of the candidate to whom
they are pledged. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 7.75 (West 2004).
260. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
261. Id.; see also 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2006).
262. See H.R. REP. NO. 72-345, at 4–5 (1932) (supporting the proposition that Congress
must count electoral votes cast for nominees alive at the time of the meeting of the Electoral
College); Amar, supra note 245, at 218.
263. See Amar, supra note 245, at 234.
264. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 1.
265. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 2.
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If Congress counts the electoral votes for the successful presidential and
vice presidential nominees who both had died after the meeting of the
Electoral College, the next person in the line of succession would become
Acting President upon taking the oath of office on January 20.266 Thus, if
the next in line is a member of a different party from that of the deceased
President-elect and Vice President elect, the result would be a change in the
party of the President-elect, contrary to the expressed will of the electorate.
This would present a politically difficult situation for members of Congress
charged with determining the outcome of a presidential election. The
alternative—the refusal of Congress to count votes cast for nominees living
at the time of the Electoral College vote—would run afoul of the Twelfth
Amendment.
1. Recommendation
Ultimately, in light of the constitutional mandate in the Twelfth
Amendment to count all electoral votes and the statutory provision267
disfavoring objections to electoral votes cast for living nominees, we
believe that Congress lacks the authority to refuse to count electoral votes
cast for nominees who were living at the time of the meeting of the
Electoral College. Congress must count those votes, regardless of
subsequent death or resignation.268
F. Succession After the Count and Declaration of Electoral Votes by
Congress but Before Inauguration Day
As noted previously, the death of either a President-elect or Vice
President elect during the fourteen days between the congressional count
and declaration of the electoral votes on January 6 and the inauguration on
January 20 is addressed by the Twentieth and Twenty-Fifth Amendments,
respectively.
How to address the death or resignation or inability of both the Presidentelect and Vice President elect during this period may present complications
if there is no Speaker or President pro tempore. The 1947 Act contains the
list of officers eligible to act as President in these circumstances, which
would trigger the cabinet line of succession.269 However, there may not
266. 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2006).
267. 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2006).
268. Furthermore, objections to electoral votes are prohibited by statute if those votes
were “regularly given by electors whose appointment has been lawfully certified.” Id.
Although the Greeley precedent would invalidate electoral votes cast for candidates who
died before the meeting of the Electoral College, this does not mean that Congress can
invalidate electoral votes cast for qualified nominees who were alive at the time of the
Electoral College vote. A “qualified” nominee is one who meets the Article II, Section 1
requirements to run for President: “No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of
the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the
Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have
attained to the Age of thirty-five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the
United States.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
269. 3 U.S.C. § 19.
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have been any cabinet nominations made by the outgoing President for the
Senate to confirm at the request of a newly-elected President.270 Thus, the
outgoing President’s cabinet members would be in the line of succession to
act as President if they had not yet resigned.
Recent practice has been for the President-elect to release the names of
his cabinet nominees and for Senate committees to hold confirmation
hearings for uncontroversial nominees before January 20. The term
“confirmation hearing” is not fully accurate because there is no presidential
nominee for the Senate committee to confirm prior to January 20. Rather,
Senate committees hold such hearings to decide whether to recommend
confirmation of the nominees to the full Senate, a vote which usually can
only occur after the newly-inaugurated President officially nominates his
cabinet selections, unless the outgoing President has agreed to do so or an
existing cabinet member continues to serve in the position.271
1. Recommendations
To ensure an orderly transition in a time of crisis, the Clinic recommends
adopting the Continuity of Government Commission’s recommendation272
for cooperation between the outgoing and incoming presidential
administrations to expedite the confirmation of incoming cabinet
members.273 The outgoing President and Congress have affirmative duties
in this regard under the Presidential Transition Act of 1963.274 The Clinic
270. The Constitution provides that only a President, not a President-elect, “shall
nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . all other
Officers of the United States . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
271. See Nina Rastogi, Aren’t These Confirmation Hearings a Bit Early?, SLATE (Jan. 15,
2009, 6:31 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2208771.
272. CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 115, at 49.
273. The proposed cooperation between outgoing and incoming administrations to
expedite the confirmation of cabinet members and secure the continuity of government has
support in Congress. See Presidential Succession Act of 2010, H.R. 6557, 111th Cong. § 4
(2010) (supporting the Continuity of Government Commission’s seventh recommendation).
274. Act of Mar. 7, 1964, 78 Stat. 153 (1948) (current version at 3 U.S.C. § 102 (2006))
(setting out the Presidential Transition Act of 1963 in the notes to 3 U.S.C. § 102). The
statute provides as follows:
The Congress declares it to be the purpose of this Act to promote the orderly
transfer of the executive power in connection with the expiration of the term of
office of a President and the inauguration of a new President. The national interest
requires that such transitions in the office of President be accomplished so as to
assure continuity in the faithful execution of the laws and in the conduct of the
affairs of the Federal Government, both domestic and foreign. Any disruption
occasioned by the transfer of the executive power could produce results
detrimental to the safety and well-being of the United States and its people.
Accordingly, it is the intent of the Congress that appropriate actions be authorized
and taken to avoid or minimize any disruption. In addition to the specific
provisions contained in this Act directed toward that purpose, it is the intent of the
Congress that all officers of the Government so conduct the affairs of the
Government for which they exercise responsibility and authority as (1) to be
mindful of problems occasioned by transitions in the office of President, (2) to take
appropriate lawful steps to avoid or minimize disruptions that might be occasioned
by the transfer of the executive power, and (3) otherwise to promote orderly
transitions in the office of President.
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suggests that the outgoing President consider promptly nominating cabinet
nominees that the President-elect submits to him prior to Inauguration
Day.275 Congress should confirm as many of these nominees as possible
prior to Inauguration Day, consistent with the proper discharge of its advice
and consent responsibility.276 As is now the practice, one or more of these
individuals should not attend the presidential inauguration and should be
located away from Washington, D.C., to ensure a line of succession that
reflects the results of the most recent presidential election.277
VIII. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Presidential and Acting Presidential Inability Recommendations
1. Statutory Action
1. Acknowledge that the President or Acting President, upon
declaration of his own inability, can transfer his powers voluntarily to the
next in the line of succession in instances of vice presidential inability or
vacancy.
2. Authorize the person next in the line of succession after the Vice
President, together with a majority of the Cabinet, to declare the inability of
the President or Acting President in instances of vice presidential inability
or vacancy.
2. Executive Contingency Planning
3. The President or Acting President should prepare a prospective
executive declaration of inability at the beginning of his service, in which
he would define the situations that in his view would render him unable to
discharge the powers and duties of the presidency in the future and would
provide that the declaration of his inability goes into effect based upon a
review process set out by the President or Acting President.

Id.; see also Jack M. Beermann & William P. Marshall, The Constitutional Law of
Presidential Transitions, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1253, 1276–80 (2006) (discussing the possibility
that the Take Care Clause places affirmative duties on the outgoing President in relation to
presidential transitions).
275. We believe that such an action by a sitting President would set a positive and
powerful precedent to be followed by future Presidents. If this recommendation is not
adopted, however, the current practice of holding hearings before Inauguration Day should
continue.
276. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
277. We recognize that under a cabinet line of succession, the death, resignation, or
failure to qualify of the President-elect and Vice President elect before cabinet nominations
are submitted to the outgoing President is a gap that is not addressed by these
recommendations. Under a legislative line of succession, the contingency does not create a
gap because the Speaker becomes Acting President upon taking the oath of office on January
20. Because the Clinic recommends the adoption of a cabinet line of succession, the cabinet
selection process should be expedited and should be one of the first items addressed by the
President-elect and the presidential transition team.
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B. Vice Presidential Inability Recommendation
1. Executive Contingency Planning
4. The Vice President should prepare a prospective executive
declaration of inability at the beginning of his service, in which he would
define the situations that in his view would render him unable to discharge
the powers and duties of the vice presidency in the future and would
provide that the declaration of his inability goes into effect based upon a
review process set out by the Vice President.
C. Line of Succession Recommendations
1. Statutory Action
5. Establish an executive line of succession that runs exclusively
through the Cabinet after the President and Vice President. In the case of
removal, death, or resignation of the President, the cabinet member
assuming the powers and duties of the presidency should be required to
resign from the Cabinet. In a case of inability, the cabinet member
assuming the powers and duties of the presidency should not be required to
resign.
6. In the event an executive line of succession is not adopted, establish
a binary line of succession that first runs through Congress, and then the
Cabinet, in instances of death, resignation, and removal. Successors would
be required to resign in these circumstances. The line of succession would
run solely through the Cabinet in instances of presidential and vice
presidential inability or failure to qualify. Under this proposal, when a
cabinet member assumes the powers and duties of the presidency, that
cabinet member would not be required to resign.
7. Confirm whether acting secretaries are included in the line of
succession and, if so, either remove them from the line, or alternatively,
amend the 1947 Act so that acting secretaries can assume the powers and
duties of the presidency, in the order of the departments’ creation, only after
succession has passed through all of the cabinet secretaries.
D. Pre-inaugural Period Recommendations
1. Political Party Rules
8. In the event of the death or resignation of a presidential candidate
before the political party conventions, require the parties to hold an open
meeting to decide which replacement candidate(s) will receive the
delegates’ votes.
9. In the event of the death or resignation of a presidential nominee
between the political party conventions and the general election, require the
parties to either hold an open meeting to select a replacement candidate or
recall the convention delegates.
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10. During the period between the general election and the meeting of
the Electoral College, provide that the vice presidential candidate replaces a
deceased or resigned presidential candidate of the same ticket and that the
candidate’s party issue recommendations to the presidential electors as to a
new candidate for the office of Vice President.
2. Congressional Rules
11. In the event of the death or resignation of a presidential or vice
presidential candidate between the meeting of the Electoral College and the
counting and declaration of the Electoral College votes by Congress,
require Congress to count votes cast for a candidate if he was alive at the
time of the Electoral College vote.
3. Executive Contingency Planning
12. During the period between the counting and declaration of Electoral
College votes by Congress and Inauguration Day, the outgoing President
should consider promptly nominating any cabinet nominees that the
President-elect submits to him, and Congress should confirm as many
nominees as possible prior to Inauguration Day, consistent with the proper
discharge of Congress’s advice and consent responsibility. One or more
newly confirmed cabinet secretaries should remain at a secure location
outside of Washington, D.C., on Inauguration Day. This recommendation
is particularly important in the case of an exclusively executive line of
succession, as the Clinic recommends.
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APPENDICES
A. Constitutional, Statutory, and Party Rule Provisions278
1. Article I, Section 2, Clause 1
The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen
every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in
each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most
numerous Branch of the State Legislature.279
2. Article I, Section 2, Clause 2
No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the
Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United
States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in
which he shall be chosen.280
3. Article I, Section 2, Clause 3
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several
States which may be included within this Union, according to their
respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole
Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of
Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons. The
actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting
of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of
ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. The Number of
Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each
State shall have at Least one Representative; and until such enumeration
shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three,
Massachusetts eight, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations one,
Connecticut five, New York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight,
Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South
Carolina five, and Georgia three.281
4. Article I, Section 2, Clause 4
When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the
Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such
Vacancies.282

278. This Appendix contains constitutional provisions without noting whether the
provision has been subsequently amended.
279. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
280. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
281. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
282. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 4.
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5. Article I, Section 2, Clause 5
The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other
Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.283
6. Article I, Section 3, Clause 2
Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence of the first
Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three Classes. The
Seats of the Senators of the first Class shall be vacated at the Expiration of
the second Year, of the second Class at the Expiration of the fourth Year,
and of the third Class at the Expiration of the sixth Year, so that one third
may be chosen every second Year; and if Vacancies happen by Resignation,
or otherwise, during the Recess of the Legislature of any State, the
Executive thereof may make temporary Appointments until the next
Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies.284
7. Article I, Section 3, Clause 3
No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of
thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who
shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be
chosen.285
8. Article I, Section 3, Clause 4
The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate,
but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.286
9. Article I, Section 3, Clause 5
The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a President pro
tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the
Office of President of the United States.287
10. Article I, Section 3, Clause 6
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When
sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the
President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And
no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the
Members present.288

283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 2.
Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 4.
Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 5.
Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
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11. Article I, Section 3, Clause 7
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to
removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of
honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall
nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and
Punishment, according to Law.289
12. Article I, Section 5, Clause 1
Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and
Qualifications of its own Members, and a Majority of each shall constitute a
Quorum to do Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn from day to
day, and may be authorized to compel the Attendance of absent Members,
in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each House may provide.290
13. Article I, Section 5, Clause 2
Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its
Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two
thirds, expel a Member.291
14. Article I, Section 5, Clause 3
Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to
time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment
require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on
any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on
the Journal.292
15. Article I, Section 5, Clause 4
Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the
Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other
Place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.293
16. Article II, Section 1, Clause 1
The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years, and,
together with the Vice President, chosen for the same Term, be elected, as
follows294

289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 3.
Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 4.
Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
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17. Article II, Section 1, Clause 2
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may
direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and
Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no
Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit
under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.295
18. Article II, Section 1, Clause 4
The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the
Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same
throughout the United States.296
19. Article II, Section 1, Clause 5
No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United
States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to
the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office
who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been
fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.297
20. Article II, Section 1, Clause 6
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death,
Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said
Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may
by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability,
both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then
act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability
be removed, or a President shall be elected.298
21. Article II, Section 1, Clause 7
The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a
Compensation, which shall neither be encreased nor diminished during the
Period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within
that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or any of them.299
22. Article II, Section 1, Clause 8
Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the
following Oath or Affirmation:—“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I
will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will

295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 4.
Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 7.
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to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of
the United States.”300
23. Article II, Section 3
He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State
of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he
shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions,
convene both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement
between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn
them to such Time as he shall think proper; he shall receive Ambassadors
and other public Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.301
24. Article II, Section 4
The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States,
shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of,
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.302
25. Twelfth Amendment
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot for
President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an
inhabitant of the same state with themselves; they shall name in their ballots
the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for
as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for
as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice-President, and of the
number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and
transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, directed
to the President of the Senate;—The President of the Senate shall, in the
presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the
certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—The person having the
greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such
number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and if no
person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest
numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the
House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the
President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by states,
the representation from each state having one vote; a quorum for this
purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the states,
and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the
House of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right of
choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next
following, then the Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of
300. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
301. Id. art. II, § 3.
302. Id. art. II, § 4.
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the death or other constitutional disability of the President.—The person
having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President, shall be the VicePresident, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors
appointed, and if no person have a majority, then from the two highest
numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum
for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators,
and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no
person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible
to that of Vice-President of the United States.303
26. Twentieth Amendment
SECTION 1. The terms of the President and Vice President shall end at
noon on the 20th day of January, and the terms of Senators and
Representatives at noon on the 3d day of January, of the years in which
such terms would have ended if this article had not been ratified; and the
terms of their successors shall then begin.
SEC. 2. The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and
such meeting shall begin at noon on the 3d day of January, unless they shall
by law appoint a different day.
SEC. 3. If, at the time fixed for the beginning of the term of the
President, the President elect shall have died, the Vice President elect shall
become President. If a President shall not have been chosen before the time
fixed for the beginning of his term, or if the President elect shall have failed
to qualify, then the Vice President elect shall act as President until a
President shall have qualified; and the Congress may by law provide for the
case wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice President elect shall have
qualified, declaring who shall then act as President, or the manner in which
one who is to act shall be selected, and such person shall act accordingly
until a President or Vice President shall have qualified.
SEC. 4. The Congress may by law provide for the case of the death of any
of the persons from whom the House of Representatives may choose a
President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them, and
for the case of the death of any of the persons from whom the Senate may
choose a Vice President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved
upon them.
SEC. 5. Sections 1 and 2 shall take effect on the 15th day of October
following the ratification of this article.
SEC. 6. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified
as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of
the several States within seven years from the date of its submission.304

303. Id. amend. XII.
304. Id. amend. XX.
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27. Twenty-Fifth Amendment
SECTION 1. In case of the removal of the President from office or of his
death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President.
SEC. 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President,
the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon
confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.
SEC. 3. Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written
declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary,
such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting
President.
SEC. 4. Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the
principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as
Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President pro tempore of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties
of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and
duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written
declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of
his office unless the Vice President and a majority of either the principal
officers of the executive department or of such other body as Congress may
by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties
of his office. Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within
forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session. If the Congress, within
twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written declaration, or, if
Congress is not in session, within twenty-one days after Congress is
required to assemble, determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
Vice President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President;
otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office.305
28. Presidential Succession Act of 1792
Chap. VIII.—An Act relative to the Election of a President and Vice
President of the United States, and declaring the Officer who shall act as
President in case of Vacancies in the offices both of President and Vice
President.
SECTION 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That except in case of
an election of a President and Vice President of the United States, prior to
305. Id. amend. XXV.
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the ordinary period as herein after specified, electors shall be appointed in
each state for the election of a President and Vice President of the United
States, within thirty-four days preceding the first Wednesday in December,
one thousand seven hundred and ninety-two, and within thirty-four days
preceding the first Wednesday in December in every fourth year succeeding
the last election, which electors shall be equal to the number of Senators
and Representatives, to which the several states may by law be entitled at
the time, when the President and Vice President, thus to be chosen, should
come into office: Provided always, That where no apportionment of
Representatives shall have been made after any enumeration, at the time of
choosing electors, then the number of electors shall be according to the
existing apportionment of Senators and Representatives.
SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That the electors shall meet and give
their votes on the said first Wednesday in December, at such place in each
state as shall be directed, by the legislature thereof; and the electors in each
state shall make and sign three certificates of all the votes by them given,
and shall seal up the same certifying on each that a list of the votes of such
state for President and Vice President is contained therein, and shall by
writing under their hands, or under the hands of a majority of them, appoint
a person to take charge of and deliver to the President of the Senate, at the
seat of government, before the first Wednesday in January then next
ensuing, one of the said certificates, and the said electors shall forthwith
forward by the post-office to the President of the Senate, at the seat of
government, one other of the said certificates, and shall forthwith cause the
other of the said certificates to be delivered to the judge of that district in
which the said electors shall assemble.
SEC. 3. And be it further enacted, That the executive authority of each
state shall cause three lists of the names of the electors of such state to be
made and certified and to be delivered to the electors on or before the said
first Wednesday in December, and the said electors shall annex one of the
said lists to each of the lists of their votes.
SEC. 4. And be it further enacted, That if a list of votes, from any state,
shall not have been received at the seat of government on the said first
Wednesday in January, that then the Secretary of State shall send a special
messenger to the district judge in whose custody such list shall have been
lodged, who shall forthwith transmit the same to the seat of government.
SEC. 5. And be it further enacted, That Congress shall be in session on
the second Wednesday in February, one thousand seven hundred and
ninety-three, and on the second Wednesday in February succeeding every
meeting of the electors, and the said certificates, or so many of them as shall
have been received, shall then be opened, the votes counted, and the
persons who shall fill the offices of President and Vice President
ascertained and declared, agreeably to the constitution.
SEC. 6. And be it further enacted, That in case there shall be no President
of the Senate at the seat of government on the arrival of the persons
entrusted with the lists of the votes of the electors, then such persons shall
deliver the lists of votes in their custody into the office of the Secretary of
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State, to be safely kept and delivered over as soon as may be, to the
President of the Senate.
SEC. 7. And be it further enacted, That the persons appointed by the
electors to deliver the lists of votes to the President of the Senate, shall be
allowed on the delivery of the said lists twenty-five cents for every mile of
the estimated distance by the most usual road, from the place of meeting of
the electors, to the seat of government of the United States.
SEC. 8. And be it further enacted, That if any person appointed to deliver
the votes of the electors to the President of the Senate, shall after accepting
of his appointment neglect to perform the services required of him by this
act, he shall forfeit the sum of one thousand dollars.
SEC. 9. And be it further enacted, That in case of removal, death,
resignation or inability both of the President and Vice President of the
United States, the President of the Senate pro tempore, and in case there
shall be no President of the Senate, then the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, for the time being shall act as President of the United
States until the disability be removed or a President shall be elected.
SEC. 10. And be it further enacted, That whenever the offices of
President and Vice President shall both become vacant, the Secretary of
State shall forthwith cause a notification thereof to be made to the executive
of every state, and shall also cause the same to be published in at least one
of the newspapers printed in each state, specifying that electors of the
President of the United States shall be appointed or chosen in the several
states within thirty-four days preceding the first Wednesday in December
then next ensuing: Provided, There shall be the space of two months
between the date of such notification and the said first Wednesday in
December, but if there shall not be the space of two months between the
date of such notification and the first Wednesday in December; and if the
term for which the President and Vice President last in office were elected
shall not expire on the third day of March next ensuing, then the Secretary
of State shall specify in the notification that the electors shall be appointed
or chosen within thirty-four days preceding the first Wednesday in
December in the year next ensuing, within which time the electors shall
accordingly be appointed or chosen, and the electors shall meet and give
their votes on the said first Wednesday in December, and the proceedings
and duties of the said electors and others shall be pursuant to the directions
prescribed in this act.
SEC. 11. And be it further enacted, That the only evidence of a refusal to
accept or of a resignation of the office of President or Vice President, shall
be an instrument in writing declaring the same, and subscribed by the
person refusing to accept or resigning, as the case may be, and delivered
into the office of the Secretary of State.
SEC. 12. And be it further enacted, That the term of four years for which
a President and Vice President shall be elected shall in all cases commence
on the fourth day of March next succeeding the day on which the votes of
the electors shall have been given.
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APPROVED, March 1, 1792.306
29. Presidential Succession Act of 1886
CHAP. 4.—An act to provide for the performance of the duties of the
office of President in case of the removal, death, resignation, or inability
both of the President and Vice-President.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That in case of removal, death,
resignation, or inability of both the President and Vice-President of the
United States, the Secretary of State, or if there be none, or in case of his
removal, death, resignation, or inability, then the Secretary of the Treasury,
or if there be none, or in case of his removal, death, resignation, or inability,
then the Secretary of War, or if there be none, or in case of his removal,
death, resignation, or inability, then the Attorney-General, or if there be
none, or in case of his removal, death, resignation, or inability, then the
Postmaster-General, or if there be none, or in case of his removal, death,
resignation, or inability, then the Secretary of the Navy, or if there be none,
or in case of his removal, death, resignation, or inability, then the Secretary
of the Interior, shall act as President until the disability of the President or
Vice-President is removed or a President shall be elected: Provided, That
whenever the powers and duties of the office of President of the United
States shall devolve upon any of the persons named herein, if Congress be
not then in session, or if it would not meet in accordance with law within
twenty days thereafter, it shall be the duty of the person upon whom said
powers and duties shall devolve to issue a proclamation convening
Congress in extraordinary session, giving twenty days’ notice of the time of
meeting.
SEC. 2. That the preceding section shall only be held to describe and
apply to such officers as shall have been appointed by the advice and
consent of the Senate to the offices therein named, and such as are eligible
to the office of President under the Constitution, and not under
impeachment by the House of Representatives of the United States at the
time the powers and duties of the office shall devolve upon them
respectively.
SEC. 3. That sections one hundred and forty-six, one hundred and fortyseven, one hundred and forty-eight, one hundred and forty-nine, and one
hundred and fifty of the Revised Statutes are hereby repealed.
Approved, January 19, 1886.307
30. Presidential Succession Act of 1947 (As Amended)
§ 19. Vacancy in offices of both President and Vice President; officers
eligible to act

306. Presidential Succession Act of 1792, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 239, 239–41 (repealed 1886).
307. Presidential Succession Act of 1886, ch. 4, 24 Stat. 1, 1–2 (repealed 1947).
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(a)(1) If, by reason of death, resignation, removal from office, inability,
or failure to qualify, there is neither a President nor Vice President to
discharge the powers and duties of the office of President, then the Speaker
of the House of Representatives shall, upon his resignation as Speaker and
as Representative in Congress, act as President.
(2) The same rule shall apply in the case of the death, resignation,
removal from office, or inability of an individual acting as President under
this subsection.
(b) If, at the time when under subsection (a) of this section a Speaker is
to begin the discharge of the powers and duties of the office of President,
there is no Speaker, or the Speaker fails to qualify as Acting President, then
the President pro tempore of the Senate shall, upon his resignation as
President pro tempore and as Senator, act as President.
(c) An individual acting as President under subsection (a) or subsection
(b) of this section shall continue to act until the expiration of the then
current Presidential term, except that—
(1) if his discharge of the powers and duties of the office is founded in
whole or in part on the failure of both the President-elect and the VicePresident-elect to qualify, then he shall act only until a President or Vice
President qualifies; and
(2) if his discharge of the powers and duties of the office is founded in
whole or in part on the inability of the President or Vice President, then he
shall act only until the removal of the disability of one of such individuals.
(d)(1) If, by reason of death, resignation, removal from office, inability,
or failure to qualify, there is no President pro tempore to act as President
under subsection (b) of this section, then the officer of the United States
who is highest on the following list, and who is not under disability to
discharge the powers and duties of the office of President shall act as
President: Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of
Defense, Attorney General, Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of
Agriculture, Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Labor, Secretary of
Health and Human Services, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development,
Secretary of Transportation, Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Education,
Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Secretary of Homeland Security.
(2) An individual acting as President under this subsection shall continue
so to do until the expiration of the then current Presidential term, but not
after a qualified and prior-entitled individual is able to act, except that the
removal of the disability of an individual higher on the list contained in
paragraph (1) of this subsection or the ability to qualify on the part of an
individual higher on such list shall not terminate his service.
(3) The taking of the oath of office by an individual specified in the list in
paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be held to constitute his resignation
from the office by virtue of the holding of which he qualifies to act as
President.
(e) Subsections (a), (b), and (d) of this section shall apply only to such
officers as are eligible to the office of President under the Constitution.
Subsection (d) of this section shall apply only to officers appointed, by and
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with the advice and consent of the Senate, prior to the time of the death,
resignation, removal from office, inability, or failure to qualify, of the
President pro tempore, and only to officers not under impeachment by the
House of Representatives at the time the powers and duties of the office of
President devolve upon them.
(f) During the period that any individual acts as President under this
section, his compensation shall be at the rate then provided by law in the
case of the President.308
31. Rule Number 9 of the Republican Party
Filling Vacancies in Nominations
(a) The Republican National Committee is hereby authorized and
empowered to fill any and all vacancies which may occur by reason of
death, declination, or otherwise of the Republican candidate for President of
the United States or the Republican candidate for Vice President of the
United States, as nominated by the national convention, or the Republican
National Committee may reconvene the national convention for the purpose
of filling any such vacancies.
(b) In voting under this rule, the Republican National Committee
members representing any state shall be entitled to cast the same number of
votes as said state was entitled to cast at the national convention.
(c) In the event that the members of the Republican National Committee
from any state shall not be in agreement in the casting of votes hereunder,
the votes of such state shall be divided equally, including fractional votes,
among the members of the Republican National Committee present or
voting by proxy.
(d) No candidate shall be chosen to fill any such vacancy except upon
receiving a majority of the votes entitled to be cast in the election.309
32. Selected Sections of the Charter and Bylaws of the Democratic Party
The Charter
ARTICLE 3—Democratic National Committee
Section 1. The Democratic National Committee shall have general
responsibility for the affairs of the Democratic Party between National
Conventions, subject to the provisions of this Charter and to the Resolutions
or other actions of the National Convention. This responsibility shall
include:
....
(c) filling vacancies in the nominations for the office of President and
Vice President. . . .

308. Presidential Succession Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-199, 61 Stat. 380 (codified as
amended at 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2006)).
309. REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., supra note 192, at 8–9.
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ARTICLE 9—General Provisions
Section 8. To assure that the Democratic nominee for the office of
President of the United States is selected by a fair and equitable process, the
Democratic National Committee may adopt such statements of policy as it
deems appropriate with respect to the timing of Presidential nominating
processes and shall work with state Parties to accomplish the objectives of
such statements.
Section 12. All meetings of the Democratic National Committee, the
Executive Committee, and all other official Party committees, commissions
and bodies shall be open to the public, and votes shall not be taken by secret
ballot.
The Bylaws
ARTICLE 2—Democratic National Committee
Section 8. Attendance and Quorum and Voting.
(g) Proxy voting shall be permitted. Proxies may be either general or
limited and either instructed or uninstructed. All proxies shall be in writing
and transferable if so specified. No DNC member may at any one time hold
or exercise proxies for more than one other DNC member; provided,
however, that proxy voting shall not be permitted in voting to fill a vacancy
on the National ticket.310
B. Executive Declarations of Inability, Letter Agreements, and Section 3
Letter Precedents
1. Past Presidential Letter Agreements
President Eisenhower and Vice President Nixon entered into a letter
agreement that provided for President Eisenhower or Vice President Nixon
to initiate a transfer of presidential powers to Vice President Nixon on a
temporary basis.311 President Eisenhower would retain the right to resume
those powers upon a simple declaration that he was ready to do so.312
Later administrations followed President Eisenhower and Vice President
Nixon’s precedent by entering into letters providing for instances of
presidential inability. They existed between President Kennedy and Vice
President Johnson,313 and between President Johnson and Speaker of the
House of Representatives John McCormack,314 because President
Johnson’s ascension to the presidency following President Kennedy’s
310. DEMOCRATIC NAT’L COMM., supra note 193, at 3, 7, 16.
311. Letter from Pres. Dwight D. Eisenhower to Vice Pres. Richard Milhous Nixon (Feb.
5, 1958), available at http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/second-term/
documents/566.cfm; see also White House Statement on Agreement Between the President
and the Vice President as to Procedures in the Event of Presidential Disability, PUB. PAPERS
196 (Mar. 3, 1958), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11313.
312. Id.
313. Feerick, supra note 36, at 922.
314. See id.
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assassination left the vice presidency vacant. President Reagan and Vice
President Bush also executed declarations of inability pursuant to Section 3
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.315 Several of these letters appear below.
a. Letter Agreement During the Eisenhower Administration
Letter from President Eisenhower to Vice President Nixon, February 5,
1958:
Dear Dick: As both of us know, there are differences of opinion as to the
exact meaning of that feature of the Constitution which provides that the
Vice President will have the powers and the duties of the President when
the President is unable to discharge them. There is uncertainty expressed
as to how there could be determined the degree of the President’s
disability that would justify transferring his powers and duties to the Vice
President.
An inability to discharge properly the powers and duties of the Presidency
could come about in several ways. One would be disease or accident that
would prevent the President from making important decisions. Such
periods of inability could be prolonged but, even if only the length of
hours, could require action should there be any question of real
importance and urgency to be decided without delay.
Another form of inability could come about through a failure of
communications between the President and the Capital at any time that he
might be absent therefrom. A somewhat similar case might be an
uncertainty about the whereabouts of the President, occasioned by a
forced landing of the Presidential airplane.
Other types of inability could unquestionably arise.
There have been many proposals for clarifying this situation, some by
law, others by Constitutional Amendment. My own opinion is that it
would be difficult to write any law or an Amendment in such fashion as to
take care of every contingency that might possibly occur. While the great
area of uncertainty now existing could and should be drastically reduced,
I am not sure that even the most carefully devised plan, objectively
arrived at, could remove doubt in every instance.
However, it seems to me that so far as you and I are concerned in the
offices we now respectively hold, and particularly in view of our mutual
confidence and friendship, we could do much to eliminate all these
uncertainties by agreeing, in advance, as to the proper steps to be taken at
any time when I might become unable to discharge the powers and duties
of the President. Based upon my studies of the history of the Constitution

315. Letter from Pres. Ronald Reagan to Sen. Strom Thurmond, Pres. pro tempore of the
Senate and Rep. Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House (July 13, 1985) [hereinafter
Reagan Letter to Sen. Thurmond], available at http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/
archives/speeches/1985/71385b.htm; see also Letter from President Ronald Reagan to the
President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House on the Discharge of the
President’s Powers and Duties During His Surgery, 2 PUB. PAPERS 919 (July 13, 1985),
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=38883. See supra notes 29–31 and
accompanying text.
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and upon the advice of Constitutional authorities, I am of the opinion that
this agreement would not in any way contravene the clear intention of the
Constitution; on the contrary, it is rather a statement of our common
intention to act completely according to the spirit of this portion of the
Constitution.
Through such an agreement, we can assure that the best interests of the
country would not be damaged by the doubts and indecisions that have at
times existed in similar cases in the past. Moreover with this advance
agreement, you could without personal or official embarrassment, make
any decisions that seemed to you proper in cases where my ability to
discharge my powers and duties may be in serious question.
This note, which I have been planning for some time to write, is merely to
confirm, in writing, the gist of the agreement that you and I have reached
between ourselves.
It is simply stated:
In any instance in which I could clearly recognize my own inability to
discharge the powers and duties of the Presidency I would, of course, so
inform you and you would act accordingly.
With the exception of this one kind of case, you will be the individual
explicitly and exclusively responsible for determining whether there is
any inability of mine that makes it necessary for you to discharge the
powers and duties of the Presidency, and you will decide the exact timing
of the devolution of this responsibility on you. I would hope that you
would consult with the Secretary of State, Governor Adams and General
Heaton, and if feasible, with medical experts assembled by him, but the
decision will be yours only.
I will be the one to determine if and when it is proper for me to resume
the powers and duties of the Presidency.
I know, of course, that you would make any decision for taking over the
presidential powers and duties only when you feel it necessary. I have no
fear that you, for any fleeting or inconsequential purpose, would do so
and thereby create confusion in the government. Circumstances would
have to guide you, and if the imminence or occurrence of any world or
domestic emergency demanded, you would have to act promptly.
There is always the possibility that, as in the cases of Garfield and
Wilson, I might, without warning, become personally incapable of
making a decision at the moment when it should be made. The existence
of this agreement recognizing your clear and exclusive responsibility for
deciding upon the inability of the President to perform his duties and
exercise his powers will remove any necessity or desire on the part of
friends and staffs to impede the right and authority of the Vice President
in reaching his decision on the matter.
There is only one final thought I would like to add. If any disability of
mine should, in the judgment of any group of distinguished medical
authorities that you might assemble, finally become of a permanent
character, I would, of course, accept their decision and promptly resign
my position. But if I were not able to do so, and the same group of
consultants would so state, then you would take over not only the powers
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and duties but the perquisites of the Presidency, including the White
House itself. In temporary cases of my “inability,” we agree that you
should act for the necessary period in your capacity as Vice President and,
additionally, as “Acting President.”
With warm regard, As ever316

Letter Agreement from President Eisenhower to Vice President Nixon
The President and the Vice President have agreed that the following
procedures are in accord with the purposes and provisions of Article 2,
Section 1, of the Constitution, dealing with Presidential inability. They
believe that these procedures, which are intended to apply to themselves
only, are in no sense outside or contrary to the Constitution but are
consistent with its present provisions and implement its clear intent.
(1) In the event of inability the President would—if possible—so
inform the Vice President, and the Vice President would serve as Acting
President, exercising the powers and duties of the office until the inability
had ended.
(2) In the event of an inability which would prevent the President from
so communicating with the Vice President, the Vice President, after such
consultation as seems to him appropriate under the circumstances, would
decide upon the devolution of the powers and duties of the Office and
would serve as Acting President until the inability had ended.
(3) The President, in either event, would determine when the inability
had ended and at that time would resume the full exercise of the powers
and duties of the Office.317

b. Letter Agreement During the Kennedy Administration
In August 1961 President Kennedy and Vice President Johnson agreed to
follow the procedures set forth below:
(1) In the event of inability the President would—if possible—so
inform the Vice President, and the Vice President would serve as Acting
President, exercising the power and duties of the Office until the inability
had ended.
(2) In the event of an inability which would prevent the President from
so communicating with the Vice President, the Vice President, after such
consultation as seems to him appropriate under the circumstances, would
decide upon the devolution of the powers and duties of the Office and
would serve as Acting President until the inability had ended.
(3) The President, in either event, would determine when the inability
had ended and at that time would resume the full exercise of the powers
and duties of the Office.318

316. Letter from Pres. Dwight D. Eisenhower to Vice Pres. Richard Milhous Nixon,
supra note 311.
317. See White House Statement on Agreement Between the President and the Vice
President as to Procedures in the Event of Presidential Disability, supra note 311, at 196.
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c. Letter Agreement From President Johnson to
Speaker John W. McCormack
President Lyndon Johnson sent a signed letter agreement to Speaker
McCormack on December 23, 1963, which Speaker McCormack signed as
well. It was accompanied by a fifteen-page explanatory memorandum. The
letter and memorandum were not released publicly. The Clinic obtained a
copy of the letter from the Lyndon Johnson Presidential Library.
December 23, 1963
Dear Mr. Speaker:
Confirming our oral agreement regarding the procedures to be followed in
the event of my inability to exercise the powers and duties of the
Presidency, I am reducing the agreement to writing and would appreciate
your signing the original of this letter and returning it to me for
safekeeping in the Presidential files. Enclosed for your use is a signed
duplicate original. The terms of the agreement are as follows:
1. In the event of inability, the President would—if possible—so inform
the Speaker of the House, and the Speaker of the House would serve as
Acting President, exercising the powers and duties of the Office until the
inability had ended.
2. In the event of an inability which would prevent the President from
communicating with the Speaker of the House, the Speaker of the House,
after such consultation as seemed to him appropriate under the
circumstances, would decide upon the devolution of the powers and duties
of the Office and would serve as Acting President until the inability had
ended.
3. The President, in either event, would determine when the inability had
ended and at that time would resume the full exercise of the powers and
duties of the Office.
4. After being informed by the President of his inability or, in the event of
an inability which would prevent the President from communicating with
the Speaker of the House, after the latter satisfies himself that such
inability exists, the Speaker of the House will resign as Speaker and as
Representative in Congress before undertaking to act as President.
Sincerely,
LYNDON B. JOHNSON319

President Johnson did not enter into a signed letter agreement with Vice
President Hubert H. Humphrey, but instead had an oral agreement.320
318. White House Statement and Text of Agreement Between the President and the Vice
President on Procedures in the Event of Presidential Inability, PUB. PAPERS 561 (Aug. 10,
1961) , available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8277.
319. Letter, President Johnson to Speaker John W. McCormack, 12/23/63, Ex FG 1,
WHCF, Box 9, LBJ Library.
320. See Arthur Crock, In the Nation: The Johnson-Humphrey Agreement Mystery, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 27, 1965, at 28 (noting a statement by the White House that, sometime before the
Inauguration, President Johnson and Vice President Humphrey “reached a verbal
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d. Letter Declarations During the Reagan Administration
President Reagan signed a letter to the President pro tempore and the
Speaker of the House in 1985, which transferred presidential power to Vice
President Bush, pursuant to their longstanding agreement, for the duration
of his intestinal surgery.
July 13, 1985
Dear Mr. President: (Dear Mr. Speaker:)
I am about to undergo surgery during which time I will be briefly and
temporarily incapable of discharging the Constitutional powers and duties
of the Office of the President of the United States.
After consultation with my Counsel and the Attorney General, I am
mindful of the provisions of Section 3 of the 25th Amendment to the
Constitution and of the uncertainties of its application to such brief and
temporary periods of incapacity. I do not believe that the drafters of this
Amendment intended its application to situations such as the instant one.
Nevertheless, consistent with my longstanding arrangement with Vice
President George Bush, and not intending to set a precedent binding
anyone privileged to hold this Office in the future, I have determined and
it is my intention and direction that Vice President George Bush shall
discharge those powers and duties in my stead commencing with the
administration of anesthesia to me in this instance.
I shall advise you and the Vice President when I determine that I am
able to resume the discharge of the Constitutional powers and duties of
this Office.
May God bless this Nation and us all.
Sincerely,
RONALD REAGAN321

Upon resuming his powers and duties following surgery, President
Reagan’s letter to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House was as follows:
July 13, 1985
Dear Mr. President: (Dear Mr. Speaker:)
Following up on my letter to you of this date, please be advised I am
able to resume the discharge of the Constitutional powers and duties of
the Office of the President of the United States. I have informed the Vice
understanding to extend the same arrangement for the continuity of executive government
during President Johnson’s tenure that was first put in writing in the Eisenhower
Administration.”); see also FEERICK, supra note 138, at 229 (noting that “[t]he oral nature of
[President Johnson’s] agreement with Humphrey received some criticism”).
321. Reagan Letter to Sen. Thurmond, supra note 315. After he left office, President
Reagan acknowledged invoking the Twenty-Fifth Amendment at this time. See REAGAN,
supra note 31, at 500.
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President of my determination and my resumption of those powers and
duties.
Sincerely,
RONALD REAGAN322

2. Letters Pursuant to Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
a. Letters During the George W. Bush Administration
President George W. Bush sent two letters to the President pro tempore
and the Speaker of the House temporarily transferring his powers to Vice
President Cheney during his presidency, once in 2002 and again in 2007.
The text of these letters follows:
June 29, 2002
Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)
As my staff has previously communicated to you, I will undergo this
morning a routine medical procedure requiring sedation. In view of
present circumstances, I have determined to transfer temporarily my
Constitutional powers and duties to the Vice President during the brief
period of the procedure and recovery.
Accordingly, in accordance with the provisions of Section 3 of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, this letter
shall constitute my written declaration that I am unable to discharge the
Constitutional powers and duties of the office of President of the United
States. Pursuant to Section 3, the Vice President shall discharge those
powers and duties as Acting President until I transmit to you a written
declaration that I am able to resume the discharge of those powers and
duties.
Sincerely,
GEORGE W. BUSH323
June 29, 2002
Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)
In accordance with the provisions of Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, this letter shall constitute
my written declaration that I am presently able to resume the discharge of
the Constitutional powers and duties of the office of President of the
United States. With the transmittal of this letter, I am resuming those
powers and duties effective immediately.
Sincerely,
GEORGE W. BUSH324
322. Reagan Letter, supra note 29, at 919.
323. 2002 Bush Letter on Temporary Transfer of Powers, supra note 34, at 1083.
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July 21, 2007
Dear Madame Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)
This morning I will undergo a routine medical procedure requiring
sedation. In view of present circumstances, I have determined to transfer
temporarily my Constitutional powers and duties to the Vice President
during the brief period of the procedure and recovery.
In accordance with the provisions of Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, this letter shall constitute
my written declaration that I am unable to discharge the Constitutional
powers and duties of the office of the President of the United States.
Pursuant to Section 3, the Vice President shall discharge those powers and
duties as Acting President until I transmit to you a written declaration that
I am able to resume the discharge of those powers and duties.
Sincerely,
GEORGE W. BUSH325
July 21, 2007
Dear Madame Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)
In accordance with the provisions of Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, this letter shall constitute
my written declaration that I am presently able to resume the discharge of
the Constitutional powers and duties of the office of the President of the
United States. With the transmittal of this letter, I am resuming those
powers and duties effective immediately.
Sincerely,
GEORGE W. BUSH326

3. Sample Executive Declarations of Inability
The Clinic has prepared a sample presidential executive declaration of
inability and a sample vice presidential executive declaration of inability.
a. Sample Presidential Executive Declaration of Inability
To the President pro tempore and the Speaker of the House:
As you are aware, there is currently no constitutional or legal provision by
which my inability can be declared in the event of a vice presidential
vacancy or vice presidential inability. Through this document, I wish to
express situations which, if they were to arise, would result in my view in
a declaration of my inability. This advance declaration, by providing for

324. 2002 Bush Letter Resuming Powers, supra note 35, at 1084.
325. 2007 Bush Letter on Temporary Transfer of Powers, supra note 34, at 1003.
326. 2007 Bush Letter Resuming Powers, supra note 35, at 1004.
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the declaration of my inability in described circumstances, will allow for
the smooth transfer of presidential power.
An inability to properly discharge the powers and duties of my office
could arise in several ways. One would be disease or accident that would
prevent me from making important decisions. Another form of inability
could arise through a breakdown of communications from me at a time of
increased urgency, uncertainty as to my whereabouts, or any such similar
scenarios involving a lapse or breakdown in communication.
Upon execution, this declaration will trigger the statutory line of
succession pursuant to Article II of the Constitution, permitting the person
next in the line of succession to act as President until my recovery or the
earlier recovery of the Vice President, should he be disabled.
The individuals I authorize to make the determination as to my inability
declaration are as follows:
[To be determined by the sitting President]
Sincerely,
President [ ]

b. Sample Vice Presidential Executive Declaration of Inability
To the President pro tempore and the Speaker of the House:
As you are aware, there is no specific constitutional or legal provision by
which I can declare my own inability to perform the powers and duties of
the vice presidency. I believe I have the right to do so and, indeed, the
responsibility in circumstances where the President is disabled or a
vacancy in the presidency has arisen.
Through this document, I wish to express my view of situations, if they
were to arise, that would constitute a basis for me to declare my own
inability. An inability to properly discharge the powers and duties of my
office could arise in several ways. One would be disease or accident that
would prevent me from making important decisions. Another form of
inability could arise through a breakdown of communications between the
President and me at a time of increased urgency, uncertainty as to my
whereabouts, or any such similar scenarios involving a lapse or
breakdown in communication.
This prospective declaration of inability will allow for the smooth
transition of power to the person next in line of succession were the
President to become unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, or died, resigned, or was removed, all contingencies appearing in
Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 of the Constitution. Obviously, I hope
none of these occasions occurs during our term in office, but prudence
dictates that I contemplate such possibilities and act accordingly.
The individuals I authorize to make the determination as to my inability
declaration are as follows:
[To be determined by the sitting Vice President]
Sincerely,
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Vice President [ ]

C. Legislative History of the Presidential Succession Acts
1. The Presidential Succession Act of 1792
On December 20, 1790, the 1st Congress addressed the issue of
presidential succession.327 A bill was presented to the House of
Representatives providing that an “officer” shall act as President when
vacancies arise in both the offices of President and Vice President.328 This
bill was referred to the Committee of the Whole on the next day but was not
considered until January 10, 1791.329 The debates reveal considerable
controversy surrounding the question as to which “officers” should be
included in the line of succession. Suggestions ranged from the President
pro tempore of the Senate to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States.330 No consensus was reached.331
The 2nd Congress first addressed the matter of presidential succession on
November 15, 1791.332 On November 30, 1791, the Senate passed a bill
entitled “An act relative to the election of a President and Vice President of
the United States, and declaring the officer who shall act as President in
case of vacancies in the offices both of President and Vice President” and
sent it to the House of Representatives for debate.333 The bill placed the
President pro tempore ahead of the Speaker of the House in the line of
succession. Representatives initially rejected the placement of legislative
officers in the line of succession because it might lead to “caballing” and
“electioneering” in the choice of a Speaker.334 Representative Hugh
Williamson contended that an “extensive construction” of the word
“officer” would allow for any individual in the United States to be properly
placed in the line of succession.335 While Representatives Theodore
Sedgwick and Elbridge Gerry argued that the Speaker was an “officer,”336
Representative Gerry argued that a legislative line of succession might
violate separation of powers by blending the executive and legislative
branches.337
By February 9, 1792, the Committee of the Whole was considering
placing the Secretary of State in the line of succession.338 The House
approved the proposal by a vote of 32 to 22,339 with five members of the
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.

FEERICK, supra note 138, at 57; see also 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1813 (1790).
FEERICK, supra note 138, at 57; see also 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1813.
FEERICK, supra note 138, at 57.
Id.
Id. at 58.
Id.
3 ANNALS OF CONG. 36 (1791).
FEERICK, supra note 138, at 59.
3 ANNALS OF CONG. 282.
Id. at 281.
FEERICK, supra note 138, at 59.
3 ANNALS OF CONG. 401.
Id. at 402.
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Constitutional Convention voting with the majority340 and one voting
against the proposal.341 Then-Representative James Madison, among
others, supported placing the Secretary of State in the line of succession
during times of a dual vacancy and/or inability for a number of reasons.342
Madison questioned the constitutionality of including the President pro
tempore and the Speaker in the line of succession because they were not
“officers” within the meaning of the Constitution.343 Moreover, Madison
believed that if the Framers had contemplated the President pro tempore
and Speaker as possible successors to the presidency, then “they would
probably have been there designated . . . instead of being left to Legislative
selection.”344 Finally, Madison believed the inclusion of the President pro
tempore and Speaker violated the Incompatibility Clause and separation of
powers.345
The Senate subsequently rejected the bill because the Federalists
successfully lobbied their supporters in order to prevent Thomas Jefferson,
then Secretary of State, from becoming eligible to succeed to the
presidency.346 As a result, on February 20, 1792, the Senate reinserted the
President pro tempore of the Senate and Speaker of the House in place of
the Secretary of State into the line of succession.347 Additionally, the 1792
Act provided for a special election for President348 in the case of a dual
vacancy and called for the Secretary of State, in such an instance, to notify
the executive of every state that electors for the President should be
appointed within “thirty-four days preceding the first Wednesday in
December,” provided that there were at least two months between the
notification and the first Wednesday in December.349 The Senate then
referred the bill to the House and, the following day, the House approved
the amendment by a vote of 31 to 24.350 The 1792 Act included a provision
for holding a special election, and it appears that Congress contemplated a

340. These members included Abraham Baldwin of Georgia, Nicholas Gilman of New
Hampshire, Thomas Fitzsimons of Pennsylvania, James Madison of Virginia, and Hugh
Williamson of North Carolina. Id. at 402; see also America’s Founding Fathers: Delegates
to the Constitutional Convention, CHARTERS OF FREEDOM, http://www.archives.gov/
exhibits/charters/constitution_founding_fathers.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2012) (providing
the state for the delegates to the Constitutional Convention).
341. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 402; see also America’s Founding Fathers: Delegates to the
Constitutional Convention, supra note 340 (noting that this member was Elbridge Gerry of
Massachusetts).
342. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, supra note 137.
a2_1_6s3.html.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. FEERICK, supra note 138, at 60.
347. Id. at 60; see 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 90 (1792).
348. Presidential Succession Act of 1792, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 239 (repealed 1886). The special
election provision applied only if “the term for which the President and Vice President last in
office were elected [did] not expire on the third day of March next ensuing.” Id. § 10.
349. Id.
350. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 417–18.
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full four-year term for a new President and Vice President selected under
this statute.351 The bill was signed into law on March 1, 1792.352
2. The Presidential Succession Act of 1886
Ninety-four years later, on January 19, 1886, Congress superseded the
1792 Act when President Grover Cleveland signed the 1886 Act.353 Vice
President Thomas Hendricks had died in Indianapolis in November 1885.354
President Cleveland’s message to Congress on December 8, 1885,
regarding the death of the new Vice President called for a constitutional
amendment to clarify the line of succession should both the President and
Vice President die or become unable to serve.355 While the Presidential
Succession Act that was proposed and passed shortly afterward was
primarily the work of the Congress, President Cleveland supported the
legislation and signed the bill into law.356
The House Select Committee on the Election of President and Vice
President (Select Committee) submitted a report concluding, among other
things, that legislators were not “officers” as envisioned by the Framers,
and that an executive line of succession would remove many of the
questions arising from a legislative line of succession. For instance, an
executive line of succession would remove the possible violation of
separation of powers and conflicts of interest in the event of impeachment
proceedings and trials in the House and Senate.357
Moreover, the drafters of the 1886 Act made it clear that they intended to
supersede the special election provision of the 1792 Act. The Select
Committee believed that in times of presidential inability, an Acting
President was only to act as the locum tenens, or placeholder, until the
inability terminated.358 If the President died, the Acting President was to
fill the position “for the remainder of the term of the removed President,
and upon the occurring of the next regular quadrennial election for
President and Vice-President and their inauguration on the succeeding 4th
of March the term of the officer acting as President should end.”359
Although the Select Committee’s Report clearly stated its intent to revoke
the special election provision, the language of the 1886 Act is unclear: it
provides that “[the statutory successor] shall act as President until the
disability of the President or Vice-President is removed or a President shall
be elected,” and “it shall be the duty of the person upon whom said powers
and duties shall devolve to issue a proclamation convening Congress in

351. See Charles S. Hamlin, The Presidential Succession Act of 1886, 18 HARV. L. REV.
182, 183 (1905).
352. 1 Stat. 239.
353. Presidential Succession Act of 1886, ch. 4, 24 Stat. 1 (repealed 1947).
354. FEERICK, supra note 138, at 141.
355. Id. at 142.
356. Id. at 143.
357. See H.R. REP. NO. 49–26, pt. 1 (1886).
358. Id. at 4.
359. Id.
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extraordinary session, giving twenty days’ notice of the time of the
meeting.”360 Thus, there is a lack of agreement as to whether the 1886 Act
did in fact supersede the special election provision of the 1792 Act.361
The 1886 Act did not pass without dissent. Many members writing for
the minority of the Select Committee believed that the 1886 Act did not go
far enough to address future issues pertaining to presidential succession.362
Specifically, those in the minority identified three distinct periods in which
a presidential vacancy might arise that remained unaddressed:
(1) Where the President-elect dies or becomes constitutionally disabled
(for “inability” and “disability” are used interchangeably) before
inauguration.
(2) Where there is a failure of election of both President and VicePresident, when the election is thrown into the House . . . .
(3) Where there is a failure to count the vote and declare the result “in the
presence of the Senate and House of Representatives”; as, if one House or
the other should fail, for any cause, to meet the other, and our recent
history more than suggests the possibility of this contingency.363

a. Debates Leading Up To the 1886 Act
Members of Congress proposed several changes to the 1792 Act during
the ninety-four years before Congress ultimately amended the Act in
1886.364 The first significant analysis of the constitutionality of the 1792
Act took place in 1856.365 On June 26, 1856, Senator John Crittenden of
Kentucky made a motion to investigate what would happen when “both the
President and Vice President were dead, or unable to act” and to address the
issue of what happens “when the President alone is either dead, removed
from office, or from any cause is unable to act.”366 On August 5, 1856, the
Senate Judiciary Committee issued a report on Senator Crittenden’s
proposal affirming the view that sections 9 and 10 of the 1792 Act,367

360. Presidential Succession Act of 1886, ch. 4, 24 Stat. 1–2 § 1. Ultimately, Congress
revisited the issue of special elections, and they are no longer provided for in the 1947 Act.
361. See Hamlin, supra note 351, at 188–91 for a complete discussion regarding the
proposed amendments of Senator Hoar regarding special elections and the adopted
amendments included in the 1886 Act.
362. H.R. Rep. No. 49-26, pt. 2, at 1.
363. Id. at 3.
364. 13 CONG. REC. 125 (1881). The Act of 1792 remained “entirely unaltered, except
temporarily in 1877, as to some of the electoral provisions.” Id.
365. See id. at 121.
366. Id.
367. Section 9 of the 1792 Act states:
And be it further enacted, That in case of removal, death, resignation or inability
both of the President and Vice President of the United States, the President of the
Senate pro tempore, and in case there shall be no President of the Senate, then the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, for the time being shall act as President
of the United States until the disability be removed or a President shall be elected.
Presidential Succession Act of 1792, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 239 (repealed 1886). Section 10 of the
1792 Act states:
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which provide for a legislative line of succession and a special election,
were constitutional.368 However, the Judiciary Committee was not
convinced that the 1792 Act prevented “the mischief of confusion and
anarchy.”369 Specifically, the report expressed concern regarding the
potential absence of a President pro tempore and Speaker, and the
possibility that either the President pro tempore or the Speaker might not
possess the “requisite qualifications, under the Constitution, to be invested
with the duties and powers of an acting President.”370
To remedy these potential problems, the Report analyzed a number of
possible solutions.371 For example, to guard against the problem of
vacancies in both the positions of President pro tempore and Speaker, a
suggestion was made to extend the line of succession to the Cabinet.372
Although the Judiciary Committee believed an extension of the line of
succession to the Cabinet would solve the problem of a dual vacancy in the
offices of President pro tempore and the Speaker by including more
individuals who would be eligible to qualify to act as President, the
Judiciary Committee quickly found cause for rejecting the proposal.373 The
report cites the potential issue of cabinet members being implicated as
particeps criminis, or participants in a crime, if a President faced
Moreover, the Judiciary Committee
impeachment and removal.374
questioned whether cabinet members were truly “officers” under the
Constitution when their positions had terminated or were suspended.375 For
example, if an Acting President found a cabinet member to be “obnoxious”
or to be an individual he disagreed with, he might decide to replace the

And be it further enacted, That whenever the offices of President and Vice
President shall both become vacant, the Secretary of State shall forthwith cause a
notification thereof to be made to the executive of every state, and shall also cause
the same to be published in at least one of the newspapers printed in each state,
specifying that electors of the President of the United States shall be appointed or
chosen in the several states within thirty-four days preceding the first Wednesday
in December then next ensuing: Provided, There shall be the space of two months
between the date of such notification and the said first Wednesday in December,
but if there shall not be the space of two months between the date of such
notification and the first Wednesday in December; and if the term for which the
President and Vice President last in office were elected shall not expire on the third
day of March next ensuing, then the Secretary of State shall specify in the
notification that the electors shall be appointed or chosen within thirty-four days
preceding the first Wednesday in December in the year next ensuing, within which
time the electors shall accordingly be appointed or chosen, and the electors shall
meet and give their votes on the said first Wednesday in December, and the
proceedings and duties of the said electors and others shall be pursuant to the
directions prescribed in this act.
Id.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.

S. REP. NO. 34-260, at 6 (1856).
Id. at 3.
Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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cabinet member.376 Ultimately, the Judiciary Committee recommended
extending the line of succession to the Supreme Court.377 The report stated:
[A]nd if there be no President of the Senate, then the Speaker of the
House of Representatives for the time being shall act as President of the
United States until the disability be removed or a President shall be
elected; and if there should be no President of the Senate nor Speaker of
the House of Representatives for the time being, and it be not a case of
vacancy caused by removal, the chief justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States, or if there be no chief justice in office, or it be a case of
vacancy caused by removal, then the associate justices of the said
Supreme Court, successively, according to seniority of commission, shall
act as President of the United States until the disability be removed or a
President shall be elected.378

Finally, the report concluded that such a “provisional” President would
only be invested with the executive functions until the “disability” was
removed or the Electoral College chose a new President.379 While the
Judiciary Committee did a thorough analysis of the 1792 Act, no further
legislative action was taken on the basis of the report.
For the next twenty-five years, there was little or no discussion on
presidential succession, until the assassination of President James
Garfield,380 which brought to the nation’s attention the need for reform. At
the time of President Garfield’s death, there was neither a President pro
tempore of the Senate nor a Speaker of the House.381 Upon President
Garfield’s death, Vice President Chester A. Arthur took the oath of office in
the early morning of September 20, 1881, by New York State Supreme
Court Justice, John R. Brady, and then again on September 22, 1881, by
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Morrison R. Waite.382 President Arthur
immediately called the Senate into special session in order to elect a
President pro tempore and to take up the matter of presidential
succession.383 He wrote to the Senate:
Questions which concern the very existence of the Government and the
liberties of the people were suggested by the prolonged illness of the late
President, and his consequent incapacity to perform the functions of his
office. It is provided by the second article of the Constitution . . . that “in
case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death,

376. Id.
377. Id. at 4–6.
378. Id. at 6.
379. Id.
380. See A Great Nation in Grief: President Garfield Shot by an Assassin, N.Y. TIMES,
July 3, 1881, at 1. The New York Times reported that on July 2, 1881, Charles J. Guiteau
shot and wounded President Garfield as he was boarding a train in the depot of the Baltimore
and Potomac Railroad. He passed away on September 19, 1881, due to infections. See
James Garfield, WHITEHOUSE.GOV, http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/james
garfield (last visited Sept. 21, 2012).
381. FEERICK, supra note 138, at 130–31.
382. Id. at 129–130.
383. Id. at 130.
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resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said
office, the same shall devolve on the Vice-President.”
What is the intendment of the Constitution in its specification of “inability
to discharge the powers and duties of the said office” as one of the
contingencies which calls the Vice-President to the exercise of
Presidential functions?
Is the inability limited in its nature to long-continued intellectual
incapacity, or has it a broader import?
What must be its extent and duration?
How must its existence be established?
Has the President whose inability is the subject of inquiry any voice in
determining whether or not it exists, or is the decision of that momentous
and delicate question confided to the Vice-President, or is it contemplated
by the Constitution that Congress should provide by law precisely what
should constitute inability, and how, and by what tribunal or authority it
should be ascertained?
If the inability proves to be temporary in its nature, and during its
continuance the Vice-President lawfully exercises the functions of the
Executive, by what tenure does he hold his office?
Does he continue as President for the remainder of the four years’ term?
Or would the elected President, if his inability should cease in the
interval, be empowered to resume his office?
And if, having such lawful authority, he should exercise it, would the
Vice-President be thereupon empowered to resume his powers and duties
as such?384

On December 6, 1881, Senators James Beck and Samuel Maxey sought
to answer President Arthur’s questions and proposed resolutions to reform
the 1792 Act.385 Senator Beck prepared a resolution asking that the
Judiciary Committee examine the laws enacted pursuant to Article II,
Section 1 concerning presidential succession so that “all doubts or defects
which may exist in our present laws on this subject may be remedied and
future controversy prevented.”386 Similarly, Senator Maxey prepared a
resolution stating:
Resolved, That the Committee on the Judiciary be, and is hereby,
instructed to inquire what legislation, if any, is necessary to carry into
effect the provision of the Constitution in case of the removal of the
President from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge
the powers and duties of the said office, as well as the provision in case of
the removal, death, resignation, or inability of both the President and
Vice-President; and said committee will report by bill or otherwise.387

384.
385.
386.
387.

13 CONG. REC. 121 (1881) (citing a submission from President Arthur to the Senate).
See id. at 22–23.
Id. at 22.
Id.
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Two days later, on December 8, 1881, Senator Augustus Garland
introduced a bill388 “to provide for the performance of the duties of the
Presidential office in case of the removal, death, resignation, or inability of
the President and Vice-President” with no further details.389
On December 14, 1881, Congress resumed discussion on presidential
succession and Senator Beck noted numerous uncertainties surrounding the
1792 Act, including: in the case of special elections, the possibility of
presidential terms beginning and expiring in the middle of congressional
terms; the expiration of a President pro tempore’s or Speaker’s term of
office while acting as President; whether the Vice President would hold
office for the remainder of the term or until an inability was removed;
separation of powers if the President pro tempore or Speaker were to take
the office; and the meaning of the term “Officer” in the Constitution.390
Although all these questions arose in the course of Senator Beck’s
attempt to revise the 1792 Act, it was the constitutionality of the 1792 Act
that emerged as the principal issue, specifically whether the President pro
tempore of the Senate and Speaker of the House are “Officers” under the
Constitution.391 Senator Beck relied on an 1862 speech by Senator Bayard
to argue that legislators are not “Officers” under the Constitution able to
succeed to the presidency.392 Senator Bayard had cited the example of
Senator William Blount,393 who, during his trial after impeachment, pled he
was not a “civil officer of the United States”394 and therefore, not liable to
impeachment.395 This plea was sustained in the Senate and the attempt to
impeach Senator Blount was abandoned.396 Senator Bayard believed this
decision made clear that legislative officers were not “Officers of the
United States,”397 because the decision was made by the Senate “organized
as a court, sitting under oath, after a public argument and hearing by the
ablest counsel in the country on both sides,”398 and should stand as
precedent.399
Senator Bayard had next looked to the difference in language between
Article II, Section 1, regarding the presidential term of Office,400 and
Article I, Sections 2401 and 3,402 regarding the terms of Representatives and
388. Id. at 55.
389. Id.
390. See id. at 123.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 1ST SESS. app. 35 (1864).
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
398. CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 1ST SESS. app. 35.
399. Id.
400. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of
the United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years, and,
together with the Vice-President, chosen for the same Term, be elected, as follows . . . .”
(emphasis added)).
401. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members
chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State
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Senators. Senator Bayard suggested that if the positions of Representatives
or Senators were those of “Officers,” the Framers would have used the
same constitutional language as applied to the President: “shall hold his
Office.”403 Article I, Section 2, for example, could have read, with respect
to Representatives: “who shall hold their office for the term of six
years,”404 rather than the language that was adopted, which reads, “The
House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every
second Year . . . .”405 Additionally, Article I, Section 3, referring to
Senators, states that “[t]he Seats of the Senators of the first Class shall be
vacated at the Expiration of the second Year . . . .”406 Senator Bayard
suggested that if the Framers meant for these positions to be those of
“Officers,” then the Framers would have written “[t]he term of office of
Senators of the first class shall expire at the expiration of the second
year.”407 Furthermore, Senator Bayard noted the language of the
Incompatibility Clause,408 which prevents any Senator or Representative,
during the time for which he is elected, from holding “any civil Office.”409
It does not state that these individuals are prevented from holding any
“other” civil office, which implies that they do not already hold “civil
Offices.” Senator Bayard then pointed to Article II, Section 1, providing
for the election of electors410 and the language distinguishing between
Senators and Representatives and persons “holding an Office of Trust or
Profit under the United States.”411 He concluded that Senators and
Representatives are not “officers of the United States” nor do they hold
“office under the United States”; rather they hold the position of a “station”
or “trust.”412 In support of this view, Senator Bayard offered the fact that
the people of the United States elect neither Senators nor Representatives;

shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State
Legislature.”).
402. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator
shall have one Vote.”).
403. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; 13 CONG. REC. 128 (1882).
404. 13 CONG. REC. 128.
405. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
406. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 2.
407. 13 CONG. REC. 128.
408. Id.
409. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6. cl. 2 (“No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time
for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United
States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been increased
during such time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a
Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.”).
410. 13 CONG. REC. 128.
411. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the
Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators
and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or
Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall
be appointed an Elector.”).
412. 13 CONG. REC. 128.
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rather, state legislatures elected Senators and the people from state districts
elect members of the House of Representatives.413
Senator Beck agreed with these points and entered into the record
additional support for addressing the question of presidential succession,
including his correspondence with the Official Reporter, D.F. Murphy, in
1881.414 The correspondence took place four days after President Garfield
was shot and dealt with the history and issues surrounding presidential
succession.415 In his correspondence, Murphy pointed to a number of
provisions of the 1792 Act that concerned him.416 Specifically, Murphy
noted that the President pro tempore can change on a daily basis, as
provided for by a Senate resolution dated January 13, 1876, declaring,
“[t]hat the office of President pro tempore of the Senate is held at the
pleasure of the Senate.”417 Under the 1792 Act the President pro tempore
was not required to resign before becoming Acting President, and therefore
it was unclear whether he would remain Acting President if the Senate
changed his status as President pro tempore. This is no longer a concern
because the 1947 Act requires both the Speaker and the President pro
tempore to resign before taking the oath as Acting President.418
Subsequently, Senator Garland of Arkansas introduced a bill repealing
the legislative line of succession and replacing it with an executive line of
succession.419 Senator Garland believed that the line of succession should
go through the Cabinet Departments “commencing with the Secretary of
State and going down in the order in which they are generally recognized
and named in our proceedings, our laws, and our correspondence.”420
Senator Garland recommended the executive line of succession in order to
maintain separation of powers within the government.421 Just as thenRepresentative James Madison believed the extension of the line of
succession to the judiciary would blur the lines of the separation of powers,
Senator Garland believed the extension of the line of succession to the
legislative branch would have the same effect.422 Specifically, Madison
noted that by including the President pro tempore and the Speaker in the
line of succession, these individuals would retain their legislative stations
and “their incompatible functions will be blended; or the incompatibility
will supersede those stations, and then those being the substratum of the
adventitious functions, these must fail also.”423 Furthermore, Senator
Garland believed that the executive line of succession enabled the President

413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.

See id.
See id. at 124–25.
See id. at 124.
See id. at 125–26.
Id. at 126.
See 3 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1)–(2) (2006).
See 13 CONG. REC. 137 (1882).
Id.
See id. at 138.
See id.
Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, supra note 137.
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to hand over his duties confidently.424 Senator Garland argued that an
executive line of succession would appeal to the will of the electorate
because all cabinet secretaries would have received the Senate’s
endorsement.425 Finally, Senator Garland argued that an executive line of
succession would dispose of the “Officer” question.426 In his opinion, the
President pro tempore and Speaker were only “Officers” of their respective
bodies.427 In support of this argument, he offered Senator Blount’s
impeachment trial and the case of Senator John Smith from Ohio, who was
punished by expulsion, not impeachment, because he was held not to be an
“Officer” within the meaning of the Constitution.428 This bolstered Senator
Garland’s position because if legislators are not impeachable, then they are
not “Officers of the United States” under the Constitution.429
Senator Garland next addressed objections to an executive line of
succession. Specifically, in response to objections regarding presidential
qualifications,430 Senator Garland suggested a clause stating that “each of
such officers above-named shall have the qualifications prescribed by the
Constitution of the United States for President and Vice-President.”431
Other objections to the proposed executive line of succession were based on
the possible implication of a cabinet officer as particeps criminis in the
impeachment of the President.432 Senator Garland suggested that this issue
could be eliminated by a clause providing “that neither of such officers
above named shall have been implicated, directly or indirectly, in any
matter for which the President may have been impeached.”433 These two
suggestions by Senator Garland were included in section 2 of the 1886 Act
as enacted.434
Senator Hoar proposed an executive line of succession, which would last
for the duration of the presidential term, eliminating any special election.435
Included in this line of succession were all cabinet secretaries, in the order
in which their departments had been created.436 Senator Hoar appeared to
firmly believe that the Secretary of State should be in the line of
succession.437 He described the Secretary of State as “usually the most
conspicuous representative next to the President of the United States, of the
same opinions and policies upon which the people put their stamp of

424.
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426.
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428.
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430.
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See 13 CONG. REC. 138.
See id.
See id. at 137–38.
Id.
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6; 13 CONG. REC. 138.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also 13 CONG. REC. 138.
13 CONG. REC. 138.
Id.
Id.
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Presidential Succession Act of 1886, ch. 4, § 2, 24 Stat. 1 (repealed 1947).
See 13 CONG. REC. 4975.
See id.
See 14 CONG. REC. 689 (1883).
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approval in the Presidential election.”438 Thus, in his view, the inclusion of
the Secretary of State and other cabinet members in the line of succession
would allow for party continuity and the furtherance of the President’s
policies. In response to challenges concerning the confirmation process of
cabinet members—primarily that there is an “unwritten law” that causes the
Senate to confirm the President’s appointments for the Departments439—
Senator Hoar noted that Senators will need to take into consideration “this
new possibility” when advising and consenting as to the qualifications of a
nominated individual, and thus take more seriously the nomination and
confirmation process.440 However, Senator Hoar did not believe that acting
secretaries should be in the line of succession. He stated, “An officer
holding ad interim, or an officer holding by Presidential appointment
without the consent of the Senate, is not entitled under this bill to succeed,
under any circumstances, to the Presidency.”441
Furthermore, Senator Hoar, like his colleagues, believed constitutional
questions regarding legislative officers and party continuity were decisive
reasons to change the line of succession.442 Senator Hoar also identified the
issue regarding possible simultaneous vacancies in both the positions of the
President pro tempore and the Speaker as important in his decision to
propose an executive line of succession.443 Senator Hoar reintroduced his
bill,444 which the Senate passed and forwarded to the House,445 but the
House again failed to take further action.446
The issue of presidential succession did not reemerge as a congressional
concern until 1885, with the death of Vice President Hendricks and
President Cleveland’s message to the 49th Congress.447 In his message,
President Cleveland stated:
The present condition of the law relating to the succession to the
Presidency . . . is such as to require immediate amendment. This subject
has repeatedly been considered by Congress, but no result has been
reached. The recent lamentable death of the Vice President and vacancies
at the same time in all other offices the incumbents of which might
immediately exercise the functions of the Presidential office, have caused
public anxiety and a just demand that a recurrence of such a condition of
affairs should not be permitted.448

438. Id. Senator Hoar also noted some of the more prominent former Secretaries of State,
including Thomas Jefferson, Timothy Pickering, John Marshall, James Madison, John
Quincy Adams, and Henry Clay. Id.
439. Id. at 690.
440. Id.
441. Id. at 689.
442. See id.
443. Id.
444. 15 CONG. REC. 661 (1884).
445. Id.
446. FEERICK, supra note 138, at 143. It should be noted that the House of
Representatives previously failed to take action in 1883, when Senator Hoar’s bill was
adopted by the Senate with amendments.
447. Id.
448. Id.
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Thus, with President Cleveland’s urging, and on the basis of the previous
exhaustive debates on the issue of presidential succession on the record,
Senator Hoar reintroduced a modified bill in the Senate.449 The Senate
passed the bill on December 17, 1885,450 and upon review the House of
Representatives also passed the bill.451 The 1886 Act became law on
January 19, 1886.452
3. The Presidential Succession Act of 1947
After almost sixty years, the issues surrounding presidential succession
were resurrected following the death of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and
Vice President Harry S. Truman’s subsequent ascension to the presidency
in April 1945.453 Members of Congress became concerned at this time
because of the perceived political inexperience of Secretary of State Edward
R. Stettinius, Jr., who under the 1886 Act was the next in the line of
succession.454 Postmaster General James A. Farley raised the additional
concern that under the 1886 Act, the President would be able to appoint his
own successor by naming a new Secretary of State.455 According to
Postmaster General Farley this was undemocratic and should be
immediately modified.456 These concerns ultimately prompted Congress to
reexamine presidential succession.457
On June 19, 1945, President Truman delivered a special message to
Congress, which echoed Postmaster General Farley’s concerns and urged
Congress to adopt new legislation to address presidential succession.458
President Truman argued that his ability to name his own successor was
contrary to democratic principles and should not be vested with the
President.459 President Truman believed that the next in the line of
succession should come as close as possible to being nationally elected.460
Thus, he recommended the Speaker of the House as next in the line of
succession.461 President Truman felt that the Speaker was the individual
who came closest to being nationally elected because not only is the
Speaker elected as his district’s congressional representative, but also by the
House of Representatives as its Speaker.462
President Truman recommended that the Speaker be placed ahead of the
President pro tempore in the line of succession because, in his view, the
449. See S. 471, 49th Cong. (1886); see also 17 CONG. REC. 214 (1885).
450. 17 CONG. REC. 252 (1886).
451. 17 CONG. REC. 614 (1886).
452. Presidential Succession Act of 1886, ch. 4, 24 Stat. 1 (repealed 1947).
453. FEERICK, supra note 138, at 204.
454. Id.
455. 25 CONG. DIG. 87, 89 (1946).
456. See id. at 89.
457. See Ruth C. Silva, The Presidential Succession Act of 1947, 47 MICH. L. REV. 451,
453 (1949).
458. H.R. DOC. NO. 79–246, at 1 (1945).
459. Id.
460. See id.
461. Id.
462. Id.
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Speaker enjoyed a more democratic pedigree, since members of the House
of Representatives are elected every two years, while Senators are elected
every six.463 Therefore, the Speaker is more likely to be reflective of the
national political mandate at the time of succession. President Truman
proposed that in times of a dual vacancy and/or inability the individual
succeeding to the presidency should serve only until the next congressional
election, at which point a President would be elected, or until a special
election to replace the President and Vice President was held.464
In sum, President Truman recommended that Congress enact a law
providing: that the Speaker of the House should be first in the line of
succession in the case of removal, death, resignation, or inability of the
President and Vice President, and he should resign from the House before
assuming the powers and duties of the office of President; that if there is no
qualified Speaker, the President pro tempore should resign from the Senate
and act as President only until a qualified Speaker is elected; that if there is
neither a qualified Speaker nor a qualified President pro tempore, the
cabinet member next in the line of succession should act as President until
either a qualified Speaker or a qualified President pro tempore is elected;
and that if Congress decides to enact a special election provision, that the
election should be held as soon as practicable.465
Initial responses to President Truman’s proposal were favorable, but as
time passed the terms stipulated in the plan were questioned on
constitutional grounds.466 On June 25, 1945, Representative Hatton W.
Sumners of Texas introduced a bill that reflected all of President Truman’s
proposals,467 and subsequently the Judiciary Committee found
Representative Sumner’s bill to be constitutional.468 Sumner’s bill
provided that if concurrent presidential and vice presidential vacancies
occurred more than ninety days before the next congressional election,
presidential electors would be chosen at the coming congressional election,
and if a simultaneous vacancy did not occur within that ninety-day period,
no special election would take place.469
The House debated this bill. Those in favor believed that it was more
democratic than the 1886 Act because the Speaker reflected the most recent
mandate of the national electorate.470 However, Representatives John
Gwynne, Clarence E. Hancock, and Raymond Springer criticized the bill
and argued that the Speaker and President pro tempore were not
constitutional “Officers.”471 Others argued that the bill would inadvertently
encourage the impeachment and removal of the President, constituting a

463.
464.
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.

Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
FEERICK, supra note 138, at 205.
H.R. 3587, 79th Cong. (1945).
H.R. REP. NO. 79-829, at 4 (1945).
Id. at 3.
91 CONG. REC. 7011–12, 7016 (1945).
Id. at 7014–15, 7017–18, 7022.
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legislative encroachment on the executive.472 Representative John M.
Robsion took particular issue with the special election provision, arguing
that it could lead to four different Presidents in one term and was bad
policy.473 The House of Representatives ultimately removed the special
election provision from the bill.474 The House passed the modified
Sumners bill on June 29, 1945.475
Once the bill reached the Senate, no further action was taken until
1947.476 The fact that the Republicans took control of Congress in 1946 did
not deter Truman, who still advocated for congressional consideration of
the legislative line of succession.477 The bill, which was introduced by
Senator Wherry, did not contain a provision for special elections and
explicitly required the resignation of the Speaker and President pro tempore
before either could act as President.478 Compulsory resignation received
much criticism, as many believed that this would discourage a Speaker or
President pro tempore from acting as President in the event of presidential
inability.479 Further, the issues regarding whether these legislative leaders
were even “Officers” under the Constitution reemerged.480 Senator Carl A.
Hatch of New Mexico argued that “[t]he officer must continue to hold that
office in order to continue to qualify to act as President.”481 Thus, the
person is no longer an “Officer” under the Constitution and cannot, having
resigned his position, act as President.482 As these concerns mounted, the
Committee on Rules and Administration submitted a report on March 24,
1947, which contained the “minority view” of various Senators and
described the bill as “piecemeal legislation,” while insisting that the
relevant issues had not been thoroughly studied.483
Representative Robsion submitted a Judiciary Committee report on July
9, 1947, recommending that the bill be enacted.484 The report included a
letter dated June 11, 1947, from Attorney General Douglas W. McGregor in
response to a request by the Judiciary Committee for review of the
constitutionality of the bill.485 Attorney General McGregor endorsed the
bill and opined that members of Congress were “Officers” under the
Constitution.486 McGregor also cited the 1792 Act and the fact that it

472. Id. at 7015; see Silva, supra note 457, at 454.
473. 91 CONG. REC. 7010, 7024.
474. Id. at 7028.
475. Id.
476. FEERICK, supra note 138, at 207.
477. Id.
478. S. 564, 80th Cong. (1947).
479. See 93 CONG. REC. 7776 (1947).
480. Id. at 7767–70.
481. Id. at 7770.
482. Id.
483. S. REP. 80-80, at 3 (1947).
484. H.R. REP. NO. 80-817 (1947).
485. Id. at 2–4.
486. Id. at 4. Attorney General McGregor cited Lamar v. United States, 241 U.S. 103,
112–15 (1916), which stands for the proposition that impersonating a member of the House
of Representatives involved an “Officer” acting under the authority of the United States.
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“represents a construction of article II by an early Congress, whose views of
the Constitution have long been regarded as authoritative, and reflects a
long-continued acquiescence in such a construction.”487 Ultimately, the
Senate passed the bill on June 27, 1947,488 and the House of
Representatives followed suit on July 10, 1947.489 On July 18, 1947,
President Truman signed the Presidential Succession Act of 1947 into
law.490 The 1947 Act, which is still in effect, includes most of Truman’s
proposals, with the notable exception of his recommendation to provide for
a special election.491
D. Post-9/11 Proposals and Presidential Succession Initiatives
1. Proposed Post-9/11 Legislation
The majority of legislative proposals following the attacks of September
11, 2001, focus on the inclusion of legislative leaders in the line of
succession, the bumping provision of the 1947 Act, and mandatory
resignation.492
a. Legislators
Legislative proposals since 9/11 have sought to address the two principal
issues regarding the inclusion of legislators in the line of succession: party
continuity493 and constitutionality.494
The potential for a disruption in party continuity is a matter of genuine
and continuing concern.495 In the ten years since 9/11, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the President have been members of
opposing political parties for three years,496 and the President pro tempore
of the Senate has been in the President’s opposing party for four years.497
Four bills,498 all introduced by Representative Brad Sherman, have
proposed that the President have the power to designate which party leader
However, “Officer” in this sense is construed according to its meaning in the penal code, not
the Constitution. Id. at 112–17.
487. H.R. REP. NO. 80-817, at 4.
488. 93 CONG. REC. 7786 (1947).
489. Id. at 8634.
490. 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2006).
491. Id.
492. This overview is current as of May 2011, when the Clinic concluded its work.
493. CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 115, at 39 (2009); see also NEALE, supra
note 229, at 9, 19–20.
494. Id.
495. Id. at 39.
496. See infra Appendix F, Chart 2, for a list of former Speakers of the House of
Representatives and the Presidents during whose terms they served.
497. See infra Appendix F, Chart 3, for a list of former Presidents pro tempore of the
Senate and the Presidents during whose terms they served.
498. Presidential Succession Act of 2010, H.R. 6557, 111th Cong. (2010); Presidential
Succession Act of 2004, H.R. 5390, 108th Cong. (2004); Presidential Succession Act of
2003, H.R. 2749, 108th Cong. (2003); Presidential Succession Act of 2002, H.R. 3816,
107th Cong. (2002).
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in each House of Congress should be included in the line of succession.499
In the House, the President could select among the Speaker, the Majority
Leader, and the Minority Leader.500 In the Senate, the President could
choose from among the President pro tempore, the Majority Leader, and the
Minority Leader.501 The President would designate one of these legislators
for the House and one for the Senate by notifying the Clerk of the House of
Representatives and the Secretary of the Senate; the leaders specified vary
depending on the bill.502 Until the President submits a letter designating
otherwise, the Speaker and Majority Leader of the Senate would be deemed
successors.503
Other bills have sought to remove legislators from the line of succession.
Senator John Cornyn proposed a bill removing legislative officers from the
line of succession altogether.504 In a separate bill, Representative Sherman
proposed removing legislators from the line of succession unless there is
neither a President nor a Vice President to take office on Inauguration
Day.505 In such an instance, the Speaker of the House and the Majority
Leader of the Senate would serve as next in line in that order.506 However,
this legislation explicitly states that the individual in this scenario acting as
President “may not nominate any individual to serve as Vice President.”507
Later proposals by Senator Cornyn and Representative Sherman did not
remove legislators,508 but left the Speaker of the House and the President
pro tempore in the line of succession.509 Senator Cornyn stated that this
change was made because he hoped that “Congress [would] enact the
Presidential Succession Act of 2005 quickly, and that the more
499. The Presidential Succession Act of 2004 also included this provision for the
President-elect. See H.R. 5390.
500. See H.R. 6557; H.R. 5390; H.R. 2749; H.R. 3816.
501. See H.R. 6557; H.R. 5390; H.R. 2749; H.R. 3816.
502. H.R. 6557, at 5 (stating that the President would select among “[t]he Majority
Leader of the Senate, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, or the Minority Leader of the
Senate”); H.R. 5390, at 8 (providing that the President-elect would select among “the
Speaker of the House of Representatives or the minority leader of the House of
Representatives,” and the “majority leader of the Senate or the minority leader of the
Senate”); H.R. 2749, at 3–4 (providing for designation of either the office of Majority
Leader of the Senate or the office of Minority Leader of the Senate, and also of Speaker of
the House of Representatives or the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives); H.R.
3816, at 2–3 (providing for the designation of the office of Majority Leader of the Senate or
the office of Minority Leader of the Senate, and also of Speaker of the House of
Representatives or the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives).
503. H.R. 6557; H.R. 2749; H.R. 3816.
504. Presidential Succession Act of 2004, S. 2073, 108th Cong. (2004).
505. H.R. 5390.
506. Id.
507. Id. The Clinic notes that this proposed restriction raises constitutional concerns that
are not addressed in this Report. Specifically at issue is whether the Acting President has the
authority to appoint a Vice President under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. See Examination
of the First Implementation of Section Two of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Hearing on S.J.
Res. 26 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong. (1975).
508. See Presidential Succession Act of 2005, H.R. 1943, 109th Cong. (2005);
Presidential Succession Act of 2005, S. 920, 109th Cong. (2005).
509. See Presidential Succession Act of 2007, H.R. 540, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 920.
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controversial but nevertheless critical constitutional issues arising out of
current law can be addressed as well through separate legislation.”510
b. Bumping
Legislators have attempted to remove the bumping provision in six
bills.511 Some of these bills provide that the individual who first acts as
President pursuant to the line of succession may serve for the rest of the
presidential term “or until the disability of the President or the Vice
President is removed.”512
c. Mandatory Resignation Provision
Under the 1947 Act, any individual who acts as the President is required
to resign his current post, prohibiting him from resuming it later.513 As a
result, potential successors may be unwilling to assume the powers of the
presidency during a temporary inability. Only two of the post-9/11 bills
would have continued the compulsory resignation for executive officers.514
In contrast, all but one bill provided for mandatory resignation for
legislators.515 The most recent proposed legislation would not require the
resignation of either executive or legislative leaders.516
d. Acting Secretaries
It is unclear whether the 1947 Act includes acting secretaries517 in the
line of succession.518 One post-9/11 bill states that officers can only be in
the line of succession if the President appointed them to their office.519
Five other post-9/11 bills state that, to be included in the line of succession,
510. 151 CONG. REC. S4409 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 2005).
511. Presidential Succession Act of 2010, H.R. 6557, 111th Cong. (2010); H.R. 540; S.
920; H.R. 1943; Presidential Succession Act of 2004, S. 2073, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R.
5390.
512. H.R. 540; H.R. 1943; S. 920; S. 2073.
513. Presidential Succession Act of 1947, 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2006).
514. Presidential Succession Act of 2004, H.R. 5390, 108th Cong. (2004); Presidential
Succession Act of 2003, H.R. 2749, 108th Cong. (2003).
515. H.R. 540; S. 920; H.R. 1943; Presidential Succession Act of 2002, H.R. 3816, 107th
Cong. (2002).
516. See H.R. 6557. This proposal raises constitutional issues not addressed in this
Report, specifically whether a member of the legislature would be able to serve
simultaneously in the executive branch. Currently, legislators must resign before becoming
Acting President. 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2006). The necessity of that requirement has been debated
throughout the history of the Succession Acts.
517. An “Acting Secretary” is an officer who was not appointed as a principal officer by
the President, but who nonetheless holds the powers of a cabinet secretary. In contrast, a
cabinet secretary is an individual who was appointed by the President to be part of his
Cabinet and confirmed by the Senate. Both an acting secretary and a cabinet secretary
would have been nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate for the positions
they were originally appointed to before they could become Acting President. See 3 U.S.C.
§ 19.
518. See supra Part VI.C for a discussion of this issue.
519. H.R. 5390.
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officers must have been appointed by the President and confirmed with the
advice and consent of the Senate to a specific office listed. Therefore only
cabinet secretaries confirmed as such would be in the line of succession.520
e. Speaker of the House Pro Tempore
Representative Sherman has proposed two bills that would allow the
President to choose among various House leaders in selecting a statutory
successor, but the bills specifically provide that a person acting as Speaker
pro tempore is not considered the Speaker of the House.521
f. Successors Outside the Washington, D.C., Area
Many commentators suggest that the greatest threat to continuity in the
presidency in the event of mass catastrophe stems from the concentration of
individuals in the line of succession present within the Washington, D.C.,
metropolitan area.522
Five bills have proposed adding the Ambassadors to the United Nations,
Great Britain, Russia, China, and France to the end of the line of succession
after the Secretary of Homeland Security.523
2. Additional Post-9/11 Proposals
a. Introduction
Others besides legislators have made proposals since 9/11. The
Continuity of Government Commission, a joint effort by the American
Enterprise Institute and the Brookings Institute, has released an evaluation
of the current system of presidential succession in the event of “a
catastrophic attack that would kill or incapacitate multiple individuals in the
line of succession.”524 Other proposals have been advanced by various
scholars, including Dr. John C. Fortier;525 Professor Akhil Reed Amar;526
520. H.R. 6557; H.R. 540; S. 920; H.R. 1943; Presidential Succession Act of 2004, S.
2073, 108th Cong. (2004).
521. H.R. 6557; Presidential Succession Act of 2003, H.R. 2749, 108th Cong. (2003).
522. Ensuring the Continuity of the United States Government: The Presidency: Joint
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary and S. Comm. on Rules and Admin., 108th
Cong. 9–10, 50–51 (2003) [hereinafter The Presidency: Joint Hearing] (statement and
testimony of John C. Fortier, Exec. Dir., Continuity of Gov’t Comm’n, and Research Assoc.,
Am. Enter. Inst.); CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 115, at 45.
523. H.R. 6557; H.R. 540; S. 920; H.R. 1943; H.R. 5390.
524. CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 115, at 6.
525. The Presidency: Joint Hearing, supra note 522, at 9–11, 49–59 (statement and
testimony of John C. Fortier, Exec. Dir., Continuity of Gov’t Comm’n, and Research Assoc.,
Am. Enterprise Inst.).
526. Presidential Succession Act: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on the Constitution
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 33–36 (2004) [hereinafter Hearing Before the
H. Subcomm.] (testimony and prepared statement of Akhil Reed Amar, Southmayd Professor
of Law and Political Sci., Yale Law Sch.); The Presidency: Joint Hearing, supra note 522,
at 6–9, 30–32 (statement and testimony of Akhil Reed Amar, Southmayd Professor of Law
and Political Sci., Yale Law Sch.).
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Professor Howard Wasserman;527 and M. Miller Baker, Esq.528 These
proposals provide valuable perspectives on alternative solutions to the
presidential succession deficiencies present in the current system.
b. Recommendations of the Continuity of Government Commission
The Continuity of Government Commission provides a detailed and
thorough discussion culminating in seven recommendations addressing
presidential succession deficiencies in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist
attacks.529 Specifically, the Commission recommends: extending the line
of succession to individuals living outside of the Washington, D.C.,
metropolitan area; removing legislative officers from the line of succession;
providing for a special election in the event of a double vacancy occurring
in the first two years of a presidential term; reordering the line of
succession; removing acting secretaries from the line of succession;
supplementing procedures for declaring a President unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office; and addressing the contingencies which
may arise during the inaugural and pre-inaugural periods.530
i. Extend the Presidential Line of Succession Outside of Washington, D.C.
The first recommendation made by the Commission is to extend the
presidential line of succession to individuals living outside of the
The reason for this
Washington, D.C., metropolitan area.531
recommendation is the concern that all of the individuals in the current line
of succession could be killed or incapacitated by a mass catastrophe
targeting the nation’s Capital.532 During the Cold War, a nuclear missile
posed the greatest threat to American security.533 Officials in Washington,
D.C., assumed that they had the capability to retreat from the Capitol prior
to an impending attack.534 With the advent of global terrorism and the

527. The Presidency: Joint Hearing, supra note 522, at 14–15, 69–77 (statement and
testimony of Howard M. Wasserman, Assistant Professor of Law, Fla. Int.’l Univ. Coll. of
Law); Howard M. Wasserman, The Trouble With Shadow Government, 52 EMORY L.J. 281
(2003).
528. Hearing Before the H. Subcomm., supra note 526, at 37–43 (testimony and prepared
statement of M. Miller Baker, Partner, McDermott Will & Emery); The Presidency: Joint
Hearing, supra note 522, at 12–14, 33–43 (statement and testimony of M. Miller Baker,
Partner, McDermott Will & Emery).
529. CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 115, at 45–49.
530. Id.
531. Id. at 45.
532. Id.
533. See CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, PRESERVING OUR INSTITUTIONS: THE FIRST
REPORT OF THE CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT COMMISSION 17 (2003) (“The concerns of that
era were similar to today, but with some important differences. The primary fear then was of
a massive nuclear strike from the Soviet Union . . . .”).
534. See id. at 11 (“The secret creation of a bomb and radiation-proof bunker for
Congress at the Greenbrier resort in West Virginia during the Cold War was based on the
assumption that a nuclear attack on Washington would kill, not incapacitate most members
of Congress. The objective then was assuring, with the notice available from the time
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portability of weapons of mass destruction, the potential threats have
intensified.
To accomplish its goal of extending the line of succession to individuals
living outside Washington, D.C., the Commission proposes two solutions.
The first proposal would add ambassadors or governors to the line of
succession.535 The Commission ultimately recommends that Congress
establish four or five new federal officer positions, requiring appointment
by the President and confirmation by the Senate, each of which would be in
The Commission contemplates that the
the line of succession.536
individuals nominated to these offices would primarily be high government
officials,537 such as former Presidents,538 former cabinet members, or even
current and former governors.539
ii. Remove Legislators From the Line of Succession
The second recommendation is to remove legislators from the line of
succession.540 Party continuity would thus be maintained.541 The question
whether legislators are “Officers” within the meaning of Article II, Section
1, Clause 6 would become moot. The bumping provision contained in 3
U.S.C. § 19(d)(2) would become ineffective and unnecessary.542 Finally,
this would address the concern that during times of temporary inability
legislative leaders may not wish to resign their posts to act as President, as
is currently required. 543
Recognizing that it would be difficult to obtain legislative support for a
bill that removes legislators, the Commission makes four additional
recommendations in the event that legislators remain in the line of
succession. First, remove the bumping provision of § 19(d)(2).544 Second,
change the criteria for selecting the President pro tempore or replace the
President pro tempore in the line of succession with the Majority Leader of

missiles were launched in Siberia until they arrived in Washington, that Congress could
evacuate the 200 miles or so to the Greenbrier.”).
535. CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 115, at 45. The inclusion of governors
in the line of succession raises some constitutional concerns that are not addressed in this
Report. Specifically at issue is whether governors can be federalized under the Commanderin-Chief Clause and what federalism implications may arise from such an inclusion. See
infra note 612.
536. See id.
537. See id.
538. Former Presidents who have served two terms are not precluded from the line of
succession by reason of the Constitution’s limitations on the length of service. A president
cannot be elected to more than two terms of office, U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1, but
arguably could serve by virtue of appointment, ascending to the office through the line of
succession. See The Presidency: Joint Hearing, supra note 522, at 59 n.1 (testimony of John
C. Fortier, Exec. Dir., Continuity of Gov’t Comm’n, and Research Assoc., Am. Enter. Inst.).
539. CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 115, at 45; see infra note 612.
540. Id. at 46.
541. Id.
542. Id.
543. Id.
544. Id.
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the Senate.545 Third, allow legislative leaders to act only in the event of the
death of a President and not during times of presidential inability.546
Fourth, address problems concerning the continuity of Congress within the
House of Representatives.547
iii. Provide for a Special Presidential Election
The Commission recommends that special presidential elections be held
within five months if a double vacancy occurs in the first two years of a
presidential term.548
iv. Reorder the Line of Succession
The Commission recommends reordering the line of succession.549 The
Commission argues that, in determining the order of succession, Congress
should consider not only the year in which a cabinet level position was
created, but also the likely qualifications of a Secretary who serves a given
department.550 The line of succession deemed appropriate by the
Commission is: Secretary of State; Secretary of Defense; Attorney
General; Secretary of the Treasury; and new officers created by Congress
who are located outside of Washington, D.C. in accordance with the
Commission’s first proposal.551
v. Remove Acting Secretaries
The Commission recommends explicitly removing acting secretaries
from the line of succession,552 as was provided for in the 1886 Act.553
vi. Supplement Inability Procedures
Another of the Commission’s recommendations is to supplement the
procedures for determining presidential inability by officials who are in the
The Twenty-Fifth
line of succession after the Vice President.554
Amendment establishes procedures both for filling a vacancy in the office
of the Vice President as well as for addressing presidential inability, but
does not address how this might be accomplished in the absence of an able
Vice President. The Commission suggests that Congress create a
procedural framework whereby an officer lower in the line of succession
can declare the inability of an officer higher in the line555 and that Congress
545.
546.
547.
548.
549.
550.
551.
552.
553.
554.
555.

Id. at 47.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 47–48.
Id. at 45, 48.
Id. at 48.
Id.; cf. Presidential Succession Act of 1886, ch. 4, 24 Stat. 1 (repealed 1947).
CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 115, at 48.
Id.
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could provide guidance on how a transfer might take place and how
Congress is to be notified.556 Additionally, the Commission recommends
that Congress, using its authority under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment,557
create an alternative body that the Vice President can convene in order to
declare a presidential inability in the event that a majority of the Cabinet
cannot convene.558 Such a body could be comprised of a majority of
governors or some other group of individuals from outside of Washington,
D.C.559 If no alternative body is created and a majority of the Cabinet is
rendered unable by reason of a mass attack, then the possibility remains that
a surviving Vice President will have no constitutional means for declaring
the President unable to perform the duties of his office.560
vii. Address Inaugural and Pre-inaugural Contingencies
The seventh and final recommendation made by the Commission is to
address inaugural and pre-inaugural contingencies. The Commission
recommends the adoption of three proposals.561
First, Congress and the political parties would take care to secure the line
of succession during these times.562 This could be accomplished primarily
with a change in custom.563 The outgoing and incoming administrations
could work together so that the outgoing President could nominate
members of the President-elect’s Cabinet.564 Then, before the inauguration,
the Senate could confirm the new nominees.565 Second, the Commission
recommends shortening the time between the casting and counting of the
Electoral College votes in order to identify the President-elect as soon as
possible.566 Finally, the Commission recommends that the political parties
plan for the possibility of the deaths of both the President-elect and Vice
President elect.567

556. Id.
557. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
558. CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 115, at 48.
559. See id.
560. A majority of “the principal officers of the executive departments,” as set out in the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, Section 4, was not thought of as a quorum but as a majority of
the cabinet positions. FEERICK, supra note 5, at 202–03 (1976). Acting secretaries were
thought to be the members acting for their respective departments and, thus, would be among
the principal officers to participate in declaring a President unable. See id. See infra
Appendix E of this Report for a discussion of the departmental lines of succession.
561. See CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 115, at 49.
562. Id.
563. Id.
564. Id.
565. Id.
566. Id.
567. Id. This proposal from the Commission would implicate the Twentieth Amendment.
U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 3.
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c. Proposals by Dr. John C. Fortier
Dr. Fortier568 has made numerous thoughtful proposals concerning
presidential succession, some of which overlap with the Commission’s
proposals.569 Additional proposals include creating a binary line of
succession and removing the bumping provision in § 19(d)(2).570 The latter
suggestions are discussed below.
i. Binary Line of Succession
In his 2003 testimony before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Dr.
Fortier proposed creating two lines of succession. First, in cases of
presidential inability, impeachment and removal, and death and resignation,
he recommends that presidential powers and duties should devolve upon the
cabinet members.571 Second, if a President and Vice President both fail to
qualify, Dr. Fortier recommends that it is both constitutional and practical
to have the presidential powers devolve upon qualified legislative
officers.572
According to Dr. Fortier, the powers of the President should also flow to
the Cabinet in the event of a double vacancy.573 This recommendation
addresses the conflicts of interest that may arise in cases of impeachment
and removal.574
In the case of death or resignation, Dr. Fortier also proposes removing
legislative officers from the line of succession.575 This section of his
proposal, however, does not specifically address post-9/11 concerns. This
proposal reflects Dr. Fortier’s opinion on the question whether legislators

568. Dr. John C. Fortier has been the Executive Director of the Continuity of Government
Commission since 2002. He has testified before the House of Representatives and the
Senate concerning the continuity of government. Dr. Fortier has held teaching positions at
the University of Pennsylvania, University of Delaware, Boston College, and Harvard
University.
569. The Presidency: Joint Hearing, supra note 522, at 9–11, 49–59 (statement and
testimony of John C. Fortier, Exec. Dir., Continuity of Gov’t Comm’n, and Research Assoc.,
Am. Enter. Inst.).
570. Id.
571. See id. at 10–11, 51–53.
572. See id. A legislator is arguably not an “Officer” within the meaning of Article II, but
a legislative officer is a “person” as used in the Twentieth Amendment. U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 1, cl. 6; id. amend. XX, § 3. The Twentieth Amendment states in part: “The Congress
may by law provide for the case wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice President elect
shall have qualified, declaring who shall then act as President, or the manner in which one
who is to act shall be selected, and such person shall act accordingly until a President or Vice
President shall have qualified.” Id. amend. XX, § 3 (emphasis added). However, concerns
about including a legislator in the line of succession through the Twentieth Amendment may
still raise separation of powers concerns.
573. The Presidency: Joint Hearing, supra note 522, at 51–52 (statement and testimony
of John C. Fortier, Exec. Dir., Continuity of Gov’t Comm’n, and Research Assoc., Am.
Enter. Inst.).
574. Id. at 52.
575. Id. at 53.
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qualify as “Officers” within the meaning of Article II, Section 1, Clause 6
of the Constitution.576
According to Dr. Fortier, in the event that a President-elect or Vice
President elect fails to qualify, it would be appropriate for legislators to be
in the line of succession.577 This situation would most likely result from an
election controversy or a terrorist attack resulting in the death of the
President-elect and Vice President elect shortly before the inauguration,
leaving no one to qualify as President and Vice President.578 Since
members of the House of Representatives are elected in the same general
election as the President-elect and Vice President elect, the Speaker of the
House would arguably best reflect the political sentiment of the country as a
whole as of Inauguration Day, and is the best person to assume the
presidency. If legislators were not included in the line of succession before
cabinet members in a failure-to-qualify scenario, the powers of the
President would flow to the previous administration’s Cabinet or even to
the previous administration’s acting secretaries.579 This result would be
unlikely to reflect the political will of the electorate.
ii. Remove the Bumping Provision
Dr. Fortier recommends removing the bumping provision of
§ 19(d)(2).580 He points out that a bumping provision, particularly in the
event of a catastrophic attack, could create several negative consequences
including: having multiple Presidents over a short period of time; the
possession of potentially extortionary power by legislators to affect the
policy decisions of an Acting President; and the election of a new Speaker
of the House by a constitutionally questionable quorum in the event that a
mass catastrophe kills or incapacitates a significant number of
Representatives.581
d. Proposal by Professor Akhil Reed Amar: New Position of
Assistant Vice President
Professor Amar582 has proposed creating a new cabinet position of
Assistant Vice President.583 According to Professor Amar, the creation of

576. See supra Part VI.B for a discussion of this issue.
577. The Presidency: Joint Hearing, supra note 522, at 10, 52–53.
578. Id.
579. Id.
580. Id. at 53–54.
581. Id.
582. Professor Amar is the Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science at Yale
University and has written extensively on presidential succession. See, e.g., Amar & Amar,
supra note 159, at 113.
583. The Presidency: Joint Hearing, supra note 522, at 6, 30–32 (statement and
testimony of Akhil Reed Amar, Southmayd Professor of Law and Political Sci., Yale Law
Sch.).
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this position would solve a number of problems inherent in the current
succession laws.584
The primary responsibility of the Assistant Vice President would be “to
receive regular briefings preparing him or her to serve at a moment’s notice,
and to lie low until needed: in the line of succession but out of the line of
fire . . . .”585 Professor Amar intends this office to be highly visible to the
American people, proposing that the assistant vice presidential nominee be
announced well before the November election so that a vote for the
presidential nominee would also signal an endorsement of the Assistant
Vice President.586 The office would require Senate confirmation.587 In
addition, the line of succession following the Assistant Vice President
would run directly to cabinet members.588 Finally, Professor Amar
suggests that if creating a new office is not politically viable, Congress
could name one of the current cabinet members to be next in line after the
Vice President in a purely executive line of succession.589
Under this proposal, the bumping provision would become unnecessary,
mandatory resignations would not be required, the Assistant Vice President
would certainly be an “Officer” within the meaning of Article II,
congressional conflicts of interest would be avoided, power transfers in
times of inability would be seamless, party and policy continuity would be
maintained, and democratic legitimacy would be ensured through the
Senate confirmation process.590
Professor Amar’s proposal is not without complications. First, the office
of Assistant Vice President could erode the political status of the Vice
President. Second, there is no guarantee that the assistant vice presidential
candidate, announced prior to an election, would assume that office,
because the Senate could refuse to confirm him or the President could
change his nominee after the election. Third, having to judge a third
individual when evaluating a presidential ticket may confuse the electorate
and complicate the selection of running mates.
e. Proposals by Professor Howard Wasserman
Professor Wasserman,591 in addition to making proposals that overlap
with those discussed above, has proposed a unique solution to the problem

584. Id. at 9, 31.
585. Id. at 8, 31.
586. Id. at 8–9, 31.
587. Id. at 8, 31.
588. Id. at 9, 31
589. Hearing Before the H. Subcomm., supra note 526, at 34, 36 (testimony and prepared
statement of Akhil Reed Amar, Southmayd Professor of Law and Political Sci., Yale Law
Sch.).
590. Id. at 34, 36; The Presidency: Joint Hearing, supra note 522, at 9, 31 (statement and
testimony of Akhil Reed Amar, Southmayd Professor of Law and Political Sci., Yale Law
Sch.).
591. Professor Wasserman is an Associate Professor of Law at Florida International
University and has written on presidential succession. See, e.g., Howard M. Wasserman,
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of presidential succession in the post-9/11 era that draws from the shadow
government implemented by President George W. Bush.592 Professor
Wasserman’s proposal lays out a framework defining the role and
composition of a shadow government.593
i. Reorder the Line of Succession
First, Professor Wasserman advocates reordering the line of
succession.594 He places cabinet members immediately after the Vice
President in the line of succession.595 The Speaker of the House and the
President pro tempore are not removed under this proposal but are placed at
the end of the line of succession.596 Professor Wasserman would have the
line run first through the Cabinet, because an Acting President coming from
the Cabinet would have been a top official in the executive branch, a
member of the President’s party, and chosen by the President to further his
policies.597 Including legislative leaders at the end of the line of succession
is a way to respond to possible catastrophic events. According to Professor
Wasserman, one lesson of 9/11 “is that the line of succession should contain
everyone who constitutionally may be an officer under the Succession
Clause and who, as a normative policy matter, should be included in the
line.”598 As long as a House of Congress is functioning, one of these
legislative leaders can be elected and assume the presidency, should
everyone else in the line be incapacitated.599
ii. Create the Position of First Secretary
Professor Wasserman suggests creating a new cabinet member, the First
Secretary, who would be nominated by the President and confirmed by the
Senate to lead a shadow government.600 The First Secretary is different
from the Assistant Vice President suggested by Professor Amar. The First
Secretary would play an important role in the daily operations of the
government. While running the shadow government, the First Secretary
would “be in contact with the President and the administration, as an active
member of the Cabinet, aware of and involved in the creation and execution
Structural Principles and Presidential Succession, 90 KY. L.J. 345 (2001); Wasserman,
supra note 527, at 281.
592. See Francie Grace, The Shadow Government, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2009, 9:13 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/03/02/attack/main502695.shtml.
593. See Hearing Before the H. Subcomm., supra note 526, at 33–36 (testimony and
prepared statement of Akhil Reed Amar, Southmayd Professor of Law and Political Sci.,
Yale Law Sch.); The Presidency: Joint Hearing, supra note 522, at 14–15, (statement and
testimony of Howard M. Wasserman, Assistant Professor of Law, Fla. Int’l Univ. Coll. of
Law); Wasserman, supra note 527.
594. The Presidency: Joint Hearing, supra note 522, at 72 (testimony of Howard M.
Wasserman, Assistant Professor of Law, Florida Int’l University College of Law).
595. See id.
596. See id.
597. See id.
598. See id.
599. See id. at 73.
600. See id. at 72, 75.
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of public policy.”601 The shadow government would be comprised of highranking members of each executive agency and department, with the First
Secretary at its head, and would function in a secure location outside of
Washington, D.C.602 Professor Wasserman’s conception of a shadow
government would allow for continuity within the executive branch after a
catastrophic attack.603
Professor Wasserman identifies several benefits of a shadow government.
The First Secretary would be intimately involved in the administration and
in a position to assume power seamlessly in the event of a double vacancy
or catastrophic attack.604 In addition, Professor Wasserman’s proposal for a
shadow government ensures that the public knows the identity of the
individual at its head.605
iii. Allow for Change in the Seat of Government
Professor Wasserman proposes a statute that would allow the seat of
government to function in a location other than Washington, D.C.606 The
need for such a move could arise following a catastrophic attack, which
renders the government unable to function in Washington, D.C.
f. Proposals by M. Miller Baker
Miller Baker607 has made several proposals overlapping with those
discussed above, but with modifications. These are: to reorder the line of
succession; to remove the bumping provision; to provide for cabinet
bumping; and to allow the President to determine the order of succession
for cabinet members after those specifically enumerated in the Act.608
i. Reorder the Line of Succession
Baker proposes reordering the line of succession by removing the lower
listed cabinet members, with the exception of the Secretary of Homeland
Security.609 He also proposes amending the 1947 Act to allow the

601. Id. at 72.
602. Id. at 14, 72, 75.
603. Id. at 72.
604. Id.
605. See id. The public would know who is heading the shadow government because the
First Secretary would be a position in the Cabinet with the specific task of assuming the
presidency in the case of a double vacancy.
606. Wasserman, supra note 527, at 321–22.
607. Baker is a partner at the law firm of McDermott Will & Emery LLP. Baker
appeared before the House of Representatives and the Senate to testify about presidential
succession after 9/11.
608. Hearing Before the H. Subcomm., supra note 526, at 37–43 (testimony and prepared
statement of M. Miller Baker, Partner, McDermott Will & Emery); The Presidency: Joint
Hearing, supra note 522, at 12–14, 33–43 (statement and testimony of M. Miller Baker,
Partner, McDermott Will & Emery).
609. Hearing Before the H. Subcomm., supra note 526, at 37, 39 (testimony and prepared
statement of M. Miller Baker, Partner, McDermott Will & Emery); The Presidency: Joint
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President, at his discretion, to nominate cabinet members after those
specifically enumerated in the line of succession.610 Baker also suggests
that the President should have the power to nominate individuals to be in
the line of succession who are neither cabinet members nor legislators—
such as governors—subject to Senate confirmation.611 To address
questions regarding this proposal’s constitutionality, Baker suggests that
governors be “federalized” pursuant to the Commander-in-Chief Clause.612
Under this proposal, the line would be as follows: Secretary of State;
Secretary of the Treasury;613 Secretary of Defense; Attorney General;
Secretary of Homeland Security; and other individuals that the President
would nominate and who would be confirmed by the Senate.614
ii. Remove the Bumping Provision
Baker proposes the removal of bumping when legislators decline to act as
President or when legislators are appointed after another officer or
individual has assumed the powers of the President.615
iii. Create a Cabinet Bumping Provision
Finally, Baker proposes a cabinet bumping provision. He suggests that a
cabinet member higher in the line of succession should have the ability to
assume the powers of the President from a cabinet member lower in the line
of succession once the former recovers from an inability.616 The purpose of

Hearing, supra note 522, at 13, 41 (statement and testimony of M. Miller Baker, Partner,
McDermott Will & Emery).
610. Hearing Before the H. Subcomm., supra note 526, at 37, 39–40 (testimony and
prepared statement of M. Miller Baker, Partner, McDermott Will & Emery).
611. See infra note 612; see also The Presidency: Joint Hearing, supra note 522, at 41,
42 (testimony of M. Miller Baker, Partner, McDermott Will & Emery).
612. The Presidency: Joint Hearing, supra note 522, at 41 (testimony of M. Miller
Baker, Partner, McDermott Will & Emery). The theory is that the Commander-in-Chief
Clause allows the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the “Army and Navy of the United
States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the
United States,” U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 1, to “federalize” a governor who is the
Commander–In-Chief of his state’s militia, since the President has the authority to call the
militia into the service of the United States.
613. Although in House hearings in 2004 Baker did not include the Secretary of Treasury
in his proposed line of succession, he had done so at the Senate hearing in 2003. Compare
The Presidency: Joint Hearing, supra note 522, at 41 (testimony of M. Miller Baker,
Partner, McDermott Will & Emery), with Hearing Before the H. Subcomm., supra note 526,
at 39 (prepared statement of M. Miller Baker, Partner, McDermott Will & Emery).
614. Hearing Before the H. Subcomm., supra note 526, at 39 (prepared statement of M.
Miller Baker, Partner, McDermott Will & Emery).
615. See id. at 40, 42 (prepared statement of M. Miller Baker, Partner, McDermott Will &
Emery); see also The Presidency: Joint Hearing, supra note 522, at 42 (testimony of M.
Miller Baker, Partner, McDermott Will & Emery).
616. See Hearing Before the H. Subcomm., supra note 526, at 40–42 (prepared statement
of M. Miller Baker, Partner, McDermott Will & Emery); see also The Presidency: Joint
Hearing, supra note 522, at 12–13, 42 (statement and testimony of M. Miller Baker, Partner,
McDermott Will & Emery).
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a cabinet bumping provision is to have the highest-ranking cabinet member
assume the powers of the President.617
E. Acting Cabinet Secretaries and Acting Legislative Leadership
1. Acting Secretaries
The manner through which staff may rise through a given executive
department to become an acting secretary is not consistent within the
various departments. Departmental lines of succession are established
through statutes, executive orders, and in some instances at the discretion of
the current cabinet secretary. Including acting secretaries in the line of
succession causes major complications arising from the length of the line
succession, and the differences and inconsistencies in the order of
succession within agencies, and the fact that the order within any agency
can be changed at any moment.
The Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 establishes the order in
which an individual working in a cabinet department becomes acting
secretary.618 In addition to setting time and other limitations for service of
acting secretaries, the Federal Vacancies Reform Act allows the President
to direct who shall serve as acting secretary for most of his cabinet
positions.619 Presidents have done this through executive orders, which in
some instances operate in conjunction with statutes creating the lines of
succession.620 Currently, executive orders and statutes establish the lines of
617. Hearing Before the H. Subcomm., supra note 526, at 40 (prepared statement of M.
Miller Baker, Partner, McDermott Will & Emery) (“In my view, the overriding goal of the
Succession Clause is the smooth and seamless transfer of Executive authority to the most
senior successor authorized and available to exercise such power.”).
618. The Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, 5 U.S.C. §§ 3345–48, 3349, 3349d
(2006).
619. § 3345 (setting out the authority for the President to direct appointment of acting
secretaries); § 3346 (setting out time limitations). The Secretaries of the Department of
Justice, 28 U.S.C. § 508 (2006), Department of Energy, 42 U.S.C. § 7132 (2006), and
Department of Education, 20 U.S.C. § 3412 (2006), have authority to implement their own
lines of succession with officers in their respective departments. The President retains
authority, however, to establish an executive order creating a deeper line of succession than
the department heads have chosen. 5 U.S.C. § 3345 (2006).
620. The following Departments have had their orders of succession set by Executive
Order:
 Dep’t of State: Exec. Order No. 13,251, 67 Fed. Reg. 1599 (Dec. 28, 2001) (as
amended by Exec. Order No. 13,261, § 4(i), 67 Fed. Reg. 13,243 (Mar. 19, 2002)).
 Dep’t of Treasury: Exec. Order No. 13,246, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,270 (Dec. 18, 2001) (as
amended by Exec. Order No. 13,261, § 4(f), 67 Fed. Reg. 13,244 (Mar. 19, 2002)).
 Dep’t of Defense: Exec. Order No. 13,533, 75 Fed Reg. 10,163 (Mar. 1, 2010).
 Dep’t of Justice: Exec. Order No. 13,557, 75 Fed. Reg. 68,679 (Nov. 4, 2010); see
also 28 U.S.C. § 508 (2006); Authority of the President to Name an Acting
Attorney General, 2007 WL 5334854 (Op. O.L.C. Sept. 17, 2007).
 Dep’t of Interior: Exec Order. No. 13,244, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,267 (Dec. 18, 2001) (as
amended by Exec Order No. 13,261, § 4(d), 67 Fed. Reg. 13,243 (Mar. 19, 2002)).
 Dep’t of Agriculture: Exec. Order No. 13,542, 75 Fed. Reg. 27,921 (May 13, 2010).
 Dep’t of Commerce: Exec. Order No. 13,242, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,260 (Dec. 18, 2001)
(as amended by Exec Order No. 13,261, § 4(b), 67 Fed. Reg. 13,243 (Mar. 19,
2002)).
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succession for all cabinet positions except the Department of Energy and
the Department of Education.621 In total, there are over 400 positions from
which an individual can become an acting secretary and, by virtue of having
been confirmed by the Senate, become the Acting President if the 1947 Act
is interpreted to include acting secretaries.622 Most notably, over 200
officers are eligible to become the acting secretary of State alone.623
Since Presidents can easily issue, revoke, or amend executive orders, the
lines of succession within most departments are flexible and can change
dramatically in an instant. For example, on December 18, 2001, President
George W. Bush issued seven executive orders changing the internal lines
of succession for the Departments of State, Treasury, Interior, Agriculture,
Commerce, Labor, and Veterans Affairs.624 Thus, if a catastrophic attack
were to occur on the same day as such a vast restructuring, uncertainty
would surely ensue. With so many officers in the line eligible to become
acting secretaries, it would be difficult to establish just who is properly in
the line of succession and in what order. The nation may be faced with an

 Dep’t of Labor: Exec. Order No. 13,245, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,268 (Dec. 18, 2001) (as
amended by Exec. Order No. 13,261, § 4(e), 67 Fed. Reg. 13,243 (Mar. 19, 2002)).
 Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.: Exec. Order No. 13,461, 73 Fed. Reg. 9437 (Feb.
15, 2008).
 Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev.: Exec Order. No. 13,243, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,262 (Dec.
18, 2001) (as amended by Exec Order No. 13,261, § 4(c), 67 Fed. Reg. 13,244
(Mar. 19, 2002)).
 Dep’t of Transp.: Exec. Order No. 13,485, 74 Fed. Reg. 2287 (Jan. 9, 2009); see also
49 U.S.C. § 102(e) (2006).
 Dep’t of Veterans Affairs: Exec. Order No. 13,247, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,271 (Dec. 18,
2001) (as amended by Exec. Order No. 13,261, § 4(g), 67 Fed. Reg. 13,244 (Mar.
19, 2002)); see also Memorandum on Designation of Officers of the Department
of Veterans Affairs to Act As Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 39 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 195 (Feb. 13, 2003).
 Dep’t of Homeland Sec.: Exec. Order No. 13,286, 68 Fed. Reg. 10,619 (Feb. 28,
2003) (as amended by Exec. Order No. 13,442, 72 Fed. Reg. 45,877 (Aug. 13,
2007)).
621. The Secretary of Energy set the Department’s line of succession by order. See
Secretarial Succession, Threat Level Notification, and Successor Tracking, DOE O 100.1D
(Apr. 20, 2007), available at https://www.directives.doe.gov/directives/current-directives/
100.1-BOrder-1d/view (acting pursuant to authority granted by 42 U.S.C. § 7132(a) (2006)).
The Secretary of Education has the authority to designate the Department’s line of
succession. 20 U.S.C. § 3412(a)(1) (2006). The current line of succession is available at
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/om/fs_po/osods/intro.html#3.
622. Positions requiring Senate confirmation were established by comparing the current
Congressional Research Service (CRS) publication declaring which positions require Senate
confirmation, HENRY B. HOGUE ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30959, PRESIDENTIAL
APPOINTEE POSITIONS REQUIRING SENATE CONFIRMATION AND COMMITTEES HANDLING
NOMINATIONS (2008), the officers listed in the various lines of succession, supra notes 619–
21, and the current officers listed in the lines of succession who have been confirmed by the
Senate despite not being listed by the CRS report on thomas.loc.gov/home/nomis.html.
623. See supra note 620 and accompanying text. The line of succession includes over
200 officers who need to be nominated by the President and who are confirmed by and with
advice and consent of the Senate. This means over 200 potential officers, if meeting the
other Presidential qualifications, could have sequential claims to become Acting President
from within the Department of State alone.
624. See supra note 620 and accompanying text.
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acting secretary far down a departmental line of succession, who becomes
Acting President but who was not, in fact, authorized to do so.625
Aside from problems in implementing the line of succession, an
additional consideration is the qualifications of the individuals who could
become the Acting President by virtue of serving as an acting secretary.
This is not to say that an acting secretary will never be qualified to become
Acting President. Certainly, there may be instances in which an acting
secretary, due to the nature of his position or individual talents, will be
better suited to become Acting President than other individuals in the line
of succession.
2. The Speaker of the House pro tempore and The Acting President pro
tempore of the Senate626
Although it has been posited that acting secretaries may be in the line of
succession, no parallel argument has been made that individuals acting as
the Speaker (Speaker pro tempore)627 or as the President pro tempore
(Acting President pro tempore)628 might be in the line as well.
The language of the 1947 Act does not specifically address this
possibility. The 1947 Act states, “If . . . there is neither a President nor
Vice President to discharge the powers and duties of the office of President,
then the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall, upon his resignation
as Speaker and as Representative in Congress, act as President.”629 The
625. Departmental lines of succession vary from one department to the next, both in depth
and in order. First, the number of individuals eligible to become an acting secretary varies
by department. Second, the order of succession within the departments is established
through various means, including an enumerated list, the order in which an individual was
appointed to office, the order in which an individual took his oath of office, or a combination
of these three systems. Having various methods to determine who becomes an acting
secretary may not typically pose problems. However, in a time of national catastrophe,
relying on multiple systems to determine who becomes an acting secretary might lead to
confusion. This is especially so when a combination of these three systems is used within
the same department. For example, the Department of State first lists officers to become
acting secretary in the order they are listed, but after succession has passed through these
officers, it runs through another list of officers, but this time according to the order in which
they have taken the oath of office. See supra notes 619–21 and accompanying text.
626. The Speaker pro tempore is an individual who is named to “act as Speaker pro
tempore.” RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 112th Cong., R. I(8). The Acting
President pro tempore may include the Secretary of the Senate, the Assistant Secretary of the
Senate, or a Senator appointed by the President pro tempore. Each of these individuals can
perform the “duties of the Chair” according to RULES OF THE SENATE, 112th Cong., R. I(2)–
(3). Apart from the lack of statutory basis for inclusion of the Speaker pro tempore and the
Acting President pro tempore in the line of succession, public policy considerations also
militate strongly against their inclusion. Many legislators can take these temporary
positions—as many as the legislators themselves decide—and they might be persuaded to do
so in order to allow a Speaker or President pro tempore to avoid having to resign his position
and thereby shield himself from having to serve only briefly as Acting President in the case
of a temporary presidential inability. The Clinic does not believe that such contingent
legislative leaders are in the line of succession or should be for the policy reasons outlined
above.
627. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 112th Cong., R. I(8).
628. RULES OF THE SENATE, 112th Cong., R. I(2)–(3).
629. Presidential Succession Act of 1947, 3 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1) (2006).
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1947 Act also states, “If . . . there is no Speaker, or the Speaker fails to
qualify as Acting President, then the President pro tempore of the Senate
shall, upon his resignation as President pro tempore and as Senator, act as
President.”630
Bills recently introduced by Congressman Sherman have explicitly stated
that the Speaker of the House pro tempore is not included in the line of
succession.631 As this is the only indication that any authority has
considered that the Speaker pro tempore might be in the line of succession,
the Clinic finds no indication that the Speaker pro tempore or the Acting
President pro tempore is, or was ever, intended to be in the line of
succession in any of the Succession Acts. Additionally, the Clinic would
not support their inclusion on policy grounds.

630. Id. § 19(b).
631. H.R. 6557, 111th Cong. (2010); H.R. 2749, 108th Cong. (2003).
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